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INTRODUCTION 
 
We are with banks today to what we were, let’s say, with traditional books at the end of 
2000’s first decade: Financial Services industry, as happened in many sectors, is already been 
and it is going  even more to be transformed by digitalization and Fintech companies are 
experiencing what can be defined as their “e-book moment”; that is a critical point in which 
customers becoming conscious of and eager to adopt alternative technological solutions are 
significant (Mead, 2016). 
Complexity, interconnection and technology are some factors driving the change in 
financial services and enabling Fintech companies to gain consumers’ appreciation and attract 
investors’ attention; while major traditional banks often suffer post-crisis vulnerability, lack 
of trust and damaged brand equity. 
Banks’ traditional business models and bureaucratic structures do not suffice anymore, 
new patterns of partnerships are emerging and new skills are required for banks to be 
developed, in order to successfully serve customers in a way that can adequately fit with their 
new habits and needs, paving the path for future prosperity. 
In order to present the Fintech “Revolution” and to state the opportunities it brings in 
for banks, we first present an overview on the banking industry’s current situation; in the first 
chapter we will discuss the most relevant changes which have characterized this industry, in 
the decade after the global financial crisis, and the trends which will reshape it in the coming 
years. In the following chapter, we will present in-depth the Fintech ecosystem; from the 
drivers which caused to a vast range of new participants to jump within Financial Services to 
the characteristics of their innovative business models. 
The analysis of the Fintech universe will lead us to understand what banks are facing 
today, who their new rivals are and how much digital disruption can impact traditional 
businesses; in particular, it will give us reasons to claim banks need to change, innovate and 
try to succeed in a world of huge technological possibilities and in this revolutionary era. 
Moving from the underlying idea of such need for banks to approach change and 
integrate technology into their business, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate how 
players in banking sector will translate this into reality; whether developing innovation in-
house or buying it in the market, exploring, in the third chapter, the pros and the cons of these 
alternatives and how they are implemented in banks. 
Furthermore, the thesis will list the possible partnering alternatives for banks to 
implement the change, i.e. strategic partnerships, equity alliances or Mergers and 
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Acquisitions, with the aim of analyzing the different facets that could characterize banking 
industry re-shaping in the next future and all the various possible degrees of co-opetition 
between banks and Fintech companies. As a matter of fact, according to a recent global report 
on Fintech, 82%, on average, of incumbent financial institutions surveyed expect to increase 
partnerships with Fintech companies over the next three to five years (PWC, 2017), with a 
shift from competition towards collaboration. 
The above mentioned emerging partnering relationships will be better explained 
through the use of examples, by mentioning a list of benchmark initiatives already in place in 
the banking industry. Finally, in the last chapter, with the use of a case study analysis on an 
international bank, BBVA Group, we will gain further insights on the opportunities banks can 
seize in their new challenging environment and we will use the case to further understand the 
reviewed literature. 
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CHAPTER 1 - OVERVIEW BANKING INDUSTRY: ECONOMIC AND 
COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE 
 
The aim of the chapter is to present an overview of the banking industry, as it appears today, 
some years after the crucial event of financial crisis of 2007-08, and in light of the subsequent 
regulatory and strategic changes put in place in the sector. 
Furthermore, we want to recall what have been the business models of banks over the 
past years, which contributed to shape the common idea of traditional banks mainly as large 
companies and bureaucratic organizations. 
These premises, together with a snapshot of the underbanked subjects’ situation, serve 
the purpose of stating what is happened in the banking industry so far, in order to move to 
what is going to happen in coming years, thus presenting the most relevant trends towards 
which banks are heading. 
 
1.1. Global financial crisis effects on current economic scenario 
 
International economy has been strongly suffering after financial crisis burst just a decade 
ago, with liquidity troubles spreading quickly among subprime lenders and causing many of 
them to go bankruptcy, thus rendering agents in the systems worried about such spread 
poorly-backed assets and leading them to put in place bank runs. 
The subprime crisis, which came after a period of optimistic ease in credit access also 
fueled by low-guarantees borrowers’ desire to follow their “American dream”, infected 
banking system, where bankers had originated a secondary market for subprime loans (mainly 
through CDOs); this forced governments and central banks to intervene with liquidity 
injections to rescue their banking systems and to put in place different bail-out measures. 
The day after such crisis the world woke up in a situation in which economy proved to 
be very fragile, with interconnection among countries rendering contagion easier and with 
structural weaknesses that make liquidity problems easily convertible in solvency crisis. 
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1.1.1. Banking: after-crisis state of the system 
 
Financial crisis and the credit boom which preceded it had substantial effects on the banking 
system, which has been facing thereafter stricter regulations, higher requirements, stress tests 
to keep track of financial stability; also, banks have been acting in an environment of lower 
growth and lower interest rates, while being required to put in place deleveraging measures. 
The underlying idea of constructing such a new environment, which challenged banks’ 
business models and margins, was that of having safer banks, able to face possible negative 
scenarios without neither the need to be saved by huge injections nor the risk to damage 
others in the system. 
As a result, in addition to the required higher capitalization, the major trends that 
characterized the response by banks to post-crisis adjustments were: a change in their funding 
mix, which relied much more on retail funding by customer deposits rather than on unsecured 
short-term wholesale funding, and also a downsizing or exiting from riskier activities, which 
had caused litigations for banks in the past (Bank for International Settlements, 2017). 
So, in order to reduce their riskiness, and making a u-turn with respect to the past myth 
of diversification, many banks reduced their branches number and their scope, either 
geographical or in terms of business range, trying to allocate resources on core competencies 
and seeking ways for cost-saving. 
By the way, other changes affected organizations within the industry, see, for example, 
how the financial sector reputation has been impaired by the financial crisis, indeed some 
signs of skepticism by investors are still present; this possibly contributed to another 
drawback of after-crisis era for banks: they lost many young people esteem, their willingness 
to work within banks possibly decreased and a serious gap between millennials generation 
and banks was created and left to fill in (The Economist, 2017). 
All the post-crisis concerns, in particular the larger equity base banks were required to 
have and the reduced profitability, contributed to banks’ lower ROEs with respect to pre-crisis 
level (see figure below). 
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Despite the financial crisis spread its effects on banks worldwide, the situation of Euro 
area banks has been and still is more dramatic with respect to American ones, which 
outperform European rivals, especially in investment banking, and which better dealt with the 
problem of non-performing loans; other geographic areas, instead, see their banks return more 
on equity to shareholders with respect of both (The Economist, 2017). 
The different recovery paths of Europe’s and America’s banks respectively were partly 
determined by the different bail-out measures put in place in each area: in particular, while 
American banks were kind of “forced” to receive injections as soon as the crisis erupted via 
the TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Programme), the recapitalization of European banks has 
been slower and intermittent, with delays in interventions caused by single countries’ urgent 
aim of protecting their own major businesses first and with the emerging evidence of a still 
incomplete banking union; furthermore, we shall also bear in mind the differences lying in the 
whole economic system recovery, which was faster in the US (The Economist, 2017). 
Fig. 1 -Median bank return on equity in major advanced economic regions 
Source: European Central Bank 
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In addition to the strong tie with the post-crisis macro-economic conditions and together 
with the different bail-out measures put in place in banks’ favor, there is evidence of other 
factors’ influence on the sector lower performances: first of all, slower revenue growth. If we 
have a look at revenues’ level track by year (see figure below), we can gain a significant 
insight: despite an appealing uptrend, the growth is slowing: while it was about 6% per annum 
from 2010 till 2015, the rate dropped at a dramatic 3% between 2015 and 2016 (Dietz, 
Lemerle, Mehta, Sengupta, Zhou, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The threats posed on banks’ profitability come with the rise of new competitors in the 
industry, namely non-bank players; in order to weigh how strong their pressure is on global 
banks’ performances, McKinsey presented a breakdown of revenue and profits by activities 
(see figure below); in the end, the latter highlights that is just the most profitable area of 
Fig.2 – Global banking revenue growth slowed to 3 percent in 2016 
Source: McKinsey & Company 
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banks, the one they call the “distribution” side, the one at higher risk (Dietz, Lemerle, Mehta, 
Sengupta, Zhou, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, what seems to emerge by the above considerations is that the impact of 
financial crisis on banking system was huge at first; by the way players within the system, 
either compelled by new regulatory requirements, either seeking new profitability recipes and 
shareholders’ approval, have put in place many organizational adjustments; this took them on 
the way towards calmer water, but still much is to be done to reconfigure banks’ business 
models, especially in light of potential threats posed by outsider innovators and by the 
changing demand of customers. 
  
Fig. 3 – Nonbank attackers are focusing on origination and sales, 
accounting for 65 percent of proft and delivering 20 percent ROE 
Source: McKinsey & Company 
8 
 
1.1.2. Financial institutions’ regulatory landscape: post-crisis main measures in EU and 
US 
 
Since it can be considered the most evident consequence of financial crisis on banking 
system, the regulatory aspect is worth a more in depth analysis. Stress tests turned from being 
internally to externally run at banks; just to have a rough idea of the size such change had in 
organizational terms for industry players, we can rely on what the CFO of an international 
bank said, with reference to the number of data collected to perform the test, when this was 
internally done and when it became out of the banks’ competence respectively: in the first 
case, the data collected amounted at a few thousands, but they rose to hundreds of thousands 
in the latter circumstance (The Economist, 2017). 
The major representative and significant regulations that financial institutions had to 
cope with can be considered the followings. 
- Basel Committee1 for Banking supervision on capital  adequacy: Basel I, Basel II and 
Basel III Accords 
Basel I: the Basel Capital Accord, was born from the increasing importance that 
capital adequacy was coming to have within the field of banking supervision; the first 
document was published in 1988, with the aim to see banks achieving the minimum 
                                                          
1
 Basel Committee was founded in 1974 by institutions from the G10 countries with the aim to cooperate on 
banking supervision and financial stability and to guarantee consistency among members jurisdictions’ 
provisions. Today the Committee includes 45 institutions from 28 countries and still serve the above purpose of 
norming financial stability and banking supervision; its role became crucial and its after-crisis provisions are 
well-known in the banking industry worldwide; by the way, before issuing Basel I, II and III on capital 
adequacy, the Committee had presented other works, as: 
- the “Concordat”, a paper issued in 1975 and revised in 1983, when it was replaced by “Principles for the 
supervision of banks' foreign establishments”; 
- “Exchanges of information between supervisors of participants in the financial markets” was a supplement of 
1983 report and it was published in 1990, its aim was to improve prudential information flow between banks and 
their supervisors; 
- “Minimum standards for the supervision of international banking groups and their cross-border establishments” 
came out in 1992, stating what G10 countries’ supervisors expected from each other to respect; 
- “The supervision of cross-border banking”, a 1996 report, which was formed by the Committee with the 
collaboration of institutions from non G10 countries and which was then applied by 140 countries;   
-“Core principles for effective banking supervision” whose first publication was in 1997, while the most recent 
revision goes back to 2012, the first version contained 25 principles which now amount to 29; the topic areas 
covered are “supervisory powers, responsibilities and functions”, about which principles highlight what it is 
expected from an effective supervision system and the importance of a precise and on-time intervention, and 
“prudential regulations and requirements” in which we find principles related to banks’ effective corporate 
governance, risk management and compliance mechanisms the Committee expects banks to implement. (See: 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm)  
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target Total Ratio of Capital (tier1 and tier2) to risk-weighted assets
2
 of 8% within the 
year 1992 and it was ultimately enforced by almost all countries with internationally 
active banks (even if not members of Basel Committee). 
Basel II: the new Capital Framework, came to replace Basel I Accord in 2004 and in 
2006, due to integrations and reviews, in its final comprehensive version, to be 
enforced within year 2007. The Accord sets three pillars on: minimum capital 
requirements, supervisory review process and market discipline respectively. 
According to the first pillar, the Total Capital (tier1 and tier2) Ratio must stay above 
or at the threshold of 8%; the accord requires capital charge to cover credit, 
operational and market risk
3
. Basel II introduces the concept of operational risk in 
order to move toward a more effective supervision, this implies that the capital 
requirements are meant to cover also this aspect of riskiness, which concerns to the 
adequacy of the banks’ internal processes, people and systems. This then-introduced 
concept of operational risk fits well with the whole ratio underlying Basel II, that is 
                                                          
2
 Basel I Accord contains definitions of both capital and risk weights on which adequacy controls should be run. 
Capital, within the document definition, is divided in two-tiers, where tier 1 includes “core capital” (equity 
capital and disclosed reserves) and tier 2 the “supplementary capital” (undisclosed reserves, revaluation 
reserves, general provisions/general loan-loss reserves, hybrid debt capital instruments, subordinated term debt, 
deductions from capital). According to Basel I, banks capital base is required to be at least for 50% constituted 
of tier1 capital, and, based on particular conditions stated in the document, capital elements different from tier1 
ones are admitted to be included in tier2, which forms the remaining capital base (Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 1988). 
As regards the weights of  the assets, the document sets 5 weights (0, 10, 20, 50 and 100%) that are applied to 
banks’ assets according to their riskiness (intended as their embedded credit risk): in particular, the higher the 
weight the riskier the asset, for example, 0% weight is assigned to cash or claims on OECD central governments 
or central banks, 50% weight is assigned to residential mortgages and 100% weight is given to claims on private 
sector, or real estate (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988).  
 
3
 Definition of Tier1 capital under Basel II accord stays almost put to the one stated in Basel I, then the accord 
states the definition of Tier2 and the conditions under which capital elements different from core ones can be 
included into supplementary capital, admitting it to be present in banks until a limit of 100% of Tier1. 
Furthermore, in Basel II we see the definition of Tier3 of capital: this class of capital is determined by short-term 
subordinated debt and can be used, under certain provisions, to face market risk only (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2006). 
As reported in the document, “Total risk-weighted assets are determined by multiplying the capital requirements 
for market risk and operational risk by 12.5 (i.e. the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 8%) and adding 
the resulting figures to the sum of risk-weighted assets for credit risk.” (BCBS, 2006; p.12) 
In Basel II accord, the assessment of credit risk to calculate assets’ weights is determined relying on credit rating 
procedures, either internal ones (IRB method, for banks authorized by supervisor approval) either standardized 
external ones (in this case, rating entities must be the ones certified by supervisors); the weights vary according 
to the procedures used, but, in any case, the higher the rating, the lower the weight of the underlying asset. The 
document allows banks which use standardized approach of credit rating to mitigate the risk of the asset, if some 
conditions are met (in particular concerning the existence of collaterals) (BCBS, 2006). 
As regards operational risk, Basel II gives banks three methods for measuring it and subsequently calculate the 
capital charge required: “(i) the Basic Indicator Approach; (ii) the Standardised Approach; and Advanced 
Measurement Approaches (AMA)” (BCBS, 2006; p.144). These are increasingly sophisticated and this is the 
reason why the Accord encourages banks to shift towards the last one, as they improve their risk management 
system functioning. 
Finally, market risk according to Basel II provisions can be measured either through standardised or internal 
methodologies (BCBS, 2006). 
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the one of enriching supervision activity, by rendering it not only an ex-post control of 
requirements’ application by banks, rather a wider system of procedures and 
provisions that, while giving banks more tools to manage risk, allows supervisors to 
better judge banks’ risk management systems’ efficacy and also let banks, whose 
assets are safer, to meet softer requirements. 
Following the same reasoning, the document presents pillar two, which highlights the 
importance of supervision not only with reference to capital adequacy control but also 
in terms of supporting banks in improving their risk management systems and 
monitoring risk aspects, which are not fully manageable by capital charge threshold 
set in pillar one. By the way, the second pillar also recognizes the relevant 
supervisors’ role to monitor requirements’ application, especially in light of first pillar 
introduction of vary and articulated methods to assess risk. 
The supervisory pillar reminds that capital requirements are not the only key to ensure 
stability and to limit risk, whose management passes through a series of internal 
processes to be constantly reviewed and improved, and which has many other facets 
from credit, operational and market ones. Also, since the capital charge set in pillar 
one represents the minimum safety threshold, supervisors are asked to encourage 
banks operating above such minimum target and, if the threshold is falling from being 
respected, their intervention is recommended to come at very early stage. 
Finally, pillar three completes Basel II Accord; the disclosure required to banks is 
needed just in light of higher complexity and greater discretion set in pillar one: to 
effectively respect the framework, banks are required to spread some information 
(either qualitative and quantitative), also in order to receive supervisors’ approval to 
adopt a specific methodology (e.g. IRB). 
Basel III came out as a result of the ongoing process of Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision to enhance financial stability; in particular, just after Basel II was 
enforced, the financial landscape started showing its weaknesses through liquidity 
crisis and excessive ease in credit growth; in order to face this situation, whose main 
evidence to the public came with Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, the 
regulatory body shifted towards so-called Basel III Accord. The new reform package 
should serve the scope to incorporate in regulations the lesson learnt from financial 
crisis, recognizing the centrality of banks within economic systems as they are crucial 
for real economy growth and daily business operations. 
As the issued documents clarify, Basel III field of action is either micro-prudential, in 
its aim to increase bank-level resilience and risk management, either macro-prudential, 
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approaching the system-wide shocks and weaknesses and providing ways to contrast 
them. 
A first step towards Basel III was the issuance of “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision” just in September 2008, which introduced the focus on 
the importance of liquidity within banks and which encouraged banks’ stress tests to 
consider more dangerous scenarios and to seriously take into account the ease of 
contagion of liquidity crisis at whole system level. 
The reform completion continued: “Basel III: International framework for liquidity 
risk measurement, standards and monitoring” and “Basel III: A global regulatory 
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems” were published in 2010, 
then the latter was reviewed in 2011; in 2013, the Committee issued “Basel III: The 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools” and, in 2014, the 
package was completed with  “Basel III: the net stable funding ratio” issuance. 
Basel III recalls and stresses the already established pillars of Basel II
4
, also it 
introduces some innovations; in particular: 
- Capital conservation buffer, equal to 2,5% of CET1, a threshold that, once 
breached, triggers constraints on banks’ discretionary distributions; 
- Countercyclical capital buffer, it is an additional measure that wants to 
safeguard banks from the adverse conditions of macro-financial environment 
in which they find themselves, this provision takes the form of an intermittent 
buffer (whose amount varies from 0 to 2,5% of RWA) that national authorities 
will ask banks to enforce whenever they assess credit is growing to an 
excessive dangerous level for the system; 
- Leverage ratio, with the objectives of controlling debt levels in banks and 
avoiding subsequent deleveraging measures, it is a percentage ratio between 
CET1 and Exposure Measures, it should have been kept at minimum 3% (till 
January 2017); 
- Liquidity requirements: Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Fund 
Ratio (NSFR), which focus on a short and long time horizon respectively, as 
                                                          
4
 Basel II introduced Tier 3 of Capital, which could eventually serve to cover market risk; but, following the 
wish to enrich capital qualitative and quantitative base, such capital layer is eliminated by Basel III. Also, in light 
of financial crisis, much more disclosure and risk coverage measures are imposed to banks with reference to 
trading book and securitisations (BCBS, 2011). 
The third accord also increases the focus on common equity, as Common Equity Tier 1 CET1 is raised to 4,5% 
of risk-weighted assets; Tier1 capital (CET1 plus Additional Tier1) must be 6% of risk-weighted assets and 
Total Capital (Tier1 and Tier2) should amount to a minimum 8% of risk-weighted assets (BCBS, 2011). 
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LCR should grant a bank’s survival to a stress scenario5 lasting one month, 
while NSFR should improve banks’ funding over the long run6; 
- Further requirements for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), the 
aim is to have systemically important banks provided with higher loss 
absorbency capacity. 
 
- Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, was issued in US in 
2010, by Obama administration; the very articulated reform came after financial crisis 
in order to impose to so-called “too big to fail” companies greater stability, to prevent 
the need of further intervention by central entities and to strengthen requirements and 
control on banks. 
The Act focuses mainly on: 
- financial stability and oversight agencies, the act introduced Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), within Federal Reserve, and the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, the latter has significant roles as monitoring 
threats for financial stability, signaling any source of risk, proposing new 
regulations; the Council also looks at firms different from banks, to assess the 
financial industry state; 
- securities and derivatives, in terms of higher risk retention, disclosure, 
representation and warranties; 
- credit rating, this area was impacted as the Act created an Office at Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), which has the role of overseeing credit 
rating agencies and kind of coordinating their work;  
- Volcker Rule, has the objective of posing some constraints on permitted banks’ 
speculative activities (like fund activities), as a result of the belief that past 
trading, with huge usage of deposits, contributed to global financial crisis. 
                                                          
5
 As reported in Basel III document, the LCR stress scenario, which is developed from the lesson of financial 
crisis erupted in 2007, “entails a significant stress, albeit not a worst-case scenario, and assumes the following:  
- a significant downgrade of the institution’s public credit rating; 
- a partial loss of deposits; 
- a loss of unsecured wholesale funding; 
- a significant increase in secured funding haircuts; 
- increases in derivative collateral calls and substantial calls on contractual and noncontractual off-
balance sheet exposures, including committed credit and liquidity facilities.” (BCBS, 2011; p.9) 
The LCR is calculated as a ratio between High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) and Total Net Cash Outflows 
(over the next 30 calendar days). Under Basel III, such ratio should be at a minimum of 100% (by 2019), 
excluding periods of financial distress. 
 
6
 NSFR is defined as the ratio between Available amount of Stable Funding (ASF) and Required amount of 
Stable Funding (RSF) and it is required not to be under the threshold of 100%. 
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The Act has been targeted by significant opposition, since many argue that it 
excessively overhauled regulations on banks and it ended up putting a huge burden of 
requirements and limits on them, sometimes missing the core objective of reducing 
risk. 
By the way the debate is still on, it was also addressed by Mr. Trump, who promised 
to reform Dodd-Frank Act; in the US the topic is of crucial importance and even some 
different proposals came out, as the CHOICE (Creating Hope and Opportunity for 
Investors, Consumers and Entrepreneurs), by the chairman of House of Financial 
Services Committee (The Economist, 2017). The latter, which according to many will 
fail becoming law, would let banks, who deliberately choose to increase their equity 
base and to become less risky, to be subject to softer requirements with respect to 
those provided by the Act. 
 
1.1.3. People perception: a collapse in trust 
 
Financial crisis also triggered a real collapse in trust with very dramatic consequences on real 
economy: in its recent global study on trust, Edelman company found that 2017 is the peak of 
such “trust crisis” with subsequent shrinking confidence and hope in the system and 
increasing opposition to innovation and globalization; this problematic scenario, where 
combined with high levels of societal fears, has also brought to the top populist movements 
and actions, which in turn create uncertainty (Edelman R., 2017). 
In particular, Edelman’s trust index measures people’s average trust in institutions, 
being them governments, businesses, media and NGOs: 2017 results show that global average 
trust declined with respect to 2016, but also that mass population does not trust institutions do 
what is right in about two-third of the surveyed countries, while distrusters represent a much 
lower percentage among informed public only, with such trust inequality gap growing. As 
regards the types of institutions towards which trust is lowest and under the threshold of 50%, 
Edelman found them in government (damaged by past scandals and solvency failures) and 
media; businesses have instead a great potential to lead the change, as still finding themselves 
at sort of a trust borderline (Edelman, 2017a). 
Also, looking at trust index to business institutions, Edelman breakdown by sectors 
found that financial services one has witnessed an uptrend form 2012 to 2017 and it has also 
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registered a lower gap in 2017 trust inequality between informed public and general 
population (Edelman, 2017b) and, with respect to trust index to technology sector, it is 
globally far above the mid threshold in percent, being at 76%, and, at varying levels, this 
holds true for all but one of the surveyed countries (Edelman, 2017c). 
Albeit these data can be discouraging and can give us a clear picture of today’s visible 
distrust, they open a window on technology as trust instrument with high potential and also 
call businesses, especially financial services, to action in order to rise people confidence and 
to improve the system standing. 
 
1.2. Relevant trends in the banking sector 
 
Traditional business models and the dominant organizational culture of banks have been 
challenged by the after-crisis’ environment described above, but also due to the higher 
competitiveness that characterizes today’s world in general: companies are needed to shift 
towards consumer-centric business models, organizational speed and more fluid cultures. 
With a faster and even accelerating pace of change and with increasing customers’ 
awareness, traditional industries’ boundaries are blurring, some well-known strategic tools are 
becoming short-sighted and inadequate, as they are often unable to give businesses an ex-ante 
focus on what is going to happen, we indeed live in so-called times of “hyper-competition” 
(D'aveni, 2010), where dynamism, rapid technological novelties arrival, change of traditional 
incumbents and unexpected identity of new entrants in the market are a fact. 
We are witnessing to what can be thought to as “the end of competitive advantage”, 
meaning firms can no longer rely on a single unique distinctive advantage, struggling to 
exploit it no matter what, rather they should continuously develop a bundle of transient 
advantages and be ready to change, reallocate resources, disengage and adapt; also, firms 
cannot consider innovation and strategy as separate activities, rather they are meant to be 
thought as strongly interrelated and innovation should become an ordinary task, 
systematically carried on within the organization, and, again, the areas of business intelligence 
interest should be broadened, moving from the mere concept of industry to the enriched one 
of “competitive arenas” (McGrath, 2013). 
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Banking system has experienced all of these conditions and disruption is guiding the 
industry towards evolution; while acting on stability is strongly required to banks and surely 
represents a priority, companies are re-shaping some established archetypes searching for less 
rigidity and trying to navigate the change. 
Based on practitioners’ effective snapshot on the point (Capgemini, 2017), we list and 
further examine what they see as the ten most relevant emerging trends in the sector in 2017. 
 Increasing collaboration with technological firms, known as Fintech: rather than 
seeing them either as competitors to defeat either as temporary negligible 
players trying to address banks’ customers, many companies in banking industry 
are recognizing the potential of these outsider disruptors and they are often 
trying to seize the opportunities underlying collaboration. 
 Shifting towards open business models: the literature had often detailed the 
advantages of having “open business models”, through which innovation flows 
in and out of the company in search for its best owner, before going to the 
market (Chesbrough, H. W., 2007); in banking, the adoption of open APIs
7
 
would represent a way to customize products in a faster way and a possibility for 
third parties to help bank applications’ innovation, providing customers with the 
ease of use and the user experience they can have in other aspects of their lives 
and that they are expecting to receive from financial services too. 
 BaaP, aka Banking as a Platform: “sharing economy” representatives’ 
successful business models are often mentioned to highlight how, in such cases, 
the best in class of some industries neither own the most used resource within it  
nor they directly provide the product that customers buy from them; this means, 
for example, that Uber, being the largest taxi company worldwide, does not 
possess cars or, again, that AirBnb does not own any accommodation building, 
and so on. In our opinion, the likely reason underlying this is that these players 
act being what literature refers to as “strategic center” within their industry 
(Lorenzoni, G., & Baden-Fuller, C., 1995) thus impacting innovation by 
orchestrating a network of strategically different partners for whom they create a 
common vision and effective strategy and to whom they offer a strong brand, 
acting as a platform: the same is somehow expected to happen in banking, once 
                                                          
7
 With the term API that stands for Application Programming Interface, we mean a set of commands and 
controls that allow two software or application to communicate, to be integrated. 
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incumbents focus on core competencies and develop an eco-system with various 
Fintech enterprises linked to them. 
 Reinforcing security systems: this is going to happen as technology and the more 
digital environment render the cause of security breaches really tough and also 
add to traditional security aspects banks have to manage the one of cyber-
security; in order to protect them against hackers and trying not to lose money 
and the already difficult-to-conquer consumers’ trust; protecting against cyber-
crime will surely become a priority in the sector, which is investing at a growing 
rate on it. 
 Adoption of public cloud-services: this represents a novelty in the industry, as 
banks traditionally used to have their own data center, but they are now trying to 
downsizing them, as this should provide them higher flexibility and since 
providers of public cloud services are trying to prioritize the importance of 
security; the scope of the trend by the way is still small as banks are mainly 
doing preemptive attempts before shifting completely to public cloud. 
 Testing Augmented Reality: mainly as a way to enrich the customer experience, 
to offer one better suitable for millennials, who are getting used to such 
technology or are seeing experiments with it in different fields of their daily life; 
the possible applications in banking go from virtual advisors and branches 
creation to the display of location-based information to customers.  
 Experiments in Distributed Ledger Technology: deriving the concept from 
block-chain, banks are attempting, either alone or with some peers, to develop 
systems that could be beneficial in terms of security, as such technology would 
imply to make a simultaneous multiple attack to all of the updated copies of 
tracks in the system to be damaged, which is very improbable, also the 
technology could be good for banks in terms of efficiency, with a less costly and 
decentralized control of what is happening in the system.  
 Reliance on Artificial Intelligence: as it has enriched the possible data analysis 
processes that businesses can put in place, also machines are becoming able to 
learn and improve constantly such process, with resulting better customization 
possibilities and quicker effective responsiveness for clients to be offered by 
banks. 
 Robotics Process Automation investments: prompted by the need banks have to 
improve internal efficiency, by the accuracy which they are required to put in 
control procedures and also by the increasing accessibility customers require 
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often looking for 24hours availability; RPA can indeed act on cost savings, can 
absorb repetitive and highly meticulous tasks from human labor and leave room 
for human staff to perform more value-adding activities. 
 Possible use of biometric: in particular helping enhancing security, as either 
biological or behavioral traits can be used as authentication methods and can 
prevent customers from identity frauds. 
These brief description of what is emerging in banking industry can give us an idea of 
how the bank of the not-so-far future should be; with technology enabling great 
transformation throughout the aspects of our lives, we see a great potential change happening 
in banking industry too; this holds true, in particular, for those players who find themselves 
ready to welcome and even anticipate it, while not for those who struggle to stay anchored to 
the past and refuse to face an ever-changing reality.  
 
1.3. Underbanked subjects 
 
Despite what we could imagine seeing banks’ and financial institutions’ huge importance 
within economic systems and their high level of globalization, the population of those who 
have no access to banks account nor to other products from official financial providers is very 
large: finance is not democratically distributed yet and those who are not or not completely 
included in financial services are called “unbanked” or “underbanked”. 
It is not just a matter of incomplete geographical coverage by banks, even if many 
unbanked find themselves in Asia or African regions (see figure below): it is also a matter of 
kind of “discrimination” by financial institutions. 
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According to the G20 the number of people excluded from financial services amounts to 
2 billion, while the one of businesses stays to 200 million (GPFI, 2017). 
The World Bank Group last Global Findex database (2015), which collects data on 
financial inclusion over time and across countries, found that there is also a gender gap in 
terms of financial inclusion, such gap stayed put from the first year of data collection, 2011 
(notwithstanding an overall improvement of financial inclusion) and it sees the percentage of 
men having an account equal to 59%, versus the one of women at a lower level of 50%. 
The Findex Database also tried to survey respondents in order to assess why the 
unbanked find themselves in state of financial exclusion, the barriers cited (reported in figure 
below) are many; the most reported one is that people do not have enough money to use an 
account, the second is instead they do not need it; but, as the report highlights, while the first 
reason was cited as the only one in many cases, the latter was not. This could suggest, and the 
same holds true even for the third most cited reason, that if other impediments were absent, it 
would not be so common for many people to give up on having a saving account just because 
a family member already has one or  because they do not feel the need for it; somehow, the 
need for inclusion is less perceived just because other factors are present, for example cost 
barriers (World Bank Group, 2015). 
Fig. 4 –The world’s unbanked adults by region 
Source:Global Findex Database 
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The most reported reason, according to Global Findex, for not having an account at a 
financial institution, is, as seen, lacking enough money to do it; this response saw quite a 
similar percentage of answers across countries, while for the lower frequent responses there 
were much more differences at a country level: for example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
second most common reason has been identified in distance from the institution, while this 
was lower ranked in other geographical areas. 
Other considerations can emerge from the above reported barriers to inclusion, for 
example, the evidence of a lack of trust on which banks should act, or the need that customers 
are showing to have financial products compatible with their needs and lifestyle, see, for 
example, religious barriers to as-are financial services. 
As regards the concept of trust, this recalls the problem that many countries experience 
in term of demand factors causing incomplete financial inclusion: many clients, whenever 
they had the possibility to use bank services, would have a negative sentiment in doing it and 
they feel to be discriminated or even frustrated by their countries’ banking services; on this 
point, Meré (2016) reported some young customers’ very impressive quotes, as “Going to a 
branch is like going to a hospital[…]” or “My ideal bank would be one where there are no 
preferred clients.” 
Fig. 5 – Self-reported barriers to use of an account at a financial institution 
Source: Global Findex Database 
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Furthermore, trying to better illustrate these concepts of exclusion using the case of 
Mexico, Meré (2016) reported that, despite the banking system of this populous country 
appears solid and banks having a franchise in Mexico find it very profitable, still credit to 
private sector as GDP percentage is low (18%) and large share of the adult population (60%) 
lacks an account at a formal institution. By the way, the mobile penetration in Mexico is high 
(87%) and such country is largely “connected”, being world’s “5th in Facebook users, 7th in 
Twitter users, and 5
th
 in Spotify users” (Meré, 2016). 
All these data and examples can trigger a pivotal discussion on the potentiality to serve 
all the unbanked subjects; financial inclusion is not only a need for governments and central 
authorities to fight poverty and to have safer and richer economic systems, but also a huge 
opportunity for financial institutions; the focus by the way should be either on expanding the 
number of “banked”, which is just roughly measured by the number of banks accounts, either 
on improving and increasing the use of such accounts, and, in general, of institutional 
financial services. 
In a nutshell, the unbanked and underbanked can represent a significant number of non-
customers to analyze and address; this especially thanks to mobile phones penetration and 
enabling technologies, as it has partially been done by Fintech companies; they are currently 
exploiting the underlying potential; this is also given by the fact that financial technology 
companies are indeed provided with outstanding digital know-how and agile structures and 
that they are not constrained by burdensome regulations. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE RISE OF FINTECH AND AGILE REVOLUTION OF 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 
 
In this chapter we will go through the Fintech phenomenon, defining what financial 
technologies are and what services they are able to offer, describing the background and the 
factors that took to the rise of this revolution in the financial services and also listing all the 
types of companies which fall under such definition. 
Also, we want to focus on the importance that big technological players, which were not 
born as Fintech, are acquiring in providing financial services; this is indeed a new 
phenomenon currently in place and it clearly highlights how important some new capabilities 
and resources are becoming, allowing non-conventional players to jump in established 
industries and to disrupt them. 
The objective of hereby define the state of the art of Fintech will be achieved by 
presenting who these companies target, the level of diffusion they reached, where this 
phenomenon is bursting and how much it has been able to catalyze investors’ attention; 
finally, we want to report the main regulatory aspects which shape the field of action for 
financial technologies. 
 
2.1. Financial technologies: blurring the boundaries of financial services industry 
 
“Technology is anything that wasn’t around when you were born.” - Alan Curtis Kay 
(Pioneering Computer Scientist) 
The above sentence is a clear and emblematic definition of technology, something that 
profoundly changed people lives in recent years and which is acquiring a huge role in shaping  
the future. The consequences of technological progress are impressive and simply amazing in 
terms of pace at which they occur and unfold their potential. 
Such pace of the change in technological progress and the scope of its interaction with 
people lives, together with the systemic impact that changes enabled by technology are having 
across many industries give reasons to claim we are at the edge of a Fourth Industrial 
Revolution (Schwab, 2016). According to WEF Founder and Executive Chairman, the Fourth 
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Industrial Revolution, which comes after the first one of steam power, the second one of 
electric power and the third one of Information Technology, “is characterized by a fusion of 
technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres” 
(Schwab, 2016). 
According to Schwab (2016), with these preconditions in place, we are witnessing to the 
disruption of many industries; the impacts of the new industrial revolution are either on the 
demand and on the supply side: in the first case, we refer, for example, to the ease or pleasure 
customers now experience in performing some tasks, as booking a flight from home at one’s 
own comfort; in the latter, we mean instead the potential on industry value chains, which can 
become more efficient, transparent, agile, thus serving existing needs in new ways. 
Given the above, when this apply to financial services, the Fintech phenomenon 
happens; even if we miss a unique definition for it, we can rely on what the governor of Bank 
of England refers to as the FSB definition of Fintech, that is “technologically-enabled 
financial innovation that could result in new business models, applications, processes or 
products with an associated material effect on financial markets and institutions and the 
provision of financial services” (FSB in Carney, 2017). 
 
2.1.1. The main drivers of Fintech revolution 
 
The interest towards this radical change in financial services has been growing recently, as the 
figures below
8
 can somehow summarize: if we have a look at Google trends data on online 
searching for the term “Fintech” worldwide over the period 2004-2017, we can easily see a 
soaring interest registered by the search engine, with present being the peak of such interest; 
while a completely different dynamic is reported for the well-known term “bank”, whose 
trend over time appears quite put. 
                                                          
8
 In the graphics from Google Trend: “The numbers represent the search interest in relation to the highest point 
of the chart in relation to the region and the period indicated. The value 100 indicates the highest search 
frequency of the term, 50 indicates half of the searches, while 0 indicates a search frequency of less than 1% 
compared to the higher search frequency”. 
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Fig. 6 – Online Searching for the term “Fintech” 2004-2017 
Source: Google trends 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 – Online Searching for the term “Bank” 2004-2017 
Source: Google Trends 
 
 
Financial Technologies, aka Fintech, are those that allow financial services to be 
delivered in more convenient and faster ways, using a consumer-friendly approach; the basic 
needs they serve are the same financial services’ institutional players have already been 
satisfying in the past as saving, investing, funding, exchanging money, etc. but the business 
models they use are new or non-conventional. 
With this reference, we have seen in recent years the rise of new payments systems, 
among which Paypal became a representative example, the introduction of platforms
9
 for Peer 
to Peer lending and for Equity Crowdfunding, the development of new asset management 
systems, as robo-advisory, etc. 
These innovations were triggered and allowed by many factors, which, according to 
many  (CGFS & FSB, 2017; IOSCO, 2017) can be grouped into two broad categories: 
“supply-side” and “demand-side” factors. 
 Supply side factors are mainly identified in: 
                                                          
9
 A Platform, in business literature, can be defined as a “business model that creates value by facilitating 
exchanges between two or more interdependent groups, usually consumers and producers” (see 
https://www.applicoinc.com/blog/what-is-a-platform-business-model/), namely businesses which, often thanks 
to a strong reliance on IT infrastructures, focus their core activities on connecting value chain actors/stages. 
24 
 
 digital DNA, this means financial technologies providers are often agile 
and digital-savvy startups, which were born with lean operations and 
strongly committed to data analysis; 
 VC Funds’ support, it is considered an enabling factor as it significantly 
contributed to lower entry barriers in financial services for startup 
companies, as reported by the Head of Payments Services at Silicon 
Valley Bank, “if you are a FinTech player, you have to talk to a number 
of VCs, and all it takes is for one of them to say yes and you can launch 
your product [...]” (Capgemini, 2017b; p. 11), despite it does not grant 
they will all eventually succeed, ease in funding has given a great 
incentive to Fintech rise; 
 cost advantages, given mainly by the ability of newcomers to scale a 
service without the need to rely on branches, especially thanks to internet 
which made accessibility of products ever broader; 
 gentle regulation, especially in those cases Fintech are able to offer 
banking services, without suffering their huge regulatory burden; indeed 
especially so far Fintech enjoyed a sort of “first mover advantage” as 
regards regulation, which by the way is expected to become stricter; 
 underserved customer segments, this mainly refers to SMEs which banks 
were often likely to exclude from target, either driven by profitability or 
legislative reasons, and to those customers, above defined as 
“underbanked”, finding themselves not to be fully served by traditional 
players; 
 disintermediation and re-intermediation, this factor is often considered a 
driver of Fintech rise as it explains cases of successful business models, 
for example those of peer-to-peer lending platforms, in which the 
valuable idea was just to let parties with complementary needs meet, 
without having to pass via a third one (as it happened in the past with 
banks) and bringing to the financial services industry what other sectors 
are familiar with (see for example Uber disintermediating taxi drivers, 
Airbnb disintermediating hotels, etc.) (IOSCO, 2017); 
 Demand side factors are mainly considered the following: 
 changing customers’ expectations, as they are now shifting towards 
financial institutions the expectancies (in terms of convenience, long-
time or full-time availability, ease in use, comfort, etc.) they usually have 
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for other online business providers and, in general, for other services 
they are used to; 
 distinctive socio-demographic characteristics, as the ones of “millennials 
generation”, or “Gen Y”, a label marketers coined for the cohort born 
from the beginning of the ‘80s till approximately the end of the 20th 
century and characterized by a strong familiarity with social networks 
and a quite open and optimistic mind-set; despite it fails to perfectly 
describe such generation in its inner variety, the analysis of this class and 
its well-known representative traits is useful to explain new emerging 
habits of the population as a whole, especially if considering the one of 
“millennial” a social label a person can be given today, regardless his 
date of birth; 
 distrust on incumbents and traditional institutions, a factor which many 
identify as proper of the millennials generation, but that characterizes 
instead the population at a very large scale, as seen above. 
Those factors by the way were also accelerated by the previously described post-crisis 
environment of damaged brand image on banks, which gave to new actors the legitimacy to 
operate having people trust by their side. 
 
2.2. Leading the change: who are major Fintech players 
 
The universe of Fintech, if the term is used (as it commonly happens) to broadly mean the 
whole ecosystem of innovations developing recently within Financial Services, is populated 
by various players: indeed, Fintech can be considered “an evolution of Financial Services” 
(McGuinness, 2017), but one which has involved also the participation to financial services of 
players different from “traditional” ones, as young start-ups or even companies coming from 
unrelated industries. 
For this reason, if trying to navigate the identities of major players within Fintech 
universe, one could easily find names of tech giant companies or incumbent banks, too, 
together with those of startups providing a niche-focused financial service. This is the case, 
for example, of a study we would like to mention; it was made by CB Insights firm (2014) 
and it is a creative and effective visual representation of the “key players” within Fintech 
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system; in this map we can easily understand the non-conventionality and the great variety of 
those who are leading innovation in Financial Services. 
In this work, called “The periodic Table of Fin Tech” (see figure below), we find a vast 
array of  players, each of them placed within a cell of the chemical well-known periodic table, 
and the list does not only include providers of Financial Services, nor only the latter plus 
some tech-giants, but it even comprises key investors and acquirers of Fintech landscape 
(since, as seen before, they played a very important role in driving the rise of Fintech as a 
system). 
The Fintech periodic table should thus serve the scope to gain a base knowledge of 
master players active in Fintech system, including a very broad and heterogeneous amount of 
participants. It is developed as follows: 
 on the right block, we have those that could be mainly defined enablers, such as 
VC firms (among which we find Felicis Ventures and Ribbit Capital, which both 
backed Credit Karma
10
, a well-known Fintech company operating in personal 
finance landscape and serving 75 million users
11
), investors, either corporate 
ones (as Google Ventures; Citi Ventures, bringing innovation within the bank of 
the same name; Ping An Ventures, a Chinese firm which, in 2014, invested, 
among others, in eToro, a social investment network
12
; etc.) either Angels (as, 
for example, Mr. Richard Branson, founder of Virgin Group, who backed, 
among others, Fintech company Transferwise
13
, in 2014), and also 
accelerators/incubators (as Y Combinator, TechStars. etc.); 
 on the left side of the table, there are many companies operating in different 
Fintech sub-areas, which CB Insights (2014) details as follows, “Lending” 
(within we find e.g. Funding Circle or OnDeck, platforms for lending to SMBs), 
“Payments/Billing Tech” (with companies like Klarna, launched in 2005 and 
now one of Europe’s largest banks14), “Personal Finance/Asset Management” (a 
sub-area for companies like, among others, Robin Hood, a company whose 
mission, as one could guess from the name, is to bring investing “Now for the 
                                                          
10
 See: https://www.creditkarma.com/about/releases/credit-karma-seriesb-funding 
 
11
 See: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-26/why-should-you-trust-credit-karma 
 
12
 See:  https://www.etoro.com/en/etoro-secures-27-million-in-new-financing-to-fuel-continued-global-growth/ 
 
13
 See: https://transferwise.com/gb/blog/sir-richard-branson-joins-our-mission-to-stamp-out-hidden-fees 
 
14
 See: https://www.klarna.com/uk/about-us/ 
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rest of us”15), “Money Transfer/Remittance” (the table includes within this 
category mainly platforms for international peer-to-peer money transfer, as 
World Remit or Azimo), “Digital Currency” (with companies like Xapo or 
Coinbase, that allow transactions with digital currency), “Institutional Tools” 
(within this category there are mainly companies which provide tools to 
incumbents in Financial Services, as banks or advisors, as the investment 
management platform Addepar
16
 or Quantopian, a “crowd-sourced” algorithm-
based investment firm
17
, or even Kensho, which levers on data analytics and 
machine learning technologies
18
 to offer solutions to other professionals in the 
industry), “Equity Crowdfunding” (the last category where we find platforms for 
fund-raising, as Crowd Cube, and also online communities of investors which 
eventually contributed to other Fintech companies’ financing, e.g. Funders Club, 
which was among the first in granting access to funds to Coinbase
19
); 
 on the bottom block, CB Insights (2014) places the then-most noteworthy cases 
of exits, mentioning those companies that had been acquired or had gone public 
by year 2014 and throughout the previous 5 years, and the acquirers who made 
notable operations in the same time span; (with this reference we find here 
examples of notable acquisitions as the one, dated 2013, of Braintree by 
Paypal
20
, which was then an E-bay’s company, before going public21). 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 See: https://www.robinhood.com/ 
 
16
 See: https://addepar.com/ 
 
17
 See: https://www.quantopian.com/about 
 
18
 See: https://www.kensho.com/  
 
19
 See: https://fundersclub.com/  
 
20
 See: https://techcrunch.com/2013/09/26/paypal-acquires-payments-gateway-braintree-for-800m-in-cash/  
 
21
 See: https://investor.paypal-corp.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=922829  
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Fig. 8 – The periodic Table of FinTech 
Source: CB Insights 
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2.2.1. A classification of Fintech companies by service offered: a focus on banking-
related activities 
 
Moving from the above presented heterogeneous landscape of leading players within Fintech, 
and in order to classify Fintech (here intended as young companies born on purpose to bring 
technological innovation in finance) by service offered, we shall first specify that the types of 
services offered by Fintech companies are many indeed and, as specified in figure below by 
KPMG (2017b), they mainly range across the following industries: “Banking, Insurance, 
Asset Management, and Other Cross-industry Propositions”. 
Fig. 9 – Fintech companies by areas of financial services 
Source: KPMG 
 
Within the above industries Fintech services impact quite every business line of 
traditional brick-and-mortar financial services providers; and, if for financial services we 
mean “[…] just that, namely services enabling businesses, consumers and investors to access 
products and services which in turn allow them to achieve their respective ends” 
(McGuinness, 2017), it becomes evident why lists of Fintech services’ categories could be 
many and at varying detail levels. 
Indeed, despite we still miss a unique classification of Fintech by service offered, we 
find in recent literature several categorizations which group examples of remarkable Fintech 
firms into categories; but, again, since the term Fintech, here specifically meaning the firms 
providing financial services in new/disrupted ways (not the ecosystem as a whole) is often 
used to comprise different kinds of actors, the available categorizations differ from one 
another. 
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Considering the above, and the ultimate scope of this work to further investigate how 
banks are copying with Fintech, our classification of Fintech companies by service offered 
will only refer to those companies whose services specifically impact banking and asset 
management businesses, thus not including either technology giants, which were not born as 
FS innovators even if they ended up doing it (so-called Bigtech, a category which we will 
analyze in depth further within this work) nor “Insurtech” (Fintech firms focused on insurance 
services). 
Our suggested classification
22
 of Fintech by banking-related service offered could be the 
one shown in figure below, in which we distinguish among the following service categories: 
 payments,  
 alternative finance,  
 digital banking,  
 asset management,  
 infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 In the classification here presented of Fintech companies by service offered, the author wants to give a broad 
picture of the very articulated Fintech industry, considering only those companies who are focusing on 
disrupting the main areas of pertinence of banks and, in order to give a clear understanding of possible types of 
services within each of the five presented categories, we want to mention some Fintech firms. All of the firms 
here shown as leading examples are taken by the “2017 Fintech 100” (H2Ventures, KPMG, 2017). 
Fig. 10 – A classification of Fintech companies by service offered within banking universe 
Source: created by the author 
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With regard to payments, the recent and ever-increasing popularity of non-cash 
payments, together with the rise of e-commerce and the greater use of mobile, had a huge role 
in spurring innovation; within this category we find, for example, firms offering mobile 
payment solutions, that let customers pay for goods and services (either purchased in physical 
or digital shops of payment companies’ partners) with their mobile phones, especially 
smartphones, instead of traditional means, e.g. cash; these solutions enhance customers’ 
payment experiences and make payments easier, as, for example, they let customers pre-
register their cards on digital wallets and use them in one-click or one-tap, whenever needed. 
The same technology is applied also to wearables, for example watches or jackets, in order to 
provide customers frictionless experiences. 
Thanks to the insights obtainable by spending patterns’ analysis, incumbents lost what 
previously was their unique privilege on customers’ knowledge (to be precise, they share this 
knowledge with others, Fintech new-comers). As a matter of fact, payments represent a 
remarkable source of cross-selling opportunities for Fintech firms active in this field: they can 
get to know how customers behave in shopping and paying; furthermore, they can also be 
active advisors of the best recommended payment options for each transaction. 
Also, within payment services’ universe, we find solutions to international money 
transfers, a field which developed mainly as a consequence of customers’ concerns about 
transparency in traditionally banks-processed transactions (which used to be costly, even in 
cases of flat rates, because of charges by banks) and due to their usually longer time frames to 
complete the operations (ones which do not fit well with today’s customers’ desire and need 
to be speed); on these premises, enabled via technology, Fintech firms brought innovation 
and, most of all, transparency, by fixing a wholesale rate for currency transfers and offering 
customers full disclosure (Laven, Bruggink, 2016).  
Finally, in the payment category we include also Fintech firms focusing on 
cryptocurrencies, among which Bitcoin became very popular, to make payments in a faster 
and more secure way; in particular, these use the blockchain technology, namely an 
application of distributed ledger technology (DLT
23
). The use of Bitcoin has many reasons on 
its favor; in particular, being digital, which directly translates in being global, allowing for 
international transactions. 
                                                          
23
 A DLT is a sort of “archive” of transactions which is rendered secure thanks to the underlying technology that 
does not allow to make changes on previously recorded transactions; furthermore, thanks to digital ledgers, all 
the participating nodes (parties) share a single real-time version of the record of transactions. Thus, there is no 
need to have a central authority to oversee the transactions. 
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Possible examples of Fintech firms acting in payments services are: Klarna, ranked 14
th
 
in “2017 Fintech 100” (H2Ventures, KPMG, 2017) and Stripe, ranked 17th (ibid). 
Klarna was founded in 2005 in Sweden, one of the first countries in terms of digital 
money readiness
24
 and it is committed to provide customers smooth and easy payment 
methods, in particular in face of and to facilitate for increasing online purchases; the 
company, which operates in 18 countries
25
, offers either direct payments methods as options 
to postpone payments, thus offering customers a “buy now, pay later” shopping experience 
and entering an innovative credit offering method;  Klarna is also worthy a mention about the 
story behind its funding by well-known Sequoia Capital: indeed, it was the founder’s nerve 
which somehow made them gain the funding (Olson, 2016). 
Stripe, founded in 2013, is a Californian company which currently operates in 25 
countries and it has the mission to serve online businesses providing them a solid and easy to 
integrate (in terms of coding and technology) payment system, which can grant businesses to 
accept many currencies and  cards and to include in their own sites/apps the most popular 
technological payments methods (such as Apple Pay)
26
. Among the company notable 
investors we find Sequoia Capital, Elon Musk, Y Combinator (H2Ventures, KPMG, 2017). 
The one of alternative finance is a class within which we find a range of recently 
introduced services for access funding. In particular, when talking of Fintech companies 
operating in lending, we commonly mean online marketplaces, also called Peer-to-Peer 
platforms (see figure below), which disintermediate credit, putting in touch lenders and 
borrowers; this happens (in the traditional model of P2P) in a quite simple and intuitive way, 
namely potential lenders can accept to fund a credit request submitted by people who need 
money and who are often rejected by retail banks: especially, SMEs. 
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 See: https://www.citibank.com/icg/sa/digital_symposium/digital_money_index/ 
 
25
 See: https://www.klarna.com/uk/about-us/  
 
26
 See: https://stripe.com/about  
Fig. 11 – Traditional functioning of P2P platforms 
Source: CGFS & FSB, 2017  
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Within lending platforms class we find several Fintech models; and, sometimes, the 
lending platforms involve also the participation of a bank or traditional financial institution 
(so-called “notary model” of lending platforms); in these cases the bank issues all the loans to 
the platform’s applicants and it subsequently assigns them to creditors (CGFS, FSB, 2017). 
Other types of lending platforms, instead, act as direct lenders: in these cases (“balance sheet 
model” of lending platforms) it is the Fintech firm itself that originates the loan and provides 
funds by its own balance sheet; then the company can eventually give claims to other lenders 
(CGFS, FSB, 2017). Finally, according to CGFS & FSB (2017), another model of lending 
platforms is focused on factoring services for businesses (so-called “invoice trading model”); 
these Fintech firms allow businesses to sell their invoices or receivables at a discount in order 
to have liquidity. 
Regardless the underlying precise model of functioning, lending Fintech, as seen, have 
been able to issue credit to previously poorly served consumers and businesses: in particular, 
SMEs. As a matter of fact, SMEs face a significant credit gap, which is given either by 
demand and supply side problems: the first refer to the length of process for accessing funds 
and to the cumbersome documentations and requirements that render SMEs reluctant to seek 
credit via traditional means, also because of its costs; while the latter problems are given by 
the fact that SMEs are considered too risky by banks; also, the amounts of money they need 
are such small and the information they provide publicly are such poor, they turn to be 
inconvenient to serve (Owens, Wilhelm, 2017). 
Instead, a crucial characteristic of lending marketplaces is just the “ease” in access to 
credit offered to customers, in particular thanks to innovative methods applied by the 
platforms to assess credit worthiness of applicants; this is done for example via the use of 
behavioral data, machine learning, mobile phones provided data analysis, etc.; these analyzes 
can be made by the lender platform itself (for example through proprietary algorithms) or they 
can be offered by Fintech firms specialized in credit scoring (see the “infrastructure” 
category). 
Indeed, the huge transformation in finance, which impacts most of all SMEs and which 
took to the rise of alternative access to finance, has been fueled by the availability of 
“alternative data” (Owens, Wilhelm, 2017): this means “every time SMEs and their 
customers use cloud-based services, conduct banking transactions, make or accept digital 
payments, browse the internet, use their mobile phones, engage in social media, buy or sell 
electronically, ship packages, or manage their receivables, payables, and recordkeeping 
34 
 
online, they create digital footprints. This real-time, and verified data can be mined to 
determine both capacity and willingness to repay loans” (Beinker, 2017). 
Furthermore, together with Peer-to-Peer Lending, equity- or debt-crowd-funding 
represent other forms of alternative finance (see figure below for a taxonomy of all the models 
within alternative finance category) on which individuals seeking for funds can currently rely; 
the beneficial aspects of the rise of alternative finance are on increasing competition they are 
putting in funding services thus eventually leading to greater efficiencies; also, they represent 
an additional investment possibility for investors and one which turns to be, with respect to 
traditional equity investments, suitable and accessible for a greater number of people. 
 
Representative firms for the category of alternative finance which is worthy to mention 
could be: Avant and Kabbage; they respectively ranked 5
th
 and 10
th
 in the “2017 Fintech 100” 
(H2Ventures, KPMG, 2017). 
Avant is a US company founded in 2012 and it is a fast-growing lending marketplace 
which focuses on offering fast credit access to customers; the company has been serving over 
Fig. 12 – A taxonomy of alternative finance models 
Source: Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance. 
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600.000 customers to date, with a main focus on consumers but with the aim to enlarge the 
customers’ range; its mission is to lower costs and barriers for borrowing27. 
Kabbage, a Fintech from US founded in 2008, and now backed, among others, by ING 
Group, offers lines of credit up to $150.000 to small businesses through its platform, namely 
Kabbage Platform; Kabbage has offered $4 Billion in funding to more than 130,000 
businesses to date and all the loans are issued by a bank
28
. In addition to Kabbage (for 
businesses) and Karrot (for consumers) B2C solutions, the Kabbage platform operates as a 
B2B under other brands for any organization which wants to offer automated online lending 
solutions
29
.  
The digital banking category encompasses all the banking services related to having an 
account (money transfers, withdrawals, bill payments, paychecks cash-in, etc.) which are 
provided through mobile phone or online platform only; these activities have been rendered 
accessible via mobile phones since the penetration rate of mobile devices is enormous and can 
represent an efficient mean to reach the underbanked population. 
As a matter of fact, current age is referred to as “the mobile economy” and today there 
are more mobile connections than people in the world, 65% was 2016 global mobile 
penetration rate, defined as the number of unique mobile subscribers (a measure which counts 
for single individuals having subscribed to a mobile service, as a SIM card, regardless the 
number of phones owned) on the population, and it is expected to reach an impressive 73% in 
2020
30
. 
As leading example of Fintech focused on digital banking we presented the one of 
Atom Bank, 8
th
 ranked in “2017 Fintech 100” (H2Ventures, KPMG, 2017). Atom Bank is a 
UK online-only bank with no branches, founded in 2014; in 2016/17 the company launched 
Fixed Rate Saving products, Business Banking Secured Loans and Retail Mortgages; it is a 
24/7 available bank with the mission to render banking easy and “customized” on the way 
each customer uses the banking services provided; the company reported average time to open 
a saving account is 10 minutes, as the company aims to render “the future of banking 
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 See: https://www.avant.com/ 
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 See: https://www.kabbage.com/  
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 See: https://www.kabbageplatform.com/  
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available today”; Atom Bank saving customers were 17.916 as of 31st March 201731 and a 
notable investor behind the company is BBVA bank. 
Moving to asset management, we find firms offering advice on personal spending, 
allowing customers to monitor their savings, their expenses and to achieve their goals by 
suggesting them how to invest, based on customers’ risk propensity and needs, and how to 
better use their money. Within this category the characteristic of Fintech is the one of have 
broadened the access to many financial products to a larger customer base: what previously 
was a prerogative of financial literates and of wealthier people can now be an option for 
previously non-customers that are targeted by Fintech; they do so by lowering the account 
minimums and the fees usually associated with investment management. 
A good portray of what we just said about wealth management can be given by the 
firms Wealthsimple, which gained the 29
th
 position of “2017 Fintech 100” (H2Ventures, 
KPMG, 2017) and Robinhood, placed 50
th
 (ibid). 
Wealthsimple was founded in 2014 in Canada and it has the mission to offer investment 
advice accessible to the underserved by FS traditional players, especially younger 
customers
32, as average Wealthsimple’s user is 29-years old33. With a 29-years old CEO at the 
top of the company, Wealthsimple brings the knowledge of professional investors at the 
fingertip of customers and the company is also well-known for its brand and marketing 
strategy, which is one of a kind within the field of investment services: with the aim to be at 
people’s side, the brand is shown as having a strong understanding of common people 
concerns and the emotional side of the service is highlighted
34
. 
Thus we think of initiatives like the company “money diaries”35 or advertisements as, to 
give an example, the one shown during Super Bowl before launching in US: the video, where 
young actor Tony Revolori, well-known for his role in the famous film “The Grand Budapest 
Hotel” is the main character, generated 3.971.766 views on Youtube to date36. 
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 See: https://www.atombank.co.uk/investor-information  
 
32
 See: https://www.wealthsimple.com/en-ca/who-we-are    
 
33
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 See previous note. 
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Similar principles of finance “democratization” inspire Robinhood business model; it is 
a company founded in 2013 in US and it is focused on brokerage, allowing US stocks and 
ETFs transactions with a $0 commission formula, backed and rendered possible to achieve 
thanks to the company lean structure
37
. 
Finally, we identified the category infrastructure, where B2B services are included; 
these are Fintech services developed with the aim to support the innovation of market 
structure and industry systems within Financial Services; indeed, this is rendered possible by 
the application of technologies (e.g. blockchain, biometrics, artificial intelligence, etc.) or 
capabilities (e.g. data analysis) which can allow the delivery of services needed by traditional 
incumbents, as the analysis of creditworthiness, the develop of security applications, etc. 
With the aim to offer remarkable examples of the last category the two firms chosen 
were: Advice Robo and Aimbrain, respectively 50
th
 and 51
st
 in the “2017 Fintech 100” 
(H2Ventures, KPMG, 2017), opening the section of the Fintech 100 dedicated to “emerging” 
Fintech
38. Also, given their characteristics both the companies are labeled as “enablers”, 
rather than disruptors of Financial Services (H2Ventures, KPMG, 2017). 
Advice Robo was founded in 2013 in the Netherlands and it is a B2B solutions provider 
for banks and insurers; as far as banks are concerned, the company solutions help lenders to 
have a deeper understanding of their customers’ credit scoring and riskiness39. The services 
offered with this regard by Advice Robo are
40
: 
 “Psychographic credit scoring”, a service which turns to be useful especially for 
the creditworthiness assessment by banks of so-called “thin-file” customers, 
namely those with a poor credit history, as  self-employed, start-ups, etc.; 
  “Behavioral credit scoring for optimal proactive servicing”, it is a warning 
system that aims to predictively reduce risks for banks; 
 “Big Data Solutions”, with the possibility to tailor-make the data  analysis 
models and get useful insights for lenders. 
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 See: https://www.robinhood.com/  
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 Please note that, within “2017 Fintech 100” by H2Ventures & KPMG (2017) the first 50 placed companies are 
labeled “leading” while the remaining 50 are so-called “emerging” Fintech. 
 
39
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 See previous note. 
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Aimbrain, a UK company founded in 2014, provides institutions with user-friendly 
authentication biometric solutions; the company authentication methodology is patented, it 
exploits machine learning capabilities and it acts on different layers of security: behavioral, 
facial and vocal; in a nutshell, the company wishes to break the traditionally existing trade-off 
between “security” and “ease of use” 41, allowing FS providers to grant their customers 
security, at no expenses for the user experience on any of the FS player channel nor on any of 
the customer device. 
 
2.2.2. Non-financial players offering financial services: major internet companies, e-
retailers, social media & telecommunication platforms 
 
Traditional firms, in particular banks and insurance companies, have been suffering not only 
post-crisis lower level of trust by people but also increasing competition coming from new 
entrants in their industries: this is the case of Fintech and Insurtech respectively, if we refer to 
technology-based companies born on purpose to change the status quo in those industries, but 
the range of digital disruptors does not end there; as a matter of fact, many giant technological 
companies operating in different industries are coming in the ones mentioned above and 
conquering a share of the market. 
These new-comers from business different than Financial Services are “giants” with 
enormous potential to disrupt traditional industries and succeed; as a matter of fact, they 
already imposed greater competition in other industries, becoming market leaders in short 
time periods or causing incumbents to become much less valuable; as Apple in music retail or  
Google with GPS companies (Busch, Moreno, 2014). 
In recent years, they have been heading traditional financial services providers’ industry 
and this is what is happening in the Western economies with so-called GAFA, namely 
Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon, whose increasing role in influencing the economy and 
the way people conduct daily life is going to impact financial services too; and also in the East 
with, among others, BAT companies, standing for Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, Chinese tech 
champions turning to be “non-bank” banks. 
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In particular, Google Wallet
42
 (first launched in 2011) now allows customers to transfer 
money among peers via pc or mobile using their e-mails or phone numbers and linking them 
to a bank account; the transfer service can be used via Gmail app (in US) or Google Wallet 
website (in US and UK, among people within same country); the claim to link the Gmail 
popular e-mail box to money transfers was to render them simple such that, as the company 
blog says, “is as easy as sending any other attachment”43. 
The company had also introduced its own plastic debit card (dismissed since July 2016), 
linked to Wallet account, given the fact that Wallet first served also as mobile payments 
system; by the way, Google launched a new mobile payments system for customers to pay on-
line and in-stores, wherever contactless payment is accepted; it is Android Pay
44
. It allows 
customers to pay easily, safely and fast, without the need to physically carry all their cards 
with them; the app is available in 14 countries (at August 2017) and has partnerships with 
Visa, MasterCard and mobile payments’ most representative firm, Paypal; thanks to the latter 
strategic collaboration, the two firms joint forces as Paypal US users are going to be allowed 
to pay with a tap in their phones (a feature of Android Pay), linking the  payment to their 
Paypal account
45
. 
In September 2017, Google introduced a new digital payment app outside US, in 
particular in India; it is called Tez
46
 and it was thought as a product “that can compete with 
cash”47 in its underlying simplicity and ubiquity. Indeed Tez allows “direct, bank-to-bank 
payments”, ”Cash Mode for nearby transactions”, which do not need the share of any 
information among nearby peers, and it is backed by Google with “Tez Shield”, a 24/7 data 
security system. 
Also Apple launched its mobile payments system: Apple Pay
48
, which came to the 
market in 2014; it can be used to pay with iPhone, iPad, Apple Watch and Mac either in stores 
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or in the web; Apple payments service is available in more than 20 countries and the company 
is recently moving into money transfer too; as with Apple Pay Cash customers from the US 
will be allowed (by coming fall) to send and receive money stored in their Apple Wallet via 
text messages or asking Siri (Apple’s voice-recognition system that assist Apple devices 
owners in many tasks, e.g. dictating text messages) to do it.
49
 
Facebook, one among most popular social media, boasts 1.37 billion daily active users 
on average (June 2017)
50
, it allows peer-to-peer money transfers through Messenger app; the 
service was first launched in US (2015) and recently took to UK and France
51
. 
As regards Amazon, incumbents carefully watch out its potential moves within financial 
services as the company already led to an impressive transformation elsewhere, as in retail 
industry; by the way, the “retailer-of-everything” already launched (in 2011) a lending service 
for SMEs which sell via its e-commerce platform. The service in the last year issued $1 
billion in loans for Amazon’s customers, the company evaluates credit-worthiness by 
analyzing potential borrowers’ sales’ trends, then offers loans from $1k to $750k; customers’ 
repayments are done via deductions to their sales on Amazon website.
52
 
Moving to so-called BAT, we can easily see (see figure below) they dominate Chinese 
Fintech landscape (EY, 2016b). 
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Fig. 13. – Sector focus of key tech companies in China 
Source:EY, 
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Baidu was founded in 2000; the young company provides a search engine platform as 
core product, and many others related ones; with a huge Chinese and internationally-
expanding users’ base, the company mainly gains its revenues from online marketing 
services, making customers pay whenever a Baidu user clicks on their links
53
. The company 
created its wholly owned subsidiary Baidu Financial Services Group (FSG) in 2015; the latter 
sells wealth management products and also issues micro-lending, using Big Data and 
Artificial Intelligence to assess credit-worthiness; furthermore the company allows payments 
through its Wallet. 
Alibaba was founded in 1999 and its core business only, which is China Commerce 
Retail, now sells to 488 million of Active Annual Consumers (as at September 2017) thus 
being world’s largest retail commerce company54. The company has a stake in Ant Financial 
Services, committed to provide financial services to SMEs and consumers; the businesses of 
Ant Financial are Alipay (payments system), Ant Fortune (an investment app
55
), Zhima Credit 
(a credit-scoring service) and MYbank.
56
 
Tencent dominates China social messaging with its app WeChat and it launched 
WeChat Pay, which has similar features of its major rival Alipay. 
As it is for Fintech, the advantages of such new entrants lie in their organizational 
culture, based on agility and entrepreneurship, and in their highly technological DNA; many 
refers to these new entrants as “Bigtech” and, according to the BCBS, “Bigtech refers to 
large globally active technology firms with a relative advantage in digital technology. Bigtech 
firms usually provide web services (search engines, social networks, e-commerce etc) to end 
users over the internet and/or IT platforms or they maintain infrastructure (data storage and 
processing capabilities) on which other companies can provide products or services.” 
(BCBS, 2017; p.15). 
Regardless their core business, Bigtech have a distinctive competitive advantage which 
allows them all to know customers behavior in depth and this is their enormous customers 
base’s available data, from which they can gain significant insights. Furthermore, their high 
                                                          
53
 See: http://ir.baidu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=188488&p=irol-homeprofile 
 
54
See:  http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/global/home   
 
55
 See: https://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2015/08/18/alibaba-finance-affiliate-launches-fund-investment-
smartphone-app/#323cdd7c6301 
 
56
 See: https://www.antfin.com/ 
 
42 
 
level of internationalization together with the excess cash and investment strengths they own, 
allow Bigtech to succeed quite easily when launching a new product/service. 
By the way, competition with GAFA does not end on technical skills only; the well-
known success of these players lies in a bundle of capabilities they own throughout their 
business model implementation. Indeed, many claim that banking industry is becoming a 
“consumer-to-business (C2B)” one, just because of the standard of customer experience set 
by GAFA companies; this means customers are more and more in control and they are often 
able to create the value companies need to capture; just think to the amount of valuable data 
customers create through their interactions online with Facebook “likes” (Accenture, 2016). 
With this regard, GAFA are masters in coping with such a new reality and, for example, 
Apple, whose brand is a very trusted one among consumers, with ever-increasing and first-
ranking value
57
, could be for banks a representative example of multi-channel finest offer and 
could even “teach” banks how to give customers a “frictionless” experience: indeed, as 
highlighted in a recent article (Salesky, 2017) the technology company’s physical stores are 
absolutely successful and brick-and-mortar customers’ experiences are complementary to the 
on-line ones. The store becomes just the right place for taking care of engagement, proving 
that to have a technology DNA does not mean necessarily to give up on branches. 
The main ability for banks to learn from GAFA way of banking is indeed “Be digital”, 
which serves as a premise, regardless how banks choose to embrace innovation, and which 
means having a diffused digital culture and an adequate IT architecture throughout the 
organization, together with a more liquid approach to customer engagement and a coherent 
and complete digitization of the processes which is end-to-end (involving also branches) 
(Accenture, 2016). 
However, even if GAFA and similar companies have not completely transformed 
themselves into banks yet, still retaining their different core businesses put and having just 
jumped into some niches of Financial Services offer, what experts are focusing their attention 
on is the huge potential they have for doing it. In particular, they would eventually have 
young consumers’ approval, as customers are used to their enormous and constant presence in 
a wide range of daily life activities; the “trust” issue somehow suffered by banks does not 
impair Bigtech companies. To be more precise, according to Accenture (2016), high 
percentage of respondents, especially the youngest (either aged 18-34 or 34-54) answered 
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they would be “likely or very likely” to bank with companies as Google, Apple, and co., if 
they were offering banking services (see figure below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. The impact of the (r)evolution: what Fintech brings in 
 
By bringing innovation within financial services, Fintech “revolution” comes at the benefit of 
customers and, at a certain extent, of incumbents, too; by the way, the rise of Fintech has 
significant implications for a larger range of players, including also governments and 
regulators, who started addressing the phenomenon (indeed a regulatory framework has been 
and will be, at an increasing extent, developed to shape Fintech field of action). 
There is quite overall consensus about the beneficial aspects that Fintech innovations 
will bring within Financial Services industry; our objective is to briefly describe the positive 
contribution to important issues in financial services, that Fintech firms rendered possible, and 
to identify (as we will do later in this work) which are the characteristics of Fintech players 
Fig. 14 – Would you bank with GAFA? 
Source: Accenture 
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and of their successful business models, thanks to which disruptors are able to change things 
for the better. 
Notwithstanding the positive influence of Fintech emergence, some possible drawbacks 
and risks related to the innovation/evolution of Financial Services require a special attention, 
too. As a consequence, after presenting the beneficial effect of Fintech firms and their inner 
DNA, we will also analyze the potential risks underlying the rise of this phenomenon and also 
the eventual challenges that Fintech firms should be able to overcome in order to succeed. 
As regards the positive influence of Fintech, according to KPMG (2017b), Fintech help 
in changing the FS for the better across the following main areas (see figure below): 
 financial inclusion: as seen before, customers and businesses (especially SMEs) 
which were previously out of financial inclusion had been served by innovative 
services and accessed financial products; 
 customer experience: on this field Fintech contribution was huge and able to 
enrich the choices at customers’ disposal, taking customization of Financial 
Services to the “tailor-made” level; also, Fintech brought to Financial Services 
the usability and the type of “user-friendly” experiences customers searched for; 
 transparency: again, an imperative of today’s world of increasing customers’ 
awareness was brought to Financial Services, trying to eliminate the information 
advantages on which incumbents had developed lucrative revenue models in the 
past; 
 security and compliance: the adoption of technologies such as biometrics took 
security issues to the next level; improvements and streamlined solutions were 
launched (in particular by so-called Regtech); 
 support and guidance: increased demand for products and services rests on 
customers’ higher knowledge of the underlying functioning of the Financial 
Services; thanks to technology support and relying on “easy” solutions, Fintech 
are able to enrich the customers’ financial literacy and to reawaken “people” 
(meaning not only elite users) interest toward Financial Services. 
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2.3.1. Common characteristics of Fintech business models 
 
In order to understand what are Fintech success factors which enables them in delivering 
innovation, it would be useful to portray the typical DNA of a Fintech firm and to identify the 
characteristics of an ideal Fintech player. By the way, the objective of identifying a 
comprehensive list of characteristics of Fintech is a very difficult one, either because of the 
differences among companies which can be included in this class either because any of them 
could be showing or not all of such eventually found traits; by the way, there are some 
emerging key success factors which seem to pertain to Fintech. With these reference, we want 
to share some of these capabilities that drive successfully the innovation in financial services. 
In order to effectively introduce them, we would like to rely on a brief story, told by the 
Governor of Bank of England at a speech he held on the rise of financial technologies: he said 
- “But first I should make a confession: I was a banker once. To earn money for university 
tuition, I worked as a teller in my native Canada. To be more precise I was a Customer 
Service Representative. My core responsibility was simple: stand at a wicket and accept 
customer deposits, mainly from small businesses, and pay out withdrawals, mainly to their 
employees. Over time, I got to know the regulars ranging from the baker who would come in 
every afternoon to deposit a bundle of bank notes smelling of bread (literally dough) to the 
executives of a failing construction company who would cash weekly their pay cheques with 
Fig. 15 – Implications of Fintech 
Source: KPMG 
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alacrity and trepidation. I learned that there were two types of client: those who engaged with 
me and those who didn’t. And I learned with time that the former got more from the bank 
because I and it knew more about them and what they needed – whether a savings product or 
a loan. The bank got more from them in terms of revenue and reliability (helpful given that 
two small banks had recently failed). Indeed, as my province was in a deep recession at the 
time, loyalty and understanding mattered. It could mean the difference between a restructured 
loan that could be repaid and a foreclosure that would bring liquidation” (Carney, 2017). 
This anecdote is crucial to shine a light on something typical of the approach of Fintech 
companies, that is engagement; its role in gaining customers and most of all in retaining them 
is quite obvious in business, even in banking, as the above tale wants to highlight; and such 
well-founded principle gets an even increasing soundness if we look at the instruments at 
Fintech’s disposal to implement it: in particular, analytics, the capability to gain insights from 
different sources of raw data. 
As a matter of fact, the Financial Services industry relies on information, which Fintech 
companies nowadays create through articulated forms of business intelligence, some which 
use machine learning and algorithms more and more and which can benefit from lots of 
consumers’ data; the way Fintech approach engagement is in line with current era of more 
“powerful” consumers, who are seamlessly in touch with their most well-known brands, in 
particular internet-based business models. 
In order to collect the attributes of successful innovators in financial services, literature 
identified the LASIC principles first (Cheun, Teo, 2015), that is to say the followings:  Low 
margin, Asset light, Scalable, Innovative, Compliance Easy. Based on an analysis of the 
above, EY (2016a) coined the CLASSIC framework (see figure below), an acronym that 
stands for: Customer-centric, Legacy-free, Asset light, Scalable, Simple, Innovative, 
Compliance Light. 
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The two frameworks give us quite similar portraits of effective Fintech business models, 
however the former had highlighted a trait which we do not find in the following anymore and 
which is worth a mention, id est low margin: LASIC principles find critical the “initial mass 
accumulation phase” for Fintech businesses to prosper, till the extent they consider common 
accepting a starting low profitability and striving to implement a sustainable revenue formula 
based on low margins, at the advantage of customers, and large volumes (Cheun, Teo, 2015). 
The “lock-in” of customers and the achievement of a significant number of users as 
common characteristic of Financial Services successful innovators is also crucial to gain 
another important mean which often helps innovators to succeed, namely funding; indeed it 
often comes to those start-ups with a valuable idea if they were able to develop a consumers’ 
base to be considered as fundamental part of the seeking-fund company’s assets. 
As regards CLASSIC framework, it is a quite intuitive and complete one; it enriched the 
LASIC principles, adding the first characteristic of customer-centric (EY, 2016a): indeed, the 
centrality of customer and all its underlying facets recall the above mentioned story about 
engagement, which is gaining increasing importance with Fintech rise. This also explains why 
Fig. 16 – Characteristichs of Fintechs 
Source:Chuen & Teo, EY analysis 
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Fintech companies are “need-focused”, thus unbundling financial services and levering on 
customization to offer tailor-made products (EY, 2016a). 
Fintech products are developed on purpose of serving a very precise target, such that, 
with their strategically focal role in shaping the firms’ value propositions, customers become 
“prosumers”, blurring the distinction between who creates products and services and who uses 
them. 
The customer represents the core of strategy making in Fintech, they are the ones who 
can grant a company success by brand-advocacy and word-of-mouth, in particular if a service 
become such popular it goes “viral”; this rule implies a constant effort to develop a better user 
experience, one which can render customers’ first impression good and make them feel 
comfortable in every step throughout the product/service purchase; this attempt to shift the 
focus on customer is not at his own advantage only and Fintech players are familiar with 
stories that can confirm this: one is “The $300 million button”58, a sharp tale about how an 
online shop experienced an additional $300.000.000 on sales just thanks to designers’ solution 
to change a “Register” button into a “Continue” one, which made customers more prone to 
conclude the purchase (Cordeiro, 2016). 
Fintech companies are endowed of similar perspicacity and empathy, to implement 
which they rely on engineering and design know-how and dedicated resources; this 
contributes to make them “Simple” in the sense CLASSIC framework means (EY, 2016a). 
Simplicity entrenches customers’ tie with the brand, it can represent the reason to 
choose a company among many, it does not deprive companies of anything, rather it gives 
them several advantages; as fewer errors, faster rate of work completion, lower need of 
customers’ assistance, more satisfied customers, etc.; in a nutshell, simple means lean at every 
piece of the company operations (Cordeiro, 2016). 
 
2.3.2 Challenges to disruptors: potential risks and drawbacks for Fintech 
 
However, despite the issues of Financial Services industry that Fintech firms are able to renew 
and improve, thanks to their characteristics and advantages, there are also potential risks and 
concerns about the future of this flow of innovations; first of all, as it often happens to 
                                                          
58
 See “The $300 Million button” at: https://articles.uie.com/three_hund_million_button/  
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technological innovations, Fintech companies may find the opposition and reluctance of more 
conservative players, especially if we consider the extent of care people use in managing their 
financial services. Also, the potential negative impact that any Fintech operators’ mistake 
could have is large, considering that the social function of the service offered by Fintech is 
exactly to help other players in the economic system to grow and to prosper. 
Furthermore, given the high reliance of Fintech firms on technology (as they usually 
carry on their main operations online), there is also a certain degree of cyber-risk to take into 
account when considering the possible drawbacks of Fintech business models.  
For these reasons, Fintech firms can be considered to have some weaknesses to improve 
and some challenges to win. With this regard, analyzing the lending activities and business 
models provided by Fintech, the CGFS & FSB (2017) identified what they call “factors 
affecting growth potential”; the latter can, albeit they only refer to lending sub-area, be 
attributed to the Fintech firms as a whole, as follows: 
 counterattack from incumbents, this refers to the possibility of a valid retaliation 
by incumbents, especially in areas, such as developed markets, where they 
already gained a significant presence; notwithstanding the emergence of Fintech 
and the disruption of recent years, many banks proved ready to respond and they 
succeeded in doing it; 
 not robust business models, since many Fintech firms came to the market quite 
recently, still having not verified their business models’ functioning over the 
long rung; 
 regulatory requirements, they represent a critical issue in financial services and 
this applies also to Fintech universe, even if they are subjected to a lighter 
pressure with respect to incumbents; 
 uncertainty, once the activity of Fintech firms is no longer peripheral, it will be 
treated by regulators in still unknown and possibly unfavorable ways, as Fintech 
could lose the “freedom” and “softness” which, at first, acted as a driver to their 
emergence; 
 reputation, many Fintech firms still find themselves in a phase of “credibility” 
building and they cannot rely on a multi-decades brand; for this reason, even if 
some traditional FS providers have been distrusted and had a lot to do to recover 
the approval of customers, many incumbents still enjoy an advantage in terms of 
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brand value and awareness, while Fintech companies should carefully ty to 
avoid any possible mistake which could damage their “fragile” reputation. 
In particular, as far as regulatory aspects are concerned, many representative players 
from banking industry are pushing regulators to align regulatory requirements on Fintech with 
those on the traditional incumbents of Financial Services industry, especially banks, 
according to the principle “same risk, same regulation”, posing a great question to what has 
been considered so far an advantage on Fintech firms (Longo, 2017). 
 
2.4. Global overview of Fintech market: the rate of adoption of technology-enabled 
financial services 
 
Fintech companies, defined as technology-based companies developing financial services’ 
innovative business models, started appearing on the market quite recently, as said; and 
despite the phenomenon attracted a huge interest throughout the spectrum of financial 
services’ players – either traditional firms, regulators or investors - it is often a common 
opinion such a trend will not last long, as many see these innovations as a temporary bubble 
or even a “geeks” prerogative. By the way, a more in depth knowledge of the phenomenon 
and a founded awareness of its underlying drivers can and should lead to claim Fintech 
services are going to have a durable impact and to reach a significant share of users. 
On this view, we find many industry practitioners and in order to measure the rate of 
adoption of Fintech services among digitally active population, in 2015, EY launched the 
“Fintech adoption index”59 and the index was found to be about 15,5% (Gulamhuseinwala, 
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 In 2015, the index was in its first year of measurement and, as reported by authors, it was derived by “a survey 
of 10,131 digitally active consumers, we look at FinTech adoption in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
the U.K. and U.S.1 In each of these markets, we have identified 10 FinTech services which fall into four broad 
categories: savings and investments, money transfers and payments, borrowing and insurance” 
(Gulamhuseinwala, Bull & Lewis, 2015; p.18). On 2017 research’s methodological aspects EY authors reported: 
“We define a regular FinTech user as an individual who has used two or more FinTech services in the last six 
months. We identify 17 distinct services offered by FinTech organizations and non-traditional providers, and 
refer to these as FinTech services. These services are considered within the five broad categories of money 
transfer and payments, financial planning, savings and investments, borrowing, and insurance. Our 2017 
research is based on more than 22,000 online interviews in 20 markets. Our surveyed population is drawn from 
a demographically representative sample of each market to the extent available, and all references to consumers 
relate to individuals who are active online, which we refer to as “digitally active.” We have applied unweighted 
averaging of results, using a “one market one vote” approach to report findings, to offer a global, cross-market 
perspective on themes and trends. The 20 markets are Australia, Belgium and Luxembourg (considered as one 
market for the purposes of our analysis), Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, 
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US.” 
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Bull & Lewis, 2015); by the way, the index, whose calculation has been perfected meanwhile 
and which is now calculated on a larger population coming from a wider range of countries to 
give a global perspective on the phenomenon, rose at 33% in 2017 (see figures below), giving 
to the authors reasons to claim Fintech services (defined within 2017 report scope as to 
include services from the categories of “money transfer and payments, financial planning, 
savings and investments, borrowing, and insurance”) find themselves at “early mass 
adoption” stage across those of the lifecycle of innovations60 (Gulamhuseinwala, Hatch, &  
Lloyd, 2017). 
 
                                                          
60The study recalls the “Innovation adoption curve” and the “Diffusion of Innovation” theory of  Rogers, that is 
one which is often referred to when talking about people awareness of new innovations: according to Rogers, the 
way a new idea or technology spreads among people within a social system is crucial for its success to arrive; the 
author explains it succeeds when reaching a critical mass. Furthermore, the author explains that adoption, 
process by which people embrace what’s perceived as new, is not simultaneous at the whole social system level. 
In particular, the author standardizes people distribution for adoption and he identified five different groups of 
people with reference to their attitude towards innovations; these groups all encompass people with different 
characteristics and who shall be addressed with different strategies, they are: 
- innovators (about 2,5% of total population): they are brave and venturesome individuals, strongly eager 
to adopt new ideas and to bring them within the boundaries of its social system; 
- early adopters (13,5% ): they are much more local than innovators and they have, among any category, 
the higher degree of opinion leadership such that they can advocate for innovations and speed up their 
diffusion; 
- early majority (34%): they come in adoption just before the large majority/the average member of the 
social system, they are follower of most leading categories; 
- late majority(34%): their approach to innovation is cautious and skeptical and they adopt novelties after 
the average member of the social system, once they can feel the underlying utility and only thanks to or 
because of the social network’s pressure and norms; 
- laggards(16%): they are typically anchored to the past when judging for innovations and they are 
traditionalists, they often come to adoption of an innovation in times in which it has already been 
surpassed by change. 
 
Fig. 18 – Fintech Adoption Index - 2017 
Source:EY 
Fig. 17 – Fintech Adoption Index- 2015 
Source: EY 
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As regards the geographical breakdown, the just mentioned index found the leading 
countries are China, India, UK, Brazil and Australia for 2017 (Gulamhuseinwala, Hatch, &  
Lloyd, 2017). Furthermore, the 2015-2017 index comparison (only available for the six 
countries already surveyed in 2015) indicates that the countries which experienced the 
greatest change in adoption rate are Australia (which passed from a 13% to a 37%) and UK 
(whose adoption index varied from 14,3% to 42%). 
The study has also found an increased awareness; in particular, for the six countries 
surveyed either in 2015 and in 2017, authors found the percentage of respondents aware of 
Fintech services rose from 62% to 84% (while across all the 20 markets, average awareness in 
2017 is at 86% of the surveyed population); this trend will probably be persistent as, 
according to the analysis conducted by Gulamhuseinwala, Hatch, &  Lloyd (2017) the 
adoption index is expected to increase, based on respondents anticipated future use, given the 
fall of people concerns and thanks to increased advancements in technology. 
So, one of the most significant barriers to Fintech services’ adoption, namely people 
“was not aware they existed”, already faced important reductions in the six countries of 
Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, UK and US; whilst another barrier to adoption 
analyzed and reported as “prefer to use a traditional financial services provider” experienced 
less significant variations and even a slight increase among Hong Kong respondents (see 
figure below) (Gulamhuseinwala, Hatch, &  Lloyd, 2017). 
Fig.19 – Fintech adoption barriers by countries 2015-2017 
Source: EY 
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The study on Fintech adoption index gives meaningful insights, not only in terms of 
popularity and people education about the services provided by Fintech companies, but also in 
portraying most active Fintech users’ typical identity; with this reference, the survey 
identified the most active cohort (giving an adoption index breakdown by age groups) in the 
25-34 years old population (with a rate of 48% regular Fintech users on the total same-aged 
surveyed population), followed by the 35-44 years old group (with an index of 41%), behind 
which we find the 18-24 aged (37%), the 45-54 (30%), the 55-64 (22%), the 65-74 (15%) and, 
finally, the over 75 (with a lower 9% adoption index) (Gulamhuseinwala, Hatch, &  Lloyd, 
2017). The most active cohorts are more digital-savvy and also in such a age they need a 
wider range of financial services, in addition to this, they, in particular the youngest, still do 
not have a strong relationship with a traditional provider, for this reason the 25-34 aged are 
the least likely to cite “prefer to use a traditional financial services provider” as barrier to 
Fintech adoption, versus respondents over 65 years old, who indicated it as a reason whit 
much higher frequency (see figure below). 
 
According to the Gulamhuseinwala, Hatch, &  Lloyd analysis (2017), Fintech users are 
often (64% of them all) willing to manage their lives through digital channels, with respect to 
Fintech non-users (among which only 38% is willing to do it), who proved to be less digital-
addicted. Furthermore, people using Fintech services are doing it on an enlarged and 
diversified spectrum, meaning many of them rely on more than one Fintech service and 13% 
of Fintech users diversified till the extent they use five or more different Fintech services: 
with this reference, EY authors define them “super-users”. 
Fig. 20 – Fintech adoption barriers by age groups 
Source: EY 
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Fintech is gaining momentum and the analysis made by EY sees many countries at an 
higher than average rate of adoption, thus, applying Rogers’ theory of Diffusion of 
Innovation
61
, it also finds that all of the surveyed markets passed by the “innovators” phase; 
this means Fintech is not a peripheral phenomenon anymore, rather in many of the analyzed 
countries it is coming to critical mass adoption among digitally active population, that is the 
one Fintech companies address. 
Even if all of the surveyed respondents with the purpose of EY analysis of adoption 
index are digitally active, Fintech users appear definitely more likely to use also other online 
services, in particular on-demand services (e.g. food delivery services), and they are more 
active parties of “sharing economy” (e.g. bike rental services) with respect to Fintech non-
users (see figure below) (Gulamhuseinwala, Hatch, &  Lloyd, 2017). 
 
Overall, it is evident that Fintech market is already a significant one, with adoption on 
the rise and with consumers geographical patterns following the “first the Rest then the 
West”62 logic in adoption, as it is increasingly happening for cutting-edge technological 
innovations; far from being a Western economies’ privilege, and thanks to legacy-freedom 
and macro-economic potential of the “Rest” areas, Fintech is flowing more rapidly in 
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 See previous note. 
 
62
 See for example:  https://dailyfintech.com/2015/09/09/digital-financial-inclusion-driving-first-the-rest-then-
the-west-trend/ on the point. 
Fig. 21 – Fintech users vs. non-users: use of other online services 
Source: EY 
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adoption in East geographies and it is taking roots among youngest and most tech-savvy 
population above significant threshold throughout many markets. 
 
2.5. Investors’ perspective on Fintech: a valuable market 
 
As highlighted previously in this work, investments in Fintech have been significant in recent 
years (especially after 2013) and they served, in particular VC investments, as a driving factor 
for Fintech phenomenon to burst. A crucial year was 2015, during which financing deals 
skyrocketed (see figure above and the following). 
As highlighted in figure above, despite the lower number of deals (which mainly 
reflects activity trends across VC market), recent VC activity in Fintech still appears to stay 
robust in terms of value and, during Q3 of 2017, Fintech attracted a total of $3.3 billion in VC 
investments, keeping growing with respect to previous quarters of 2017 and with this quarter 
being the fifth in terms of value (among the tracked quarters); also, VC has still remained the 
dominant type of investment in Fintech (for example with respect to M&As, given the fact 
that many Fintech players are still evolving) (KPGM, 2017a). 
Fig. 22 – Global VC activity in Fintech 
Source: KPMG 
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Considering not only VCs, rather all of Fintech financing deals (VC, PE & M&A), 
again a slight reduction has been registered in transactions volumes globally quarter over 
quarter: they passed from 293 deals in Q2 of 2017 to a lower amount of 274 in Q3, for a total 
value of $8.2 billion (see figure below) (KPMG, 2017a). 
 
As regards a breakdown of overall deals by geographies (Americas, Europe, Asia only) 
the Q3 of 2017 saw Americas, as leading area, with $5.35 billion and 158 deals (with US 
contributing to the greater extent), followed by Europe, with $1.66 billion and 73 deals, and 
Asia, which reached $1.21 billion across 41 deals (KPGM, 2017a). 
By looking at previous years’ quarter3 results, and with a focus on VC investments 
only, we could claim that Q3 2015 was dominated by US in terms of deals value’s share, 
followed by Asia in Q3 2016; but, as far as Q3 2017 is concerned, Europe role in terms of 
deals’ value’s share completely changed: indeed, in relative terms to the total amount of VC 
funding for the third quarter of the year, it rose to about 20% in 2017 (see figure below)
63
. 
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 The author analysis on the Q3 results for years 2015-2017 has been made on the basis of the following 
researches: KPMG & CB Insights analysis of 2015Venture funding in Fintech (KPMG & CB INSIGHTS, 
2016b), KPMG & CB Insights analysis of Q3 2016 results on the same topic (KPMG & CB INSIGHTS, 2016a) 
and on KPMG analysis of similar results for Q3 2017 (KPMG, 2017a). From within each report data on global 
total VC funding were gained and considered as total amount, in order to present a geographical breakdown of 
the same for the main areas of interest: US, Europe and Asia. The latter breakdown is obtained by calculating the 
Fig. 23 – Global investment activity (VC, PE and M&A) in Fintech companies 
Source: KPMG 
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This is probably a clear evidence of Europe entering a more mature and substantial 
phase on Fintech, with larger deals’ values and with the emergence of different active hubs, 
but also with a higher awareness of incumbents, in particular banks, of the innovative 
phenomenon within Financial Services; indeed Corporate Venture Capital is a very active 
type of investment as a way to outsource innovation, and, in Europe, we see especially banks 
acting this way (KPMG, 2017a). 
 
The geographical distribution of Q3 2017 top – by value - investment deals in Fintech 
(VC, PE and M&A) was dominated by US, a geographic area characterized by a significant 
presence of megadeals; in particular, the distribution saw six out of ten top deals for US, 
namely Intacct ($850 million), CardConnect ($750 million), Xactly ($564 million), 
Merchants’ Choice Payments Solutions ($470 million), Access Point Financial ($350 million) 
and Service Finance Company ($304 million); the following one only for Asia, Dianrong 
($220 million), and, finally, two deals for Europe, these were ConCardis ($806 million) in 
Germany and Prodigy Finance ($240 million) in UK; while another left top deal was closed in 
Canada and it was TIO Network ($238.9 million) one (KPMG, 2017a). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rough percentages shown in the figure (considering the VC funding value for each quarter and geographical area, 
as presented in the above researches). 
Fig. 24 – VC funding: a geographical breakdown comparison over Q3 for years 2015-2017 
Source: author analysis on KPMG data 
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In order to state which have been the top VC deals (by deal value) and who the most 
active investors (by deal volume) throughout the first half of 2017, Innovate Finance recently 
summarized the first half of the year results, listing the most active investors (as 500 Startups, 
Startupbootcamp, Y Combinator, each making 17 deals in H1 2017) and also presenting some 
notable examples of deals (see figure below), such as: SoFi (in US), a company active in 
lending (from student loans to mortgages) and wealth management, which raised about $500 
million funds for expansion
64
; Paytm (in India); Atom Bank (in UK); iZettle and Klarna (in 
Sweden); etc. 
 
 
Fig. 25 – Top Deals and Investors; H1 2017 
Source: Innovate Finance 
 
2.5.1. Mapping innovation: Fintech hubs and leading geographies 
 
The rise of Fintech and the subsequent flowering of opportunities, for incumbents and for new 
participants of Financial Services, are facilitated by the emergence, all over the world, of 
communities which are paving the way to the future of Financial Services industry and which 
prove to be more active in exploring Fintech themes and implications. These communities 
play a very important role for the transformation of this industry mainly because they allow 
entrepreneurs, innovators, bank experts, technological talents, investors to meet and, also, 
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 See: https://www.sofi.com/press/sofi-announces-500-million-strategic-growth-investment-led-silver-lake/  
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because they provide them a series of enabling structures which make easier to deliver 
innovation. 
Among the affirmed and the emerging ones, we mention here some leading hubs for 
Fintech and explain the underlying factors which contributed to the development of these 
communities. Many of them are also considered crucial centers for the Financial Services 
industry as a whole, as the existence of a developed industry can itself be a significant catalyst 
for the rise of Fintech; with this reference, for example, Barba Navaretti, Calzolari, Pozzolo, 
(2017) measured the correlation between investment in Fintech companies and Credit/GDP 
ratio
65
 (see figure below) and found that the first are larger in more financially developed 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
By the way, other factors, e.g. the regulatory state of the Country of the communities, 
the proximity with universities which provide Fintech ecosystem with needed talents, etc. are 
crucial too; also, as Cockerton (2016) highlights ,the existence of a crowded startup 
community is a determinant factor, as many serial investors consider worthy to meet all of 
their funded companies by one single travel (think of Silicon Valley as the most 
representative example of this) and even because this facilitate innovators to partner. 
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 The authors used data from CBInsights and the World Bank’s Global Financial Development Database and, as 
they reported, “Credit to GDP ratio is the total value of credit to the private sector as a percentage of nominal 
GDP. The sample includes the following countries: Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.” 
Fig. 26 – Correlation between investment in Fintech companies and Credit to GDP ratio 
Source: Barba Navaretti, Calzolari, Pozzolo, 2017 
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Despite some common drivers which characterize the Fintech leading geographies, as 
Gnirck & Visser (2016) point out, there are peculiar characteristics of each which contribute 
to its importance in Fintech and there are very different backgrounds between the Fintech 
hubs located in the developed countries and those in the developing economies; as a matter of 
fact, while the first rely on Fintech to innovate and add value to the most traditional financial 
services, the latter are prompted to innovate by the underlying need to address some critical 
issues, “pain points” (e.g. the one of financial inclusion), strongly felt in their economies and 
which have been turned into market opportunities. 
All of the above determinants contributed, together with several specific characteristics 
that we will discuss for each hub, to the emergence of the following Fintech leading 
geographies (as London, Singapore, New York, Silicon Valley, Hong Kong, etc.); by the way, 
the list is not exhaustive, as throughout the world we are witnessing to the growth of Fintech 
communities, with new nascent hubs, such as Vienna, focused on niche areas of the whole 
Fintech universe, and with a rising number of regions which try to cope with innovation in 
Financial Services and to have an active role with this reference. 
In order to map the state of the art of Fintech in geographies throughout the world, 
Deloitte and Global Fintech Hubs Federation (2017) recently presented a study which profiles 
44 hubs and assesses how conducive they are for supporting Fintech. This study, which led to 
the assignment of an “index performance score66” for each hub (either to the “new” ones, 
namely those added to the list in 2017, either to the “old” hubs, that are less recently emerged 
hubs which were included in the previous edition of the study). 
The scores (showed in figure below) are useful to make comparisons on a global base 
and to have a broad understanding of where innovation in financial service is boosting; as a 
matter of fact they somehow confirm which are the deemed leading hubs for Fintech (London, 
Singapore, New York, Silicon Valley, etc.) while shining a light on where emergent hubs are 
in comparison to them. 
 
 
 
                                                          
66
 The scores given to each hub shall be intended as follows: the lower the index, the more the hub is supportive 
for Fintech. The index is an aggregated total of three indicators: “Global Financial Centre Index” (a measure of 
the hub’s competitiveness as a financial center); “Doing Business Index” (a measure of the hub’s ease of doing 
business, based mainly on the government and regulatory support to setting up a new business) and “Global 
Innovation Index”. 
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Fig. 27 – Fintech hubs: Index Performance Scores on 44 cities 
Source: Deloitte, 2017 
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- London: Europe’s main hub 
It is often referred as Europe’s heart for Fintech development; what renders it a leading 
example in Fintech hubs for Europe is, according to many (Cockerton, 2016), a series of 
factors, such as: the state of financial services, as the city can rely on a well-established 
financial sector and thus on the presence of many industry experts and of many banks, in 
addition to the abundance of funds for the setting up of a new firm; also, UK’s governmental 
measures, they are facilitators for new firms to settle down, think for example of gentle tax 
rates and labor laws and even to its cutting edge Fintech-specific regulatory attempts (which 
we will discuss further in the chapter).  
Furthermore, London boasts a favorable investment climate, as the possibility to meet 
investors or to attend lots of networking events is high, and also a very good talent pool, given 
by the mulidisciplinarity and multinationality of the people living in London; these, coupled 
with the excellence of London’s Universities and with their engagement with the community, 
are also considered crucial by Cockerton, (2016) because they bring to an understanding of 
different markets and to the development of “diversity” within businesses, that is something 
needed to foster change and innovation. 
Given the above and in order to maintain this leading position, London has also seen the 
emergence of many Fintech-related institutions, as Innovate Finance
67
 organization, which 
prompt themselves the development of the community (Cockerton, 2016). For all of these 
reasons many champions of the Fintech ecosystem are based here; as highlighted by Deloitte 
(2017) some of London “Top Fintech Companies” include: “Atom Bank, Azimo, Clear Score, 
Crowdcube, Currency Cloud, Digital Shadows, DueDil, Ebury, eToro, Funding Circle, Go 
Cardless, Iwoca, Kantox, LendInvest, Market Invoice, Monzo, Nutmeg, Property Partner, 
Ratesetter, Revolut, Seedrs, Starling Bank, Syndicate Room, Tandem, Transferwise, World 
First, World Remit, Worldpay, Zopa”. 
 
- Singapore: South-East Asia strategic point of reference 
According to EY (2016) and Gnirck & Visser (2016), Singapore is still emergent on 
some aspects but it is gaining traction within Fintech ecosystem, mainly due to political 
factors, such as, the overall ease of doing business, good talent immigration schemes  and 
because of the presence of a dedicated Fintech team in the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS), which tries to promote partnerships for the development of the industry and which 
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committed, in 2015, $225 million for the next five years to the “Financial Sector Technology 
& Innovation” (FSTI) scheme. 
Furthermore, Gnirck & Visser (2016), highlights how important are Singapore’s 
strategic positioning in geographic terms, its high financial maturity combined with a 
significant technological readiness, and the education development on the theme 
demonstrated by local educational institutes. 
 
- New York: a main financial center opportunities 
This city main characteristics are the development of its financial center and the  
presence of some among the largest financial institutions, thus offering Fintech support in 
several ways, either by funding them (US investments used to lead by value in the peak years 
of Fintech financing) either by initiating collaborations; also, this directly translates into 
availability of talents, especially from the Financial Services industry (EY, 2016). 
Furthermore, New York boasts impressive proximity with customers, as local demand is 
very high for innovative financial services. Another important factor on its favor is the 
investment culture of New York, which represent a catalyst for startups growth. 
 
- California: technology and entrepreneurship hometown 
This geographic area owes its merit within Fintech ecosystem because of, above all, the 
impressive talent pool of the area; this is mainly given by the presence of an unmatched 
startup ecosystem and due to the fact that many technological companies are headquartered 
here; this environment is also populated by numerous investors and entrepreneurs, thus 
ensuring to Fintech high investment availability (EY, 2016). 
 
- Hong Kong: promising hub to be developed 
It benefits from the proximity to China and since it is considered “Asia’s largest 
financial centre” (Deloitte, 2017); according to the index score Hong Kong does better in 
financial center competitiveness and in ease of doing business, than in terms of innovation. 
Similar considerations can be found in EY (2016) analysis: according to it, financial services 
talent is high here, while the area suffers a cultural aversion towards risk and, as a 
consequence, entrepreneurial talent is poor or it is imported and this is seen as a limit. 
 
- Vienna: an emergent payment hub 
There is a rising interest towards Vienna as Austria’s capital could be, according to 
Haas & Bierbaumer (2016), the right place for  the establishment of a very vertical hub, 
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namely the one of payments; this view is shared by the authors and attributed to several 
factors of pertinence of Vienna, such as: its strategic location, within Europe, its banks’ high 
presence throughout CEE region, a rising number of startups in the payment class, the 
presence of noteworthy investors (e.g. SpeedInvest) and even the fact that Austria is the 
country of origin of NFC technology, the current standard for contactless payments. 
 
In conclusion, provided the above description of main Fintech geographies, we would 
like to offer a comparative analysis of the most important ones; the latter was drawn up by EY 
(2016) with the attempt to compare and benchmark seven well-known regions of Fintech, 
namely UK, California, New York, Germany, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia. These 
are compared in the study we would like to mention, on the basis of four attributes that EY 
(2016) considers crucial for the success of a geography towards Fintech growth; these are: 
“Talent”; “Capital”; “Policy (government policy across regulation, tax and sector growth 
initiatives)”; “Demand (end-client demand across consumers, corporates and financial 
institutions)”. 
The analysis of EY (2016), which overall ranked UK as the leading region for Fintech 
because of a combined good level of all of the attributes, gives interesting insights in 
comparative terms; for example, the report highlighted that (see figure below):  
- as far as talent is concerned, UK is considered to lead “financial expertise”, but to be 
lacking in terms of entrepreneurship if compared to California (scored highest on 
Talent), especially because of the existence of a very “vibrant entrepreneurial 
community”; by the way, the lowest ranked in this field is Hong-Kong; 
- as far as capital is concerned, UK is considered good for early-stage but California 
stays dominant considering all types of investments; the analysis also takes into 
consideration that, despite being the third-largest geography for capital investments 
(with a total of £524m of FinTech investment in 2015), UK numbers are much smaller 
than California’s (£3.6b) and New York’s (£1.4b) ones for the same period; 
- moving to policy, UK is considered first, thus the most supportive region for  
regulatory regime (in particular, the report mentions a greater manageability for the 
authorization process and the tax incentives, together with the UK’s government 
initiative to fuel competition at the benefit of innovation); beside the first ranked, EY 
places Singapore as “an attractive place” and Australia as a region which is trying to 
incentivize innovation; 
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- finally, the demand attribute (here deemed either consumers’ one and also the 
businesses and Financial Institutions’ ones) sees its highest score in New York; with 
UK high score especially as far as SMEs demand is concerned. 
 
 
 
 
- Italy: what is the state of the art of our country’s Fintech community 
As far as Italy is concerned, the only city included as Fintech hub in the study by 
Deloitte on 44 cities is Milan; it is there scored 128, namely 117 points distant than the best 
scored London (whose index is 11). Despite this distance with the best in class London, given 
mainly by a less competitive financial center and by a less favorable environment for 
businesses to be run in Milan, the presence of the Italian hub is an important sign of how Italy 
is trying to follow other geographies’ example. Here, as highlighted in the report by Deloitte 
(2017), the most active investors are, among others, Innogest SGR, Principia SGR, United 
Ventures, Invitalia (public), Primomiglio SGR, SellaVentures, H – Farm Ventures, Vertis Sgr, 
etc., while some representative Italian startups can be considered: 
Fig. 28 – Benchmarked ranking of FinTech ecosystems 
Source: EY, 2016 
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- Satispay68; an Italian Fintech founded in 2013; its mission is “Make the smart choice 
when moving your money”, as it offers an alternative system of mobile payments that 
allows consumers to make free peer-to-peer transfers and free easy payments from 
their smartphones, either online and in physical partner stores; also, for businesses, the 
platform allows payments from individuals to merchants; 
- Borsadelcredito.it69; an online lending marketplace which allows applicant SMEs in 
search for funding to meet potential lenders (either other firms or banks) and the latter 
to invest their money; since its launch the Fintech has allowed more than 22 million 
euros to be lent to Italian, mainly from Lombardy region, SMEs. 
Furthermore, in order to understand the current Italian Fintech landscape, it is worthy to 
mention a recent initiative launched just in Milan, as the city represent the financial center of 
the country; it is the “Fintech District70”, namely an open ecosystem created to support and 
represent the Italian Fintech community. It was established in 2017, by SellaLab and 
Copernico; the first is the innovation center and accelerator of the Italian bank Banca Sella 
Holding Spa, while the second is a platform to grow and accelerate businesses and which 
provides smart working solutions. At the Fintech District several events are held to let Fintech 
stakeholders meet and make networking, just with the aim to give Italian Fintech a significant 
support; there are several partners supporting the initiative, such as Cisco or other accelerators 
and many Italian Fintech startups are members of the district, among which the ones 
mentioned above. 
 
2.6. Regulation and Fintech: some representative legislative initiatives to regulate 
innovation in Europe 
 
As Fintech firms enter the field of providing financial services, their businesses should 
consider regulation an aspect of paramount importance; as said before, this could impact 
Fintech firms’ business models till the extent it could be considered a challenge for new-
comers to win in order to succeed in bringing innovation within financial services. As a 
matter of fact, handling regulation is a very complex task within the supply of financial 
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 See: https://www.borsadelcredito.it/  
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 See: http://www.fintechdistrict.com/  
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services and Fintech rises many regulatory challenges for new participants, for incumbents 
and for consumers too. 
The main rationale underlying the first legislative attempts and the next future 
directions of regulators, when trying to norm the Fintech and the innovation in financial 
services, is and should remain the simultaneous pursuit of consumers’ protection (with 
reference to their money and their financial data security), together with the need for financial 
stability (ensuring financial institutions’ safety requirements compliance) and for innovation 
support. In particular, given the latter objective, the regulators should act in a constant search 
for an equilibrium between the willingness to regulate innovation, not to risk it flows into 
shadow activities and in order to provide a level field of competition with banks, and, on the 
other hand, the desire not to overload innovators, at the expense of their agile structures and 
inner core values; furthermore, considering the great opportunities related to collaboration 
between Fintech and banks, regulators’ focus should also be on how to promote such 
matching. 
In order to present a brief overview of current state of the art in Fintech regulations, we 
wish to mention here some benchmark initiatives undertaken in Europe, which tried to 
address the above key objectives. 
First of all, these include the establishment of regulatory sandboxes; according to 
Deloitte (2017), in Europe, there are 5 countries (UK, Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland and 
Norway) which are currently experiencing with a  regulatory sandbox, namely a regulatory-
driven attempt to experiment with innovative projects, by allowing some businesses to test 
their innovative products, services or business models in a “live environment” thus 
conducting a market trial with the support of regulators. By the way, only two of the above 
sandboxes, in UK and Netherlands, are currently “live” (already launched and receiving 
applications) while the others are “proposed” (not effective yet); but they signal a regulatory 
commitment and Europe is also seeing some of its countries (UK, France, Switzerland) where 
regulators are trying to cooperate with others for international regulatory projects (Deloitte, 
2017). 
In UK, the regulatory sandbox is under the control of the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) and it was launched in June 2016. As the FCA’s website dedicated section explains, 
“The sandbox seeks to provide firms with: 
- the ability to test products and services in a controlled environment 
- reduced time-to-market at potentially lower cost 
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- support in identifying appropriate consumer protection safeguards to build into new 
products and services 
- better access to finance.”71 
For example, based on each applicant’s case and needs, the sandbox offers some 
“sandbox tools” to the selected participants of the project; these are: 
- “Restricted authorization”; instead of entering the traditional authorization and 
registration process, the participants to the sandbox can be given a restricted and 
tailored authorization by the FCA in order to be ready for the test in a shorter time and 
at lower cost; 
- “Individual guidance”; the authority offers a close advice on regulatory aspects and 
requirements; 
- “Waivers or modifications to our rules”; in face of the test to be run the FCA can 
eventually modify some of its requirements, if it is deemed helpful; 
- “No enforcement action letters”; it is a measure by which the FCA accepts possible 
“unexpected issues” to arise from the test and does not take disciplinary actions during 
the test period; 
- “Informal steers”; for products that are at an early stage of development.  
Thus, the establishment of regulatory sandboxes allows the participants to innovation in 
Financial Services to benefit from the possibility to test and validate a new idea within a 
controlled time frame and customer base and relying on the support from the government; as a 
matter of fact many startups fail to pass their initial phase, because of, among the others, a 
possibly poor experience in regulations and this is extremely true for Fintech. 
Such support to innovators, in turn, allows the regulatory body to identify the issues 
underlying any potential innovation and to be ready in dealing with them at the benefit of 
consumers’ protection. Finally, such initiatives can benefit the incumbents too; as a matter of 
fact, looking at the list of participants selected up to date, we also find innovative projects 
launched by banks, such as: HSBC SaveSmart, an app for smart saving launched by the bank 
in partnership with the Fintech startup Pariti technologies. 
Furthermore, UK is worthy to be known also for other regulatory initiatives related to 
innovation; for example, UK government tried to promote innovation and collaboration in 
Financial Services through the “Bank Referral Scheme”; an initiative, effective from 
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November 2016, that requires banks to refer a SME to alternative finance platforms, if it has 
been rejected after a funding request to the traditional financial institution. The rationale of 
this regulation lies in the commitment of UK government to fuel lending to small and medium 
enterprises, since this suffered a reduction by large banks, due to profitability and regulatory 
concerns, as we have seen above. The initiative was launched because many of the SMEs 
unserved by banks were not aware of the alternative finance possibilities they could turn to or 
they were not able to choose the best ones to address for their needs. 
The scheme functioning is the following, as explained by the British Business Bank and 
summarized in figure below; if the applicant SME meets the eligibility criteria of the scheme, 
one of the participating banks after having rejected its funding request, automatically refers 
the client to one of the designated platforms; the platforms help the referred SME to find the 
best alternative finance options. The designated platforms of the scheme enable comparisons 
for funding options for businesses easily; they are: Alternative business funding
72
; Business 
finance compared
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; Funding Options
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; Funding Exchange
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Fig. 29 – UK: banks’ referral scheme 
Source: British Business Bank 
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- Revised Payment Service Directive, PSD2: Directive (EU) 2015/2366 
The main European attempt to regulate innovation is the PSD2; the objective of the 
directive is to render international electronic payments easier, more efficient and safer. 
Furthermore, it opens the supply of payments services to new entrants, with the aim of fueling 
competition at the benefit of customers and in order to reduce prices, while regulating their 
conduct. It entered in force in January 2016 and EU countries had to adopt the directive into 
national law by January 2018. 
Dirk Haubrich, Head of the Consumer Protection, Financial Innovation and Payments at 
the European Banking Authority stated in an interview from the CNBC (2017) that the PSD2, 
“has the explicit objective to bring about competition in the market for payment services and 
to facilitate innovation in the market for payment services across the 28 member states of the 
EU”; in addition to this, other underlying objectives of the PSD2 are “increasing security” for 
payments and making them more convenient for customers. 
The Directive asks banks to open their accounts to external parties, (Third Party 
Payment Service Providers), authorized in providing payments services; the novelty supports 
the idea of “open banking” and this comes at the particular benefit of new participants, such 
as: 
- account information service providers; those players which allow users of payment 
services to track their financial situation and to have an overview of their financial resources, 
in order to help their management; 
- payment initiation service providers; those which allow online payments. 
By the way, the PSD2 should also be seen in traditional banks’ favor since, as HSBC’s 
Josh Bottomley said to CNBC (2017), it facilitates the sharing of data, thus hopefully 
allowing also to a banker to provide customers a wiser advice, by letting him understand and 
know the customers’ whole financial data situation. 
As far as security is concerned, the directive sets standard requirements for e-payments 
and for the safeguard of consumers’ financial data; it also calls for rules in terms of 
transparency of conditions and information for payments; consumer rights are protected also 
thanks to the reduction of the liability for some non-authorized payments and thanks to the 
removal of fees for the use of cards for payments. Finally, the directive is meant to strengthen 
the role of the EBA, for example by asking it to develop a public register of authorized 
payments providers, to be kept updated by national authorities. 
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Fig. 30 – Main changes brought by PSD2 - 1 
Source: European Payments Council, 2017 
Fig. 31 – Main changes brought by PSD2 – 2 
Source: European Payments Council, 2017 
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Fig. 32 – Main changes brought by PSD2 - 3 
Source: European Payments Council, 2017 
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CHAPTER 3 - HOW BANKS WILL COPE WITH DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 
AND EMBRACE INNOVATION 
 
The objective of this chapter is, firs of all, to acknowledge the importance for banks to 
innovate their businesses and to approach the change in face of the emergent conditions and 
of the disruptive forces reshaping their industry, in order to subsequently analyze how this 
change can be achieved. Indeed, the entrance of new participants in their industry is forcing 
banks to develop new capabilities required by customers and to face new competitive forces; 
either by pursuing in-house innovative initiatives or by relying on Fintech to bring them what 
it needs to be competitive. 
The specific issue of interest is thus analyzing how banks are implementing the change 
imposed by new market conditions, either in terms of in-house development of innovative 
offerings and also in terms of acquisition of new core capabilities from the external: with this 
reference, we discuss how the organic pursuit of innovation by banks is happening and also 
which role have the deals of  M&As and the strategic alliances that banks are putting in place 
with Fintech players. 
Keeping in mind all of the above possible different strategies via with banks are 
embracing innovation, we discuss the benefits, risks, processes and characteristics underlying 
each of them, trying to assess what could be an effective way for banks to innovate 
themselves. Given the above objective and considering recent trends, we mention some 
noteworthy cases of strategies for  innovation recently seen in the banking industry. 
 
3.1. The imperative of innovation: banks’ need to change and face competition 
 
In recent years Financial Services, as many other industries, have experienced a significant 
disruption mainly triggered by digital technology; a 2015 study by the Global Center For 
Digital Business Transformation (an IMD and CISCO initiative) had ranked it 4
th
 out of 12 in 
“vulnerability76 to competitive disruption by digital technology” (Bradley, Loucks, Macaulay, 
Noronha, Wade, 2015). 
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The evidence of disruption is indeed a fact; however, sometimes, it fails to be 
recognized in many organizations either in terms of importance and in terms of potential risk; 
thus, according to Bradley, Loucks, Macaulay, Noronha & Wade (2015), 45% of companies 
(across industries and countries) seemed not to consider digital disruption a matter that is 
“worthy a board-level attention” and 43% of them did not see adequately disruption-related 
risky consequences; in a nutshell, only 25% of them self-evaluated as “proactive” with 
reference to the phenomenon. 
The digital disruption has been and still is changing the competitive dynamics within 
many industries, the profitability and attractiveness of which, using the 5 competitive forces 
framework by Porter (2008), is questioned by factors like innovation and technology and it is 
seriously threatened by new-entrants’ and substitutes’ increasing pressure, due to technology-
eroded entry barriers and to new business models based on disintermediation of industry 
incumbents, and even by customers’ enlarged force, if we consider how technology is 
empowering buyers and putting them at the center of strategy-making. 
If we look at Financial Services industry’s competition, in particular, we see it is more 
intense today than it used to be in past years, not only among industry rivals, but also between 
incumbents and new entrants (like tech giants) or substitutes (such as disruptors coming from 
Fintech universe) or customers (who are becoming more informed and influent). 
If compared to other businesses, such as the airlines’ or the travel agencies’ ones, the 
retail financial services have been feeling the threat of digital disruption just recently, most of 
all because they’ve always used to be a very regulated business and the complexity of 
regulation used to protect their industry from the entrance of disruptors; by the way, many 
new participants to Financial Services industry have recently started to emerge by leveraging 
technology and mobile penetration at their own advantage and bypassing regulation by 
building vertical offers, namely very niche-focused and value-adding products and services 
(Lopez Moctezuma, 2018). 
This wave of disruption does not only trigger firms’ need to profoundly change 
themselves end-to-end, in terms of processes, culture and business models, but also forces 
them to strategy-making in terms of reaction to new competitive forces. Indeed, (as can be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
countries. The score assigned to each industry was based on the following parameters: “Investment” (the amount 
of investors’ contribution given to disruptors – as it can be predictive of the market’s bet/expectancies on 
disruption with reference to the industry), “Timing” (time-lasting of the impact triggered by disruption), 
“Means” (the measure of entry-barriers limiting the entrance of disruptors and, on the other hand, the means of 
disruption at disposal to digital disruptors), “Impact” (the weight of digital disruption’s effect on the industry, 
e.g. in terms of existent market shares, etc.). 
 
75 
 
seen in figure below), the surveyed industry participants (with reference to the above study on 
the assessment of digital disruption on industries’ reshaping) see an average of 4 firms 
belonging to their industry, namely about 4 out of their direct rivals, losing their places in the 
“Top 10” of their respective industries, with Financial Services ranking second in terms of 
industry-specific number of companies at risk; such places are often taken by “unicorns”77, 
whose commonness is on the rise, or, on a general basis, by digital disruptors (Bradley, 
Loucks, Macaulay, Noronha, & Wade, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within such prevailing context of profound change, the incumbent players often fail to 
fight or exploit disruptive forces; their inner barriers to innovation can be many, as cultural 
impediments towards change, lacking entrepreneurial mind-set and a rooted habit in 
performing established processes and routines. This made us accustomed to the death of many 
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 The term “unicorn”, within venture capitals and start-ups world, was coined to refer to startups with valuation 
of over $1billion; as the mythical term can easily recall, the rationale under such label lies in the low frequency 
of such cases. The list of current unicorns includes, among others, Uber, Airbnb, Spotify, Dropbox, till Lu.Com 
or Stripe (as Fintech companies). See: https://www.cbinsights.com/research-unicorn-companies  
Fig. 33 – The Mighty Will Fall 
Source: Global Center for Digital Business Transformation, 2015 
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champions which used to dominate their industries, till digital disruptors deposed them; just 
think of Blockbuster’s decline given the advent of Netflix. 
By the way, despite the common impediments and difficulties to face innovation and 
even taking into consideration the risks and possible drawbacks that come with the rise of 
digital disruption, we could say that today there are a large agreed consensus and a rising 
evidence of the beneficial aspects of such disruptive forces, for the society as a whole; 
although it may seem paradoxical, such belief is even shared among surveyed executives from 
industries currently threatened by digital disruption, as more than the majority of them agrees 
digital disruption is either “a form of progress” or “good for society” and it even “improves  
quality of life”, etc. (Bradley, Loucks, Macaulay, Noronha, & Wade, 2015). 
In a nutshell, many traditional firms know they cannot think to boast a competitive 
advantage for ever and, in the case of banking, there is an increasing awareness of the need to 
change. As a matter of fact, regardless how innovation will be put in place, listening to the 
imperative of change is vital, inevitable and wise at big banks’ organizations; in a very simple 
world, we could claim banks need to “fintegrate” (a term coined by Heather Cox, then-CEO 
of Citi FinTech), namely to adapt to change prompted by Fintech, to digest it and spread it 
throughout their organizations, and, finally, to learn from disruptors’ capabilities (Gandel, 
2016). 
 
3.2. How to embrace innovation: organic development and external sourcing of new 
capabilities 
 
As a consequence of industries’ reshaping seen above, banks have been facing the rise of 
Fintech platforms in recent years and many CEOs and managers within banking industry 
companies found themselves in front of a very debated decision: how to react to the 
emergence of innovators and new products and services.  
In particular, their options, in face of such changing industry conditions, were either to 
ignore this phenomenon, or to embrace it and somehow cope with the new-comers and the 
innovation they brought within Financial Services. Furthermore, in the latter case, banks 
should decide if: 
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 adapting to change with internal initiatives, relying on their resources and 
capabilities; 
 buying already developed Fintech platforms in the market, opting for M&A 
deals; 
 partnering with active Fintech players, forming strategic alliances. 
The first possible reaction, namely the one of simply ignoring the noise of innovation, 
would probably be the “easiest” in traditional banking firms’ shoes, but, despite an eventual 
short-term gain of not needing to implement any organizational change and manage its 
subsequent complexity and difficulties, this way would end up impairing banks’ businesses in 
the future, actually a not so far one. Indeed, the current threat from newcomers would become 
more dangerous, and, if banks simply ignored them trying not to retaliate and mitigate their 
entrance in the industry, the risk of losing customers in face of substitute products and 
services would become a reality. 
By the way, many banks, especially at first, ignored the Fintech phenomenon, either by 
minimizing its impact, as it usually happens with new digital business models, either by 
thinking they would not be likely to launch any “Fintech type” of financial services because 
of, among the others, a fear of cannibalizing their own traditional products and services. 
Indeed, if banks launch cheaper and more consumer-friendly services, they will probably lose 
a share of their traditional sales and see some of their customers migrating to the more 
innovative services. 
This possibility led many banks to opt for a “wait and see” approach, in particular in the 
first phase of Fintech emergence. By the way, even if there actually is the possibility of 
eroding some traditional sales with the launch of Fintech platforms by banks, the main risk of 
having such a passive attitude lies in the myopic belief that avoiding to be the one who 
promotes innovation will inhibit anyone else from doing it: this means that, whenever banks 
opt not for reacting to Fintech and disruption, they probably avoid being the one who 
cannibalize their traditional business lines’ sales, but there will be someone else ready to do it, 
as many industry professionals believe (Lopez Moctezuma, 2018) and as it happened in other 
industries in the recent years. 
On this point, Mr. Carlos Lopez Moctezuma, Head of New Digital Businesses at 
Bancomer and Global Director for Financial Inclusion at BBVA, claims that digital disruption 
is first of all about “sacrifice things”, also citing an example from his own organization 
which decided to launch a platform, called “Wibe”, to buy auto-insurance, at lower prices and 
78 
 
higher degrees of customization with respect to the bank’s branches’ traditional service; he 
thinks that, probably, a share of the bank traditional sales is lost with some customers opting 
to buy from the platform than from the branches, but, also, the point is the company is 
“acquiring clients from the open market” and “stealing those clients from the competitors” 
(Lopez Moctezuma, 2018). 
The willingness to avoid this risk of sacrificing some traditional sales and, often, the 
need to satisfy shareholders on shorter time horizons and gains, could have led some banks 
not to be adequately prepared to innovation: taken to the extreme, failing or refusing to react 
to changing conditions fueled by the rise of Fintech poses banks to the risk of being 
substituted in their traditional role. By the way, if not substituted as, for example, Blockbuster 
was, considering how important banks are within economic systems and also due to the fact 
that newcomers mainly focus on niches of the whole banking industry’s value chain, banks 
which do not react to Fintech and innovation actually take the risk of “commoditization”. 
As a matter of fact, while some (Barba Navaretti, Calzolari, & Pozzolo, 2017) firmly 
sustain that “FinTechs will not replace banks” at least in many of their traditional functions, 
and, as a consequence, they do not see banks’ business questioned and threatened as many 
other already disrupted by digital technology, according to Mead (2016), there currently is the 
“utilities risk” for banks, meaning they risk to end by being perceived as mere back-office 
suppliers in their industry (since many Fintech services need anyway to rely on banks to offer 
their service), letting instead all the merit for innovation, in terms of delivery of consumer-
friendly services and, in general, in terms of management of the customer relationship, to the 
disruptors, namely Fintech. 
Given the above, thus since the choice to ignore the phenomenon actually appears not to 
be wise enough, banks need to react to the Fintech revolution and to adapt to the new kind of 
experience that customers are requiring; the range of possibilities that financial institutions 
have in order to implement change and face current competitive scenario can be to either 
“build” innovation organically, adapting by themselves, or to “buy” it via M&A deals, or to 
“ally” with any from Fintech universe to jointly co-develop something new, or, even, to opt 
for a mix of the above strategies. 
This means traditional major banks are currently facing a crucial corporate strategy 
decision in terms of what to do organically and what to achieve via M&As or partnerships 
with Fintech, this means many banks already internalized the “why”, namely the reasons 
behind the current need to change, and they see themselves currently wondering on the 
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“how”, thus strategizing on which should be the most appropriate way to produce and 
distribute competitive products and services similar to Fintech offerings. 
 
3.2.1. How to “build” innovation in banks: rationales, processes and challenges of 
developing new capabilities in-house 
 
Today’s banks fight for success and future prosperity is strictly tied to a bank ability to 
innovate; as seen above, banks are called to innovate their services and to be competitive with 
those offered by new-comers in the industry. 
Innovation of financial services, by the way, is not an easy process and, in particular, 
financial services are characterized by a high level of “intangibility” and by “simultaneity of 
production and consumption”: the first characteristic implies that innovation for these 
services should be implemented via high levels of communication within the financial 
institution, as we are not talking about tangible products whose inner characteristics and also 
eventually added/changed features are easily visible and touchable; while the second 
characteristic of financial services has an impact in terms of “user involvement” in the 
innovation process, this indeed should be high in order to develop effective innovations 
(Vermeulen, 2004). 
Taking into consideration the above characteristics of financial services and studying 
the processes that Financial Services firms usually adopt to manage innovation, Vermeulen 
(2004) concluded that there usually are four very well-known barriers to innovation in these 
firms, namely:  
 “Functionally departmentalized structures”, an organizationally feature which 
causes many time scarce or weak interactions among different departments, or 
even tensions among them, as they can feel to have “conflicting priorities” and 
often enter “battles for resources”; 
 “Limited use of New Product Development (NPD) tools”, as many times 
financial institutions are not used to those methods, such as inter-functionality, 
thus, for example, they fail in creating dedicated and very close teams to work 
on projects, opting instead for dedicating to innovation process some human 
resources belonging to other departments, and, by doing this, discouraging 
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innovation which becomes just an extra-task than ordinary ones and which is not 
well perceived among these people who fail to communicate effectively; 
 “Conservative organizational culture”, this is a very common barrier, even if 
many banks and insurance companies started eroding it and understanding the 
need for change, but, especially for some more technical department, there still 
is a shared avoidance towards the inherent risks of innovation; 
 “Constraining information technology”, an impediment which mainly refers to 
the lack of IT people within banks and even to the existence of legacy structures 
which could render very difficult a shift towards more innovative products. 
These general innovation barriers in banks can render the reliance on internal resources 
and initiatives not enough to deliver innovation and to face disruption; but, despite the above, 
and with reference to the recently required change, many players within Financial Services 
industry opted to “build” innovation internally, with their own capabilities, and, for example, 
they are trying to build up internal team dedicated to innovation; but, such teams can be truly 
efficient if their function is just the one to deal with innovation on a daily basis, not to run into 
the above described difficulties for innovation. 
For this reason, many times the innovation dedicated teams, created in face of Fintech 
revolution, are equipped with talented people from the outside of the bank’s organization (for 
example, with young talents coming from most well-known technology Universities and from 
backgrounds different from the banking and finance ones only) just to avoid the risk of not 
having in the team the right attitude towards innovation. 
Another popular strategy that banks have been adopting in order to launch their own 
Fintech businesses and to implement change within their organizations, is the creation of 
dedicated divisions via the model of innovation labs or hubs: initiatives run by and within 
banks to gain ideas from disruptive “makers” and to foster innovation, often fueled by 
competitive contests.  
A popular characteristic of such labs/hubs is, again, the reliance on external talents, 
especially the youngest and tech-savviest ones that banks try to be able to attract; indeed, the 
underlying idea is that existing workforce alone could not be able to propose innovative and 
cutting-edge technological ideas, while talents from the outside of the bank could. Diversity is 
seen, with this reference, as a competitive advantage for innovation to flourish; many 
backgrounds and industries of pertinence characterize people hired within innovation labs, as 
long as, according to Sonea’s (2016) considerations on innovation labs, such diversity is 
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actually respected thus searching either for the “nerds” young talents but also for people 
strictly rooted into banking business, in other words those able to bring “hard”, namely 
technical, skills too. 
This strategy, while opening the bank’s space to an inflow of innovation, can still allow 
the traditional organization to maintain the control on the development of the new products 
and services and also lets banks to retain the produced knowledge and capabilities within the 
firm’s boundaries. 
Furthermore, this choice lets banks develop talented people groups able to foster further 
innovation. Just the centrality of people involved with reference to the pursuit of an effective 
internal innovation strategy for banks also explains the location choices for such hubs: within 
their global presence and network, banks often place their innovation labs in the most 
prominent geographies in terms of talented people concentration (New York, Singapore, etc.). 
According to Sonea (2016), “an innovation lab is a Noah’s ark of professions and 
specialisms”, a definition which highlights how such labs should be endowed with very 
different species of professionals, just to lever on this “combination” for an efficient 
innovation to come out; by the way, such heterogeneity, which characterizes a successful 
innovation lab, requires adequate management and organization: first of all, in terms of 
“common language” creation, thus a very hard work must be done to lead all of the diverse 
profiles towards aligned goals and to create a method via which they can be able to 
collaborate with each other, since, as said, such figures can and actually should come from 
very different fields. 
As far as dedicated resources to innovation labs are concerned, there can be cases in 
which these initiatives are run within “normal business (rooms, technology and processes)” 
available resources, but still the majority of traditional financial services’ players use to 
dedicate a new “remote location” to them (Sonea, 2016). In the latter case, these places, 
which many times appear to be much more colored and modern in style with respect to the 
traditional banks’ spaces, have the potential to facilitate the generation of new and creative 
ideas, but, according to Sonea (2016), given the separation from the rest of the organization, a 
gap among the innovation division and the others could be created as a result and the 
necessary interactions among innovation-dedicated employees and those who will be mostly 
influenced by their innovations could become more complicated. 
Failing to grant adequate relationship with the inner organization and legacy of a bank 
can go at innovation delivery expenses, as people supposed to reinvent the bank processes 
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could not be able to understand the exact functioning of the bank they wish to innovate; also, 
collaboration with other key employees and functions of the bank serves the purpose of 
granting innovation team access to data, the huge source of insights within the banking 
organizations (Sonea, 2016). 
In short, innovation within the bank organization does not come by simply encouraging 
creative and disruptive thinking, as, in the view of Sonea (2016) a good innovation execution 
should be precisely governed: the author claims it is just by a “clear definition of what the 
innovation function needs to do in order to have access to resources and what experts and 
governing bodies it needs to consult in order to make sure the data is not compromised and 
large risks are not created through experimentation” that innovation can be successfully 
achieved. As a matter of fact, an innovation which really has an impact for the bank should be 
tied to core issues of its functioning, otherwise remaining focused on the “tip of the iceberg”, 
that is on more visible yet less radical processes or tasks (Sonea, 2016). 
Also, an effective internal pursuit of innovation implies a strong commitment of the top 
management of the company; as highlighted by Lopez Moctezuma (2018) too, if the Head of 
the bank is not able to catalyze innovation and change, these won’t never spread throughout 
the organization and cannot be implemented by all the employees. 
In summary, against this backdrop, the main challenges for banks to be able to launch 
their own tech-edge products and services organically are: the lack of adequate digital 
expertise, with the subsequent need to rely on external talents, and the difficulty to effectively 
manage simultaneously innovative projects on such a diversified and large scope as the one of 
Fintech universe; these limits to in-house innovation, and further conditions that we will 
better explain in a few, led many banks to opt for partnering strategies to acquire innovation 
from Fintech universe. 
 
3.2.2. Discussing the M&A alternative for banks: what does it mean for banks to rely 
on Fintech acquisitions to innovate 
 
Needed innovation for banks implies, as said, the adoption of methodologies, as agile, used by 
technology companies and startups, and, also, the shift of the company culture towards a more 
consumer-centric approach but, most of all, it is about the development of a new bundle of 
capabilities considered crucial for competitive advantage in the industry, one above all a 
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strong digital expertise. Since the ones who first took to the Financial Services the new 
characteristics required by customers (such as greater usability, design, convenience, etc.), 
were just the new participants, many in the sector sustain it is not possible to think of internal 
innovation only for banks. 
Talking about internal innovation, for instance, Lopez Moctezuma (2018) stated “It is a 
good first step, and something you must do. But, in my opinion, that is not enough: you have 
to start interacting with those startups that are emerging and that are offering those specific 
value-added to the clients”, introducing us to the need for these capabilities to be found by 
banks in the ecosystem too and to the need for them to open their process of innovation, 
which should be not only restricted to build something new, but even to buy it. 
In other words, the Head of New Digital Businesses at Bancomer and Global Director 
for Financial Inclusion at BBVA, claimed it could be “arrogant” and even mistaken to assume 
that banks can have all of the required skills to offer innovative services and to manage 
several different innovative projects simultaneously (Lopez Moctezuma, 2018). 
But, the traditional financial institutions currently finding themselves to make the 
decision on how to innovate, have historically been the sole holder of a very regulated 
business and, for many of their services, the sole owner of the license to offer them. Thus, a 
possible impediment for banks to opt for external acquisition, seizing the opportunity of being 
“open” in their approach to innovation and becoming curator of many and different 
businesses, lies in the “mind-set”, in terms of organizational culture, embedded within many 
banks’ structures: they often are “control freaks”, this meaning they could reject to trust third 
parties, because they are used in being the only responsible of complicated and crucial 
services for consumers (Skinner, 2017). 
However, the risk of losing the opportunity of being open is getting stuck into outdated 
businesses, with potentially enormous negative impact such that the choice of “build or buy” 
could be, according to Skinner (2017), reformulated as “build and die”, highlighting the 
author’s view on how danger can be for banks not to accept to search for third parties in the 
market, opting instead to develop new products and services in-house at time-consuming 
conditions and refusing to receive the contribution of skilled and specialized Fintech players. 
Furthermore, if banks do not consider the possibility to acquire potential interesting 
targets from Fintech universe within convenient time, they could also risk to be left out of this 
possibility due to the fact that, according to Dietz, HV, Lee (2016), as Fintech industry 
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matures, a likely trend it will experience is consolidation: mergers and acquisitions between 
equals could become a popular way for Fintech to scale and expand their business. 
Moving from the acknowledgment of this risky consequences and searching for 
synergies between their business and the Fintech ones, some banks decided to enter deals with 
the new participants of the industry: so, looking at the whole ecosystem of Fintech, many 
deals took place throughout the Fintech categories. 
As a matter of fact, according to a recent report by BCG, (Kengelbach et al., 2017), in 
2017, an increasing number of companies decided to access the new technologies which are 
impacting and disrupting their industries by buying tech-companies, rather than by building 
them on their own; for such organizations in search of tech-targets, the common objectives 
were to “boost innovation, streamline operations and processes, shape customer journeys, 
and personalize products, services, and experiences”. Kengelbach et al. (2017) claimed that 
high-tech deals represented about 30% of the value of completed transactions in 2016 (totally 
worth $2.5 trillion): in a nutshell, this report sustains that “almost one out of every five 
transactions involves a tech target today” (see figure below). 
 
The above report also highlighted some tech trends within the boosting high-tech M&A 
market and it found nine tech sub-areas particularly significant for the boost of such M&A 
area, for example “Industry 4.0”, “Health care IT”, etc.; but, as far as our issue of interest is 
Fig. 34 – “Tech M&A is on the rise” 
Source: BCG, 2017 
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concerned, it is worthy to know that even Fintech represents a trend within high-tech M&As; 
according to Kengelbach et al. (2017), within the Fintech space 150 deals were concluded in 
2016, with an average size of the deals (for the period 2013-2016) of $96 million. 
As said, the most notable driver of this boosting number of tech M&As is that the nature 
of the buyers of tech companies is changing; not only tech players buy their similar, but also 
the range of buyers includes an increasing number of buyers from non tech sector because of 
the lack of talent and adequate time for them to build such technological base on their own; 
this evidence which is confirmed by Kengelbach et al. (2017) is according to them 
particularly true in the case of Financial Services, which is the second non-tech industry, after 
private equity to enter tech M&As. (see figure below). 
 
Considering all of the above and looking at Financial Services industry, we saw also 
banks acting as potential Fintech acquirer. These deals were entered with the idea that, in face 
of Fintech emergence, the banking industry undertook a transformation and, even if banks 
cannot lose their role within economies, they face the risk, as said, of being commodities and, 
given stricter competition, they are surely experiencing an evolutionary phase in which only 
the “best equipped” ones will succeed to survive. 
Fig. 35 – “The share of non-tech buyers is rising” 
Source: BCG, 2017 
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The banks-Fintech M&As deals were also fueled by the idea of a common ground to be 
possible to find by Fintech and banks, thus from the idea that in Financial Services industry, 
entering such deals is beneficial for both the disruptors and the traditional players; indeed, as 
the Fintech phenomenon passed an initial phase of “hype” and the underlying functioning of 
many new business models within Financial Services became clearer, there has been a change 
in the initial belief that banks would be simply substituted by digital disruptors, as it 
happened, for example, for Blockbuster with the advent of Netflix, and many (Barba 
Navaretti, Calzolari, & Pozzolo, 2017) sustain this fear should be mitigated, in case of 
banking industry, for many reasons, as: 
- Fintech business models are often not purely unbundled (for example, among 
alternative finance platforms, while a pure P2P platform is unbundled, other models, 
such as the “balance sheet model” or “the notary model” of lending platforms, are not, 
thus they do not make a direct match between lenders and borrowers); 
- many new functions offered by disruptors still need to be backed by banks (here the 
list includes, for example, many payments systems or even lending activities) thus 
causing complementarity to exist between Fintech and banks; 
- going ahead in their growth, many Fintech itself bundle several services thus 
converging towards a bank business model, possibly finding themselves to play in a 
very regulated field and also, when this convergence happens, Fintech could even end 
up by losing customers’ trust given their higher inherent risk (e.g. in comparison with 
heavily regulated banks) while banks already enjoy economies of scope. 
Based on the above considerations on banks’ still recognized foundation and on the 
possibility for them to seize the opportunities Fintech brought within their industry, Barba 
Navaretti, Calzolari, & Pozzolo (2017) point out a distinction in banking industry disruption, 
in comparison with what happened elsewhere, just in the reactions (among which we can 
place also M&As of Fintech) that many banks, especially large ones, implemented, and in the 
creation of a new model of institution which concurrently offer traditional services and 
Fintech ones. 
The choice to react by acquiring some competitors from Fintech universe can be a 
viable one for banks, taking into consideration that the new-comers in Financial Services are 
in search, by entering such deals, for money, namely investments to grow their business, and 
for customers; but, as far as these two are concerned, the second can be considered of even 
greater importance, since, as seen above, funding for Fintech flourished by VC funds and can 
eventually be found by startups with a good product, regardless the involvement of banks; 
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thus, for the incumbents, the main advantage they boast when entering an M&A with Fintech 
is just their enormous customer base. 
The ownership of huge customers’ bases gives banks several advantages, among which 
the one Barba Navaretti, Calzolari, & Pozzolo (2017) call the “informational advantage”, 
namely the control on huge data set, that are crucial for the application on new technologic 
tools as machine learning and big data, but, also, the possibility to gain “soft information” 
(particularly important when, for example, lending to SMEs) given by the customer 
relationship held by banks, and on which Fintech cannot rely (especially in their first stages 
with small customer bases). Fintech players need to access these customers and to gain scale 
quickly in order to make their business models, especially when based on fees, successfully 
run. 
On the banks’ strategic agenda instead, Fintech M&As can be, according to Lopez 
Moctezuma (2018) mainly divided into two types of bank-Fintech acquisitions: 
 the first, focused on the “people” the banks buy, is run to endow the acquiring 
company, namely the bank, with unique competencies it found in the team of a 
Fintech startup, here the Fintech greatest value is just human talent while not 
any physical asset; 
 the second, much more focused on the “product” the banks acquire, is instead 
driven by the search for an already developed and running platform that the bank 
needs to innovate its business, but it could not easily build on its own within 
convenient time. 
Thus, since the first type of deals are somehow a “bet” on the human talents of the 
startup acquired, and, taking into consideration the peculiarity of the first type of acquisitions, 
it becomes crucial for banks not to lose the unique capabilities of the team, that are often 
intangible and related to the specific culture of these startups: in order to do this, acquiring 
banks usually design very effective incentive plans for the people not to leave the company 
after it has been acquired and also tend (at least in the case of the company subject of our case 
study) not to integrate the acquired company within the organization of the bank, as this 
would inhibit its innovative spirit (Lopez Moctezuma, 2018). Such tendency of not to proceed 
with heavy integration processes is also highlighted by Kengelbach et al. (2017) with regards 
to tech M&As in general. 
In addition to the above reasons to acquire Fintech, banks also have on their strategic 
vision other underlying rationales to achieve via these deals: for example, they can be a way 
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to enter a new geography where the Fintech is well-known, or to enlarge the bank’s customer 
base; even if it is more a matter of complementary strengths. 
Notwithstanding the benefits discussed above, the M&As strategy for banks to adopt 
Fintech technology does also entail possible risks: the tech targets are usually young 
companies without long histories to be used by the acquirers to evaluate them carefully (this 
implies the need to use ad hoc metrics to evaluate them, as, for example, the number of 
registered users); also, as  Kengelbach et al. (2017) suggested, it may happen that, in face of 
“bidding wars” between potential buyers, the prices for such deals skyrocket. In addition to 
possible concerns about too high price paid, while managers often consider acquiring a 
minority stake worthy to stay ahead of a particular technology, investors are more wary in 
these cases, as there is the possibility not to realize desired synergies, due to a lack of 
adequate influence within the acquired company (Kengelbach et al., 2017). 
Given the above, also Kengelbach et al. (2017) conclude that experience is crucial for 
“doing tech deals right”; as a matter of fact, companies which are used to buy on tech targets 
at the benefit of their innovation, develop the capability  to select, acquire and integrate them 
well. 
The above considerations can be applied also to banks willing to use this strategy for 
innovation: it is necessary to consider the M&As as part of the ongoing strategy, in a 
continuous effort to improve the ability of screening and executing valuable deals; 
furthermore, as Kengelbach et al. (2017), highlighted for tech M&As in general, it is crucial 
to consider the peculiarity of such deals and to adapt to this the deal structure, in terms of 
time, which shall be shorter than usual, given the fast pace of technological progress, also in 
terms of earn-outs and other incentives, that can help to maintain  the entrepreneurial culture 
of the acquired companies, even when they become part of a large organization, and even in 
terms of post-deal considerations, because, after the acquisition, it is required for the two 
entities to collaborate strongly in order to achieve the desired synergies. 
As far as the screening process is concerned, collaborating with the corporate fund and 
with other structures of the company, as the banks’ innovation lab, can help the teams 
dedicated to the M&As to gain insights on the emergent trends in technology and to identify 
notable targets; indeed similar considerations are highlighted by Kengelbach et al. (2017) for 
tech M&As, together with a reiterated concept of heterogeneity, which is entailed in such 
processes: in face of the unique primary goal of closing the innovation gap, several sources 
are needed to identify opportunities, and several resources, again internal and external to the 
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companies, intervene in these deals. This lets us conclude that such deals need the acquirer to 
be more flexible and agile, in comparison to traditional M&As processes, when it comes to 
seize opportunities from technological space via acquiring a tech target. 
 
3.2.3. Ally for innovation: strategic partnerships and equity investments  
 
After and despite the initial phase of Fintech development, which many (Juengerkes, 2016) 
refers to as “Fintech 1.0”, in which the mission of new comers was mainly characterized by 
the idea of disrupting and possibly substituting the most traditional players within Financial 
Services industry, a different climate started appearing. In particular, many companies, 
previously meant to be at opposite sides of the cracked financial services’ ground, 
acknowledged the value of ally to jointly deliver innovation: a shift in Financial Services 
industry happened from the idea of “competition” towards that of “complementarity”. 
Beyond this renewed strategic objective there were the mutual recognition of each one’s 
strengths (see figure below), and the aim to search for synergies obtainable by strategic 
alliances, as another possible strategy to be pursued by banks to innovate themselves. 
Fig. 36 – Fintech and Financial Institutions joining the strengths 
Source: IIF & CFI, 2017 
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First of all, banks appeared to be more able to manage the complexity beside the 
provision of financial services, in particular in terms of regulation; as a matter of fact, 
notwithstanding Fintech’s first phase in which regulation was kind of gentle letting room to 
new-comers, it appeared evident that banking industry would have called for stricter 
regulation to the new entrants’ rival business models; Fintech firms, instead, represented for 
banks the ones able to deliver the type of experience ever-more required by customers and 
this capability is one that traditional players are strongly longing for (Meinert, 2017). 
Another crucial issue lies in the need to scale on Fintechs’ priority agenda; indeed, even 
if many startup companies are characterized by a very fast acquisition and accumulation of 
users, this is not obvious in services which people judge to be, as financial ones, of paramount 
importance and having an economic impact on consumers. For this reason, the already owned 
customer bases that main banks have are a competitive advantage on traditional players’ side, 
especially enriched when the bank’s brand is well trusted and known by customers 
worldwide; these and similar considerations, according to many (Meinert, 2017; Lopez 
Moctezuma, 2018; Juengerkes, 2016) prompted a new phase for Fintech development, in 
which not only these companies’ business models are much more designed as B2B and on 
banks’ current needs, but also the willingness of the then-born as disruptors to cooperate and 
partner with bankers is becoming higher. 
The need for an ample customer base to test and validate their products and services is, 
as said, huge for Fintech, and, relying on banks’ one to do it allows the new industry 
participants to be faster in the delivery of their idea, with respect to how they would be by 
searching for users on their own; and it also serves the partner, namely the bank, to assess in 
which state the Fintech finds itself and what eventually renders its service unique.  
Also, there are some services which Fintech wish to offer that necessarily need a 
banking license to be hold by the provider: in these cases, a partnership is not only driven by 
the above considerations, but also fueled by the choice of some Fintech players to opt to 
partner with a bank, which already has a license, instead of applying for a new one; in a 
nutshell, while these partnerships are made “to run the business”, the others are mainly 
formed “to accelerate and grow the business” (Juengerkes, 2016). 
On the other hand, according to Juengerkes (2016), banks find in their partners, in this 
case Fintech startups, the willingness to test new products and to deliver tech-edge 
innovation; these missions, together with the Fintech talents’ ability to use a much more 
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customer-centric approach, e.g. making an intense use of social media, and to act in an 
entrepreneurial and agile way, are just what banks need to bring within their organizations. 
The common goal underlying this shift towards collaboration is to serve customers in a 
more effective way closing the gap they used to feel with financial institutions, indeed as 
Lopez Moctezuma (2018) declared “The best part of the Fintech Revolution is not for the 
banks, is not for the startups: at the end, it is for the final client”, who can now choose among 
a vaster array of financial services in order to find the most suitable solution for him. And 
banks and Fintech decided to lever each other strengths at the advantage of innovation. 
Also, partnerships and alliances are often a pre-emptive attempt to collaborate before 
entering an eventual M&A process; as, via the joint co-development of a product or service, 
then collaborating side by side with a startup, a bank can analyze the innovative solution its 
partner is trying to offer, can test the readiness of the founders’ team to effectively serve a 
very large customer base, like the one of the bank, and can assess whether the capability of 
the people within the Fintech are not replicable; if so, the uniqueness of the inner ability of the 
people and the readiness to launch a product can trigger a M&A process (Lopez Moctezuma, 
2018). 
The choice of the right partner is a decision of great importance for the partnership to 
succeed: banks, given the implied investment costs, risk of failure and need to find the fit, 
usually evaluate the possible partners carefully, as VC investors would do before offering 
funds (Juengerkes, 2016). 
Arranging for a partnership is often a tricky issue, especially considering the inner 
different nature of the parties involved when talking about Fintech and banks; in light of this, 
even if it is not possible to provide a unique and good-for-all model, many industry 
professionals are trying to draw up useful suggestions’ lists for a bank-Fintech partner to 
succeed. On this matter, for example, Meinert (2017), given on-field professionals’ 
contributions, collected three keys, namely: 
 “adopt the right cultural mindset”, this suggestion mainly refers to the need for 
banks to stop viewing Fintech as mere opponents to their models, rather as fresh 
contributors, and, also, the author stresses the importance for traditional players 
to accept the idea innovation doesn’t come without any risk; enlarging banks’ 
risk-tolerance and nurturing a more entrepreneurial mindset are considered 
crucial, while still caring for control and security; 
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 “do something”, as said before, it is not convenient to take a wait and see 
approach when it comes to innovation, as things are moving faster in the 
competitive field of banks, this should encourage them to start engaging with 
Fintech, as early as possible, and to try to do it with several partners; 
 “be forward-looking”, this implies an immediate recognition of most important 
trends in place in financial services and a subsequent willingness to embrace 
them, even accepting challenges and uncertainty implied. 
In addition to forming strategic alliances, many banks translated their attempt in getting 
closer to Fintech ecosystem in doing equity investments; this is mainly done via the banks’ 
corporate funds and can be a way followed in conjunction to the partnership with the Fintech, 
possibly to render it stronger and to signal the bank’s commitment, or it can even be a strategy 
per se which does not imply the bank and the investee to collaborate.  
As a matter of fact, the corporate funds owned by banks are usually kept independent 
from the bank’s organization, in order to give managing partners autonomy in decisions and 
to be able to act in the portfolio companies’ interest; also, given the fact that some Fintech 
startups do not aspire to be acquired by a bank, since they still see them as too much 
bureaucratic and not innovative firms to disrupt, this independence of the fund is also used to 
have a greater appeal on target companies in which the fund wish to invest. 
Investing by a fund arm also allows the bank to simultaneously bet on several projects, 
to spread the risk and to avoid the integration troubles which arise with direct investments. 
 
3.3. Emerging models for innovation in banking: strategic alternatives and 
partnering cases in the industry 
 
In face of similar conditions and even given a shared urgency to change, the several players 
within banking sector, in particular the biggest ones, have been using different models to 
pursue innovation; each one is trying its own “recipe” to stay ahead and we want to briefly 
describe some approaches using representative cases from the industry, which serve as 
examples of the above described strategies. Also, after providing such benchmark cases, we 
present an overview of Italian banks’ recent strategies to engage with Fintech, in order to 
asses where our country’s players currently find themselves. 
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- JPMorgan acquires WePay 
 
WePay
78
 is a “platform payments company that 
provides payment, risk and support products and 
services to software and platform companies”; this is 
the mission of the Fintech startup recently bought by JP 
Morgan Chase, one if US’ biggest banks. The payment Fintech was founded in 2008 in 
Silicon Valley and had already raised $75 million in funding from investors and was 
valued $220 million. 
The deal was announced in October 2017, the terms were not disclosed but the press 
reported the valuation to be higher from the last one, above mentioned. Today WePay is 
officially a Chase company; the deal was completed after a year from JP Morgan’s first 
approach to the Fintech; the aim of JP Morgan is to use the ability of this vertical 
innovator to better serve its 4 million customer base of small and medium businesses, in 
particular to accelerate the times and ease for them to receive card and digital payments. 
On the other hand, by joining the financial institution, which boasts a global presence, 
WePay’s objective is to expand its presence.  
Also, WePay could become, under the strategic desires of its acquirer, a Silicon Valley 
payment incubator, namely the bank’s point of touch with latest technologies in payments 
also due to its crucial position in California. 
This example suggests us how important is for banks to open their boundaries to 
innovators, whose expertise in niche areas is high, and who can serve as catalyst of other 
further innovations for the bank to be projected and developed. Indeed this was the first 
significant Fintech acquisition of JP Morgan and signaled to the market an even greater 
commitment of the US bank to Fintech to be embraced. 
 
- Partnerships for innovation: the case of JP Morgan 
 
JPMorgan Chase, while entering the field of M&As just 
recently, has ever been active in Fintech space in terms of 
investments and partnerships; indeed the bank has formed 
several strategic alliances, such as the one with 
InvestCloud, a Californian company providing digital, customizable applications for 
institutional investors; this partnership was formed in 2016, with the aim of – as revealed 
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 See: https://go.wepay.com/  
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by the bank - “coupling the firm’s wealth management expertise with InvestCloud’s 
innovative technology solutions”79 and it was strengthened by an equity investment by 
JPMorgan Chase in the young company. Once again, the alliance proves the above 
discussed mutual benefits for a common ground to be found by banks and Fintech; while 
the first lack needed expertise, the second are willing to scale thanks to the incumbents’ 
infrastructure and to couple their specific skills to the experience of the traditional 
institutions. 
 
- Citi Ventures: accelerate and invest in Fintech 
 
Citi bank innovation is strongly supported by its 
“innovation engine”, namely Citi Ventures80. It 
is the greatest source of new ideas for the bank and an evidence of a tendency in place in 
banking sector: many big banks are indeed relying on innovation labs for their inner 
transformation; by the way, Citi Ventures represent also the funding arm of the bank. It 
has the mission to analyze new trends and topics, to screen valuable ideas to be eventually 
adopted at Citi’s, to help startups to launch in the market by offering them accelerating 
programs and funds. 
Since the launch, Citi Ventures has marked its 40
th
 investment in 2016 and has developed 
the Global Lab Network, namely a series of Innovation Labs, each located in strategic and 
leading geographies for Fintech (Dublin, Tel Aviv, Singapore, New York) and used to 
experiment in tech-edge areas of interest and to spur fresh knowledge creation, with the 
aim to validate worthy models to be funded or implemented within the banking business. 
The model of Citi innovation is thus a mixed one, indeed the company uses the 
acceleration program offered by its labs to learn and explore new business models and, as 
said, some of them are eventually funded and added to the portfolio of Citi Ventures while 
others could become partners of Citi. 
For example, among the many Fintech startups in Citi Venture portfolio we find the 
followings. 
 
Founded in 2008, “Betterment is a Fintech from Asset Management 
class: it is a goal-based online investment company, delivering 
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 See: http://www.citi.com/ventures/index.html  
 
95 
 
personalized financial advice paired with low fees and customer experience”. According 
to Crunchbase, Citi Ventures participated, with other investors, to the SERIES E financing 
round of Betterment, in 2016, during which the company raised $100 million. 
 
FastPay also is in Citi Ventures portfolio, it is a Fintech belonging to 
Alternative Finance class. Its vision is being “The leading financial 
solutions platform for media”. Founded in 2009 in Los Angeles; it now 
has offices in San Francisco, New York, Boston and London too. FastPay offers invoice 
financing for publishers, agencies or ad-tech innovators. Since launch it has originated $ 2 
billion in loans, whose amount goes from $5k to $20M and it is delivered within 48 hours. 
 
- Co-developed initiatives by banks to support Fintech: the case of Fintech 
Innovation Lab 
 
The Fintech Innovation Lab
81
 was first established in New 
York in 2011 (by the Partnership funds for New York city 
and Accenture, the two main sponsors); and it expanded 
thereafter to London, Dublin and Hong Kong (see figure below), with the aim to nurture 
the growth of valuable startups in Fintech and in order to promote collaboration within 
them and traditional financial institutions. 
                                                          
81
 See: http://www.fintechinnovationlab.com  
Fig. 37 – Fintech Innovation Lab 
Source: http://www.fintechinnovationlab.com , 2018 
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It offers a an annual accelerator program that lasts 12 weeks; during this period the 
Fintech startups can test their products with potential customers, validate their business 
models and get in touch with executives from Financial Services industry to either gain 
advice or to form relationship to be eventually continued over time. The acceleration 
program, during which also workshops and events to discuss relevant themes are held, 
there is a DemoDay for companies to present their business ideas to Financial Services 
representatives, investors, journalists; and, to date, it has raised $863 million for 
program’s participants. 
This initiative is a very clear example of the collaborative climate which has been 
characterizing Fintech ecosystem with reference to banks; as a matter of fact (as 
summarized in figure above) there are many partner banks which back the program, such 
as Bank of America, Citi, CreditSuisse, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Intesa San Paolo, 
Santander, UBI Banca, etc. 
This program and its recognized success contribute soundness to the idea that 
Fintech are not only existing to disrupt the banking industry at the expenses of 
incumbents, rather they offer search for their advice, given their long experience and for 
their support in many ways. 
 
- Italian banks: most notable initiatives 
 
As far as Italy is concerned, it is interesting to 
mention the case of Satispay, one of Italian most 
famous Fintech startups which was also included 
among the emerging 50 innovators of Fintech in the list provided by H2 Ventures and 
KPMG (2017); its last financing round – SERIES B in 2017 - hit the press in Italy due to 
the fact that it saw the participation of previous investors, in particular industrial players, 
as Iccrea Banca, but together with other financial institutions, namely Banca Etica and 
Banca Sella (through its arm Sella Ventures). The financing round was also considered an 
Italian one of a kind investment due to the amount raised: € 18.3 million, mainly justified 
by Satispay’s potential and by its performances, as 175.000 active users and 19.000 
merchant partners throughout Italy at the times of the round. 
  
We had already highlighted the participation of Banca 
Sella, through its Lab, to the creation of the Fintech 
District in Milan, contributing to the growth of an 
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Italian community to participate in the global Fintech ecosystem; indeed this Italian bank 
is trying to catch the opportunities from Fintech in several ways, since it also has its 
innovation lab and a venture arm, as seen in the case of Satispay. 
The innovation lab is called SellaLab, it is an innovation platform for startups and firms, 
which aims to help them both in achieving open innovation and digital transformation. It 
was founded in 2013 by Gruppo Banca Sella, with the idea to make R&D for the bank on 
trended themes, especially Fintech-related ones. The Lab tries to control the Italian 
territory via different geographic points, indeed together with Milan it is located in other 
Italian cities (Torino, Biella, Lecce) and it also participates to other initiatives and 
networks (see the Fintech District or Magic Wand, below). 
 
 
UniCredit EVO, Equity Venture Opportunities, 
is another initiative worthy to mention within 
Italian landscape. It was launched in 2016 by a 
joint venture of UniCredit Group and Anthemis Group, a financial services technology 
venture and advisory firm; it is an initiative born with the aim of investing in valuable 
Fintech startups. 
The stated aim of UniCredit, which committed €200 million for investments in Fintech 
businesses, is “to collaborate with emerging players within the FinTech ecosystem and 
explore, sustain and develop cutting-edge technologies and solutions to deliver next-
generation experiences for our customers”82 thus using such investment initiatives at the 
benefit of its digitalization process. 
This case once again demonstrates the willingness of banks to support the growth of the 
Fintech innovative system just to be able to contribute hints and resources to their own 
organizations. 
In particular, UniCredit is mainly using the fund to get in touch with Fintech players (see 
figure below for an overview on the EVO portfolio of companies) and the underlying 
opportunities. 
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Fig. 38 – Unicredit EVO Portfolio of businesses 
Source: www.unicreditgroup.eu 
 
 
Recent Fintech initiatives which saw the engagement of banks in Italy also include the 
launch, in 2017, of “Magic Wand83” an acceleration program for Fintech and Insurtech; it 
was launched by Digital Magics, an Italian digital businesses incubator, together with 
partners from the banking industry such as BNL, Credito Valtellinese, Innovation Center 
of Banca Intesa San Paolo, SellaLab, UBI Banca; and also other participants, as Poste 
Italiane. 
The program is aimed at growing potential startups, through grants, equity investments 
from the partners of the project, dedicated services and advisors and also through 
workshops; the program ends with a Demo Day, its first one will be held in June 2018; the 
idea of the project is clearly developed on benchmark initiatives borrowed from leading 
countries in Fitnech (such as the Fintech Innovation Lab) and aims at boosting Italian 
participation to Fintech ecosystem. 
 
Despite the just described initiatives and even in light of the above participation of some 
Italian banks to the ecosystem, Banca d’Italia recently published a report where 283 
Italian financial institutions’ initiatives related to technological innovation were studied 
and the conclusive assessment of Italian landscape, according to it, was that Fintech 
investments are still modest in Italy in comparison with other geographies: Financial 
Services players appear, according to Banca d’Italia (2017), particularly slow in their 
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moves mainly due to the fact that investing in Fintech is expensive and, as highlighted in 
literature, does not grant to the bank an immediate nor a fast realization of synergies and 
added revenues. 
Also, there is a lower number of Fintech established in Italy and, among banks, there is a 
shared sense of uncertainty as far as future outcomes of Fintech are concerned; finally, 
Italian banks seem to be much more traditional in their business models, with a still 
significant role of the branches and the presence of smaller banks which consider 
investing on Fintech particularly difficult (Banca d’Italia, 2017). 
According to Banca D’Italia (2017), the surveyed financial institutions are likely to launch 
an initiative related to technological innovation in the short-run or have already launched 
it (37% of total financial institutions surveyed) and only a smaller share of them (26%) 
does not want to take any (see figure below); in particular the banks, either the larger (first 
column in figure below), either the smaller ones (second column in figure below), are 
apparently very actively engaged with Fintech. 
 
 
 
But, such apparently high level of initiatives to foster technological advance is not 
adequately funded by Italian banks, which still commit too little resources to them and do 
Fig. 39 – Italian Financial Institutions’ initiatives with reference to technological innovation 
Source: Banca d’Italia, 2017 
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the majority of such projects (39%) in-house, with still low reliance on 
accelerators/incubators and on partnering strategies. 
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CHAPTER 4 - ANALYSIS OF A REMARKABLE CASE STUDY: BBVA’S ROAD TO 
INNOVATION 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of a case study from the banking industry, namely BBVA 
Group, as it appears to be a very active bank as far as Fintech revolution opportunities are 
concerned and also in terms of digital transformation. 
Having selected the above as benchmark case study to describe a multiple-strategies 
approach to innovation in banking industry, we first present a brief overview of the company 
and of its main facts and performances, then moving to the description of all the innovation 
related initiatives implemented by BBVA. 
The description of the strategies for innovation implemented by BBVA serves the 
purpose of gaining useful insights on what can be effective ways for banks to pursue required 
innovation and to cope with Fintech, it also leads us to gain evidence of discussed literature 
and to offer an overview on how each initiative was run by the company, analyzing its 
underlying characteristics, challenges and rationales. 
 
4.1. Introducing the case study analysis: rationale and methodology 
 
The objective of this dissertation was to analyze in depth the different strategies that a large 
international bank can implement in order to succeed in today’s environment of fierce 
competition and of rapid changes. In particular, we wanted to describe the strategies 
implemented within incumbent banks when they pursue innovation and the dynamic of 
partnerships/alliances between them and Fintech players eventually put in place; our research 
focus was analyzing: “How can banks seize eventual opportunities coming from the 
emergence of Fintech?”; “Why do these opportunities arise for banks?”; “How do banks 
react internally to the changing environment?”; “Why should banks and Fintech eventually 
partner?”. 
Given this purpose, we decided to analyze a single case study of a large international 
bank more in-depth, after having described all of the possible strategies in the previous 
chapter, reviewing current available literature, and after having there briefly mentioned some 
examples of initiatives undertook in the banking sector. 
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The decision led us to describe BBVA’s main strategic actions for its “digital 
transformation”, collecting any available piece of information to give a complete picture of 
this organization’s model of innovation, which started to be implemented about a decade ago. 
The choice of the bank to analyze in this case study was done among the ones most 
often found in recent literature to be actively adapting their business models to changing 
environment; among these “brave” players, BBVA was chosen due to the fact that the 
company opted for different strategies simultaneously in order to pursue innovation, namely 
organically launching some new services and also buying Fintech companies or forming 
partnerships with them in the meanwhile. This multiple approach to innovation was 
considered useful by the author to investigate links between a specific strategic objective to be 
pursued and the approach used by the bank, and also to make comparisons between the 
different alternatives possible and finally to try to gain as much evidence as possible on the 
whole scope of literature reviewed. 
Furthermore, the choice of BBVA Group transformation over the last decade as unit of 
analysis allowed us to collect many data on which to base our analysis: as a matter of fact, the 
company has, beside the annual reports for the period of interest, which are all available 
online, a large series of contents on its websites, which were very useful to understand the 
rationale of the strategies and moves implemented.  
In order to implement a complete data collection and with the aim of building a rich 
data set on the case study, we relied on the following data: 
- an interview personally conducted by the author via Skype with a person from BBVA 
(see Appendix A, where the interview is reported), in order to be able to understand 
the point of view and the strategic aims of key people from within the Company and 
also with the aim to confirm reviewed literature insights in the previous chapter; 
- secondary data available on BBVA Group’s main steps and strategies (see Appendix 
B, where a table with most representative data reviewed is reported), collected from 
several sources (online journals, websites, Youtube channels) trying to search for 
different types of data (articles, company news, video interviews, case studies, etc.). 
The above searched heterogeneity in data served the author purposes of enriching the 
meaningfulness of the information developed and of providing an overview on BBVA’s 
journey towards innovation as much complete as possible. 
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However, in illustrating the case study, our research lacks available financial data on 
some of BBVA’s and its fund’s investments; this data were not disclosed by the company to 
the public neither they were possible to find through the interview conducted by the author. 
Similar limits on financial data availability were found as far as some Fintech performances 
are concerned; indeed, these are often young startups in their early stages of business records. 
Although such constraints, once available data were collected, the main information on 
BBVA’s journey towards innovation were developed; further in this chapter we will present it 
distinguishing BBVA’s initiatives into in-house and external ones: according to this 
reasoning, the first encompass all of the internally developed and launched innovative 
services, together with the supportive initiatives to the development of Fintech ecosystem run 
at BBVA; the latter are instead information about BBVA’s investments or alliances with the 
new participants to Financial Services. 
By describing all of the innovation strategies of BBVA, we tried to highlight the drivers 
of each initiative and to comment on the results that the company achieved  at each of its steps 
towards innovation. The eventual merits are given to the successful moves and the possible 
downsides are identified for the most questionable ones. Finally, the objective of drawing our 
conclusions on BBVA multi-strategies approach to innovation is achieved, even if many 
aspects of such approach are still evolving and will probably unfold their potential and their 
permanent outcomes only in the next future. 
  
4.2. The company: history, strategy and most important facts of BBVA Group 
 
- History and expansion of the Group 
In 1857, Banco de Bilbao was founded and there lies the origins of the whole Group which 
has been evolving since there till becoming an international reality. In 1901, Banco de 
Vizcaya was created and started operating, from Bilbao first to the whole Spain. The two 
contributed a lot to the development of the industrial sector of their geographic area and 
when, in 1920,  the Banco de Crédito Industrial (BCI) was formed they were both part of it, 
and in the meanwhile, Banco de Bilbao had also merged with Banco del Comercio. The BCI 
was a consortium created by bankers and manufacturers in order to fuel the industrial growth 
by lending. 
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As a matter of fact, years of economic expansion followed and during the ‘60s Banco de 
Bilbao acquired greater importance too, especially via other mergers, thus creating a financial 
group; the same happened for Banco de Vizcaya. Then, in 1988, as a result of the merger of 
Banco de Bilbao and Banco de Vizcaya, BBV was created. 
Some years later, in 1999, BBV and Argentaria, which was the result of several 
important mergers happened in Spain in the previous years, announced their merger into a 
new entity: BBVA, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria; this would have been a large, highly 
capitalized bank with significant diversification in scope (either in terms of products and in 
terms of geographic presence). 
Further on, the integration phase kept on and, also, the creation of a single brand name 
and identity for the Group. In 2007, BBVA was the second largest bank in Spain and it 
acquired Compass Bancshares, a bank which had opened its first branch in Alabama, in 1964, 
and had expanded throughout US thereafter. It became a fully owned subsidiary of the Group 
and it was renamed BBVA Compass. 
Today the Group has a significant international presence, as, according to 2017 Q3 
results, it is present in more than 30 countries (see figure below) characterized by varying 
level of economic development; Spain is the country of origin and also the geographic place 
where the Group has its parent company; there BBVA is among the country’s top banks, 
together with competitors like Santander. Mexico represents a very important market too, 
since BBVA is the largest financial institution there; by the way, the geographic scope of 
BBVA is largely diversified as the Group main geographies also include Turkey (through its 
investment in Garanti Bank) and US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 40 - BBVA's global presence 
Source: BBVA corporate presentations, 2017 
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- Key Indicators 
As the company annual reports and public information highlight, the Group achieved positive 
performances over the last years. In the figures below we summarized the most important 
results for the period 2007-2017 (as by the end of 3
rd
 quarter), since this is the period in which 
the Group implemented its transformation strategy, which we will describe in-depth in the 
following paragraphs, and since these decade mainly represents the one of great challenges 
and changes for the banking industry as a whole. 
Today, the Group (as by the end of 3
rd
 quarter 2017) has € 690.797 million of total 
assets (amounting to € 731.856 million at the end of 2016) and  € 416.240 million of gross 
loans and advances to customers (which amounted to € 430.474 million at the end of 2016); 
the two items (whose trend over the decade can be observed in figure below) both grew from 
the beginning of the “transformation journey” undertaken by the Group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As far as the economic results are concerned, the Group Net interest income and Net 
attributable profit are reported in figure below for the period taken into consideration; in 2017 
(at the end of 3
rd
 quarter) they respectively amounted to: 
Fig. 418 – BBVA Group Total Assets and Loans to customers (2007-2017) 
Source: author analysis (BBVA annual reports) 
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- Net interest Income of € 13.202 million (in comparison with € 12.674 million, as by 
30
th
 of September 2016, and with € 17.059 million at the end of the same year); 
- Net attributable Profit of € 3.449 million (compared to € 2.797 million at the end of 
same quarter for 2016 and to €  3.475 million at 2016’s year-end), thus the highest 
result since 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The geographical breakdown of the Net attributable Profit for Q3 of 2017 (see figure 
below) highlights the greatest contribution comes from Mexico (39%) followed by Spain 
(19%) and the other geographies (Turkey, 14%; South America, 15%, USA, 10%; Rest of 
Eurasia, 2%). 
Fig. 42 – BBVA Group Net Attributable Profit and Net Interest Income (2007-2017) 
Source: author analysis (BBVA annual reports) 
Fig. 43 – Q3 2017 Net Attributable Profit geographical breakdown 
Source: Shareholders and Investors Website BBVA, 2017 
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During the decade 2007-2017, the capital adequacy ratios also saw an overall 
improvement (see figure below) and, at the end of 3
rd
 quarter of 2017, they were respectively 
equal to: 
- Total Capital Ratio: 15.7% , (15.1%, at the end of 2016); 
- Total Tier 1 Ratio: 13.1%, (12.9%, at the end of 2016); 
- Core Capital Ratio: 11.9%, (2.2%, at the end of 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Throughout the period (see figure below), the Group’s branches have been initially 
slightly reduced (with 2010 being the year of minimum number of branches), but, overall, the 
number of branches did not see a significant reduction; indeed, as by 2017 (end of 3
rd
Q) the 
Group relies on 8.374 branches internationally. This can highlight the Group willingness not 
to deny the role of branches’ network in the new business model of the bank; as a matter of 
fact, within the Group transformation strategy, the branches are used just to educate the 
customers of all ages to the use of new and digital channels and to maintain the relationship 
with customers: the aim is to offer customers the possibility to bank when and where they suit 
better, thus also via traditional branches channel. 
The number of employees of the Group was instead significantly grown in the period of 
digital transformation, and the latest results of the Group report a number of employees of 
about 132k internationally (as by 2017, 30
th
 September), while the amount of people within 
Fig. 44 - BBVA Group Capital Adequacy Ratios (2007-2017) 
Source: author analysis (BBVA annual reports) 
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the Group amounted about to 111k in 2007 (see figure below). This uptrend persuades us to 
think how great is people and human talent contribution for the success of the desired 
transformation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coherent with this view can be judged, for example, some training initiatives that the 
Group undertook just to render the branches’ employees “technology facilitators”, shaping 
this role, according to the Company news, on that of Apple Stores’ Genius Bar personnel; a 
tendency, that of willing to be “phygital” and of learning an effective digital and physical 
integration from big technology players like Apple, which was highlighted in the reviewed 
recent literature seen above and which seems necessary for incumbent banks. 
This vision about branches, then the idea they have a significant role for digital 
transformation, even if they do not constitute the sole and principal means of growth and 
investment priority for the bank, was also supported at BBVA Group by a BBVA Compass’ 
study which found the existence of a positive correlation between digital sales and the 
proximity of branches, such that more products are sold digitally when branches are located in 
proximity; this is interpreted by BBVA’s managers as a need for customers to feel they are 
somehow backed by the local physical branch, when they purchase digitally; in particular, 
Fig. 45 – BBVA Group: n. of employees and branches over time (2007-2017) 
Source: author analysis (BBVA annual reports) 
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given a trust issue, they tend to buy more digitally, if they feel the products and service are 
eventually obtainable via branch interaction too. 
Finally, as far as clients are concerned, the Group experienced a significant growth in 
customers’ base during the decade analyzed: the amount of total customers grew by a rate of 
50%, reaching a total of 72 million in 2017 (in comparison with 2007’s 47 million customers 
and in constant uptrend throughout the period of interest). Of the total customer base a share 
of 30%, namely about 20 million are digital customers. 
 
4.3. BBVA’s structure: organigram and people 
 
In recent years, the Group has been evolving on the organizational side too and it has adapted 
its structure to the aimed transformation; one among the most crucial organizational changes 
at BBVA, in terms of people, was, in 2015, appointing Mr. Carlos Torres Vila as Chief 
Executive Officer. In 2008, he had already joined the company in the role of Head of Strategy 
& Corporate Development first and of Head of the Global Digital Banking Area later. 
This change represented a significant acknowledgment by BBVA of a banks’ new 
identity, one which is ever more rooted in technology and which needs the contribution of less 
traditionally bank-associated kind of talents. As a matter of fact, many highlighted Mr. Torres 
Vila background boasts a BS in Electrical Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), and his professional background was interpreted as a signal to the 
company’s commitment to change in terms of digital disruption, since the then-Head of 
Digital Banking was assumed to be the CEO of the whole Group. 
The bank has also recently designed its whole organizational structure just on the 
purpose of, while boosting the performance and results of its business, adding “the critical 
competencies and global talent to build a sustainable competitive advantage in the long term 
and accelerate results growth in the mid-term”. As a matter of fact, as highlighted in BBVA’s 
website section dedicated to its organigram, the structure is divided into four functions, three 
of which are under the CEO, Carlos Torres Vila, responsibility while the Group Executive 
Chairman, Francisco González Rodríguez, is appointed as directly responsible of the last one. 
The four functions are: 
 Execution & Performance, 
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 New Core Competencies, 
 Risk & Finance 
 Strategy & Control.  
The “Execution & Performance” function manages the Geographies (either directly 
CEO-reporting countries either those controlled through Country Monitoring function) and 
Corporate & Investment Banking (global area for the bank’s investment banking, market, 
loans and transactional services for international corporate clients and institutional investors). 
The second function, namely “New Core Competencies” was created just to respond to 
emerging conditions by “building critical skills and attracting global talent”; within the 
function, which is worthy a more in depth analysis with reference to our issue of interest, we 
find four areas, namely: 
- Customer Solutions,  
- Talent & Culture 
- Engineering 
- Data. 
The area of Customer Solutions is divided again into five units: “Operating; 
Capabilities; Products and Experiences; Strategy; Enabler”. These units manage a recently 
emerged set of new activities, as, for example, Business Development, New Digital 
Businesses. The last is just the one responsible for the launch of Fintech services internally 
developed or co-created with partners and acquired companies. In the units under Customer 
Solutions we find new crucial skills, such as Design & Marketing, Data & Open Innovation or 
Customer Solutions Engineering, needed to face current competition. 
The Customer Solutions area can be thought as the executive arm for customer-centric 
strategy making; but, to support the transformation of the bank, there are also the areas wholly 
dedicated to the spread of a new culture and to the strategic use of data, that is “Talent & 
Culture” and “Data” respectively. Along them there is also “Engineering”, an area assigned to 
software development. 
Going back to the functions level, there is the one of “Risk & Finance”, under which the 
key activities of global risk management, balance sheet accounting and capital adequacy 
monitoring are done via the areas of “Finance” and “Global Risk Management”. 
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Finally, the “Strategy & Control” function drafts the Group’s strategy and sets BBVA 
frameworks and control models; the areas here within comprised are “Global Economics 
Regulation & Public Affairs”, “Legal & Compliance”, “Strategy & M&A”, “Accounting & 
Supervisors”, “Communications”, “General Secretary”, “Internal Audit” (see figure below 
where the organizational chart of the Group is drawn). 
 
4.4. BBVA’s digital transformation: a multi-faceted model for innovation 
 
“In 2016, we continued to make progress in our transformation process. We began this 
process some years ago and are ahead of the rest of the industry, with a multi-dimensional 
vision that includes: new platforms and processes, new capacities and talent, a new corporate 
culture, new work spaces and ways of working, a new organizational structure, new products 
and businesses and active participation in the digital ecosystem.” This quote by the Group 
Executive Chairman’s letter to shareholders in 2016 annual report of BBVA clearly 
summarizes the vision on which BBVA has been working since 2007 to transform itself. Led 
Fig. 46 – BBVA: organizational chart 
Source: created by the author (BBVA company info) 
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by the new purpose coined in 2016 that is “to bring the age of opportunity to everyone”, the 
approach of BBVA to innovation is overtly a mix of internal and external initiatives, since, as 
stated above, it implies the need to participate to the “digital ecosystem”. 
With such “multi-faceted” model the company decided to put in place many initiatives 
simultaneously to innovate itself. Not limiting itself neither to in-house innovation nor to 
external sources of innovation only for the launch of Fintech services, the bank ended up 
creating a benchmark case of “open innovation” in its industry, namely a company which 
allows innovative ideas to flow from the outside of the firm (especially from the Fintech 
disruptive ecosystem) to be adopted by its big organization and which, in the meanwhile, also 
produces innovation internally. 
As explained by BBVA’s CEO Torres Vila at “Money 20/20” first edition, in order to 
implement this multi-dimensional model, the Group focuses on five main areas: 
- Internal incubator; 
- Strategic partnerships with Fintech players; 
- Digital M&A and direct investments; 
- Venture capital; 
- Open platform. 
The new vision based on the willingness to seize new opportunities was coined in face 
of acknowledged changes in place in the environment surrounding the firm; and BBVA’s 
effort to signal its commitment to the achievement of its new long-term aspiration is often 
communicated by marketing initiatives too, such as the adoption, starting from February 
2017, of a new tagline thereafter always associated with the brand name and showed in the 
logo: “BBVA - Creating Opportunities”. 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 47 – BBVA’s new tagline: focus on a new vision 
Source: BBVA website, 2017 
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The new purpose was also immediately translated in what the companies defined as its 
six strategic priorities (see figure below): 
1. New standard in customer experience;  
2. Digital sales; 
3. New business models; 
4. Optimize capital allocation; 
5. Unrivaled efficiency; 
6. A first class workforce. 
 
Thus, prompted by the digital disruption and due to the changes in customers’ needs, 
much more focused on “immediacy and customization”, BBVA chose to develop digital sales 
and, to do this, the company developed a new ad hoc value proposition at the core its 
business, whose three keys are: 
 Convenience, mainly achieved via huge reliance on mobile as relationship 
channel; 
 Simplicity, it refers to the offering of very simple services and to the effort of 
crafting streamlined buying processes and customer journeys, but also to the 
bank’s ability and willingness to stay trustworthy and transparent; 
Fig. 48– Six Strategic Priorities: BBVA objectives 
Source: BBVA Investors Presentation, 2017 
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 Advice, this is mainly related to the hard functions, provided via a wider range of 
tools. 
The new value proposition is very much focused on the pillars of Fintech disruptors and 
it appears aligned with those of tech companies too; it clearly shows the bank’s shift in 
priority towards a closer relationship with customers and to the placement of their experience 
at the center of strategy. 
As a result of this multi-strategies model for innovation, BBVA reached significant 
targets and key figures by which the company measures its “digital banking capabilities”, 
such as (as after Q3 results’ announcement, by November 2017): 
 “DIY milestone”, about 90% of BBVA’s products offered as “do-it-yourself 
digital services”: the bank is able to offer almost its complete range of services 
via computers, tablets, ATMs and mobile apps, at a Group average of 87.3%, 
but with intra-countries differences, thus meaning some geographies, as Turkey 
or Spain, can do even better in terms of “DIY capability”; 
 Growing mobile banking, BBVA has a mobile customer base close to 16 million; 
 Digital channel increasing impact, 25% of total sales are digital, with consumer 
loans being leading digitally sold service, and deposits and investment funds 
following the rank. 
Even in face of these targets achieved, as the “DIY milestone”, the company does not 
abandon the more traditional approach to customers, since the CEO vision of the banking 
industry for the long-term is to bet on a “hybrid model – a combination of technology and 
personalized advice”, thus the aim is not a substitution of traditional channels, rather the 
provision of a where-and-when-you-want banking service, as seen by the branches’ 
importance discussed above.  
 
4.4.1. In-house innovation: tech-edge products built within BBVA’s organization and 
initiatives launched to promote innovation 
 
In order to deliver the innovative services that customers require today, one of BBVA’s focus 
has been to develop internally the ability to design and launch innovations which were 
somehow similar to those often brought to the market by Fintech players, thus the focus of in-
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house innovation at BBVA has been mainly to learn from the disruptors. As a matter of fact, 
this ability to innovate is ever improved and codified just as a result and thanks to the points 
of contact which BBVA has established with the Fintech ecosystem.  
As suggested by many in recent literature, participating to Fintech ecosystem has 
brought to banks Fintech’s methodologies, talents, skills. In BBVA, this led to the adoption of 
“agile” methodology, which it applies for its “scrum” teams dedicated to development of new 
digital solutions, and, also, many talents crucial to succeed in innovation came from the 
Fintech ecosystem, after the bank participated in it. Closing the talent gap recently suffered by 
many banks, these human resources who moved from the Fintech industry, were able to 
somehow realize that the change they were advocating for out of the banks’ world, was a 
priority within the Spanish Group too. 
However, learning from Fintech and applying these principles beyond a mere overtly 
declared commitment to innovation, has led BBVA to transform some internal processes and 
structures of the bank and to commit adequate resources to innovation, giving evidence to 
what highlighted by many authors in literature. For example, BBVA Bancomer grew the 
teams dedicated to prototyping and testing of innovative ideas, in Mexico, from 14 in 2014 to 
50 teams, working the way a “Digital factory” (as the bank subsidiary actually calls its 
department) does: projects are iteratively tested with the aim to launch a novelty in the market 
in few months only. This means also ensuring that human resources working on Business 
Development within BBVA have an adequate level of “diversity”, since, as said, this is seen 
as one of critical factors literature identifies for effective in-house innovation in banks. 
In a nutshell, the in-house innovation requires more than internal resources and 
capabilities and, again, it can be considered strongly supported and, as expected, necessarily 
paired with a series of initiatives to support and engage with external disruptors. So, in order 
to engage with disruptors, BBVA has its own hub, a reality which shows a tendency 
highlighted in literature, as many banks trying to navigate innovation are launching one. The 
one of BBVA is “Open Space”84, in Madrid; there the bank holds, among others, “Open 
Talent”, an yearly competition for Fintech startup projects, organized since 2009, or the 
“Fintech University”, an event to discuss the hottest themes and research fields in banking 
innovation, etc. 
The hub is a core source of innovation for BBVA; the choice of its location is worth a 
comment, since it seems countertrend with literature’s highlighted tendency of big banks to 
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place their innovation labs within the Fintech hottest geographies, especially in order to better 
supply the needed external talent; by the way, even if this tendency is not confirmed by 
BBVA’s choice to place the hub in Madrid, it could allow the bank to overcome the possible 
risks noted by literature of dedicating to an innovation hub a “remote location”, impairing to 
an excessive extent the necessary communication and collaboration  with the bank’s core 
people and functions. 
All of these efforts in terms of in-house innovation led BBVA to launch many tech-edge 
vertical services in addition to the banks’ most traditional ones, but also to implement a 
constant improvement of the core services for its clients. This improvement and the 
willingness to constantly adopt new features on traditional products and services took BBVA 
to many achievements, summarized, for example, in what the company advertised (via a 
video advertisement on Youtube which was saw by more than 2 million users) as “The 
revolution of the small things”. The strategy is to render the mobile app and the online 
channel of the international bank as much nimble and user-friendly as possible and to always 
perfect them. For example, the above mentioned advertising campaign shows some of the 
features added to the bank’s mobile app in 2015, such as the possibility to pay without the 
physical cards needed, the possibility to sign contracts remotely, or even the app’s function 
for always having a direct contact with an advisor, the opportunity to use the bank in the 
Apple Watch, etc. 
Indeed the BBVA Wallet App is considered a success and its online tools for digital 
banking were ranked as “World number 1” in mobile banking according to the Forrester 
consultancy; as said, the web and mobile represent crucial channels to the Group, which is 
expanding the digital and the mobile users on a constant yearly base. 
As digital bank BBVA is able to offer a very large range of its services, with many 
features which were deemed to be a prerogative of “neo-banks” and substitutes from Fintech 
space only, such as: “My day-to-day”, an asset management tool launched in 2016, which lets 
users to record and predict income and expenses by categories, to save for “savings targets” 
and to manage their financial lives easily. Also the tools accessible online include “Mobile 
Cash”, a service via which customers can go online and send money to a BBVA ATM, where 
withdrawal does not need a card, or “Cash Up”, the function for p2p transfers. 
In addition to the additional technological features added to BBVA’s core products and 
services, in-house innovation efforts have led also to the launch of alternative financial 
services, brought to the market under the bank’s own control. In this cases, the bank 
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developed vertical/niche focused business models with the aim to enlarge its revenue streams 
via additional sources; this happened, for example, with “Trust-u” or “Tuyyo”, Fintech 
platforms launched by BBVA. 
Trust-u is an alternative finance platform which offers loans to startups if they gain their 
teams’ families’ and friends’ support. Basically, Trust-u does an initial rough assessment of 
the trust index of the applicant entity (which shall be formed by less than 30 months), using 
both financial available data and alternative ones; this serves as first element to proceed and 
as yardstick to calculate the further conditions of the funding. After that, once the closest 
supporters commit a certain amount to a project, the digital platform provides the rest, in form 
of a loan, with the aim of “sharing trust”. 
The strategic aim of BBVA’s in supporting such a service, which was developed inside 
the incubator in Madrid, is to fuel alternative funding with the aim of supporting the growth 
of what one day could be an additional share of its customer base. 
 Tuyyo
85
 is another app recently introduced by BBVA; its function is international 
remittances from mobile phone between US and Mexico. It was launched in 2017 by BBVA 
to focus on one of the world’s hottest corridors for international remittances; money can be 
send on another bank account, to cash-up locations or to a BBVA ATM. The bank also has 
the aim to target Mexico’s unbanked people situation, thus it will offer to them the possibility 
to eventually store the cash received into a virtual account even if they are not yet clients of 
BBVA (a feature that is going to be added in a few to the app). Clearly, such app, especially 
the last feature, is a way to target the unbanked market, turning one of Mexico’s pain points 
into an opportunity for BBVA. 
This service is a good example of how BBVA learnt from disruptors: indeed, many 
from Fintech universe had previously recognized such opportunity and they had developed 
their entire business models on international remittances; this service adds to the ones 
launched by BBVA with the long-run objective to get closer to the unbanked. The choice of 
Mexico is strategic, either for the potential of this country in terms of unbanked population, as 
we have seen based on recent studies’ perception, and also because BBVA is strong there and 
can lever on its well-known brand. 
All things considered, BBVA’s in-house innovation efforts appear to be significant, 
adequately organized and they also seem to be leading the company measurable results; but 
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still it is evident that such innovation must have external contributions from Fintech 
ecosystem, as we highlighted in recent literature, and, in order to be effective, it needs to be 
communicated at every line of the whole bank organization. This hint is confirmed by 
BBVA’s conduct, since the bank, in addition to the constant external signaling of 
commitment by the Head of the company, communicates it even through internal initiatives: 
for example, in 2017, BBVA held a new edition of an in-company event, “Live@BBVA”, 
which serves the bank to communicate its employees the functioning of new business models 
and the support for the innovation ecosystem that the bank provides; partnerships are 
explained and employees learn what it is going on in the innovative areas of the banking 
sector. 
 
4.4.2. Investing in Fintech: BBVA Ventures and Propel Venture Partners 
 
Despite in-house new digital business development, innovation in Fintech has been strongly 
supported by BBVA by acting as an investor to prompt innovative entrepreneurship. This 
strategy began in 2013, when the Group established BBVA Ventures, a VC fund to invest in 
Fintech, committing $ 100 million to it; the main objective to have a fund subsidiary was to 
invest in valuable ideas and, by supporting innovators in growth, having a deeper 
understanding of changes in the industry. 
The fund operated in San Francisco and in the first years of activity it invested also in 
Ribbit Capital, a very well-known VC fund focused on Fintech, and also on 500 Startup, 
which provides seed-capital and incubator programs to disruptors. 
In 2016, the first fund was shut down and a new VC fund was created: becoming a 
limited partner of Propel Venture Partners
86
, BBVA allocated $ 250 million to be invested in 
US’ and Europe’s best Fintech startups. 
The two main reasons for BBVA to being partner of a new separate VC were: 
- the idea of distinguish the fund from the bank entity in order, according to 
BBVA management, to have a greater appeal for Fintech than it would have 
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happened by being much more associated with the BBVA Group (as it was with 
BBVA Ventures); 
- the willingness to overcome BBVA’s previous fund limit in structure, as it was 
often only allowed to invest up to 5% in any financing round. 
Given these objectives, also different structures were given to the funds used to finance 
Fintech; while BBVA Ventures was a corporate fund, the new established fund is a SBIC, 
Small Business Investment Company, namely an independent structure from BBVA, which 
renders participating to the financing rounds worthy due to not having restriction in the stake 
size. 
As identified by Peachey (2016) there are “seven keys” that explain Propel and BBVA 
Fintech investment strategy; some of these explain the main advantages of such a structured 
fund: 
- “The Managing Partners have significant fintech experience”; in particular, 
BBVA maintained two of the previous managing partner of BBVA Ventures to 
the new fund (Jay Reinemann and Tom Whiteaker) and they both come from 
VISA and from other VC funds; 
- “There will be two Propel funds”; it is highlighted the advantage of having a 
presence both in US and in Europe, where the managing partners recognized 
huge rising opportunities and decided to set a dedicated office when establishing 
Propel; 
- “Propel is already managing a number of investments”; in particular, those of 
BBVA Ventures portfolio; 
- “$250m of BBVA’s money will be under Propel’s management”; 
- “Propel’s new independent structure will make it more competitive”; as said, 
the idea of independence was crucial either to fight startups reluctance in being 
invested by a bank organization either to make more competitive investment 
decisions; 
- “Propel’s U.S. fund is set up as an Small Business Investment Company 
(SBIC)”; 
- “Propel will have an office in London”; as BBVA recognized UK is a vibrant 
Fintech market and London is considered by many the first hub for Fintech, 
given these facts the strategy to invest more massively in Fintech included the 
location of Propel offices both in San Francisco and London. 
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Among some of Propel’s notable investments, according to Crunchbase, there are the 
ones shown in the figure below, such as Coinbase, Insikt, Personal Capital, Prosper, Taulia. 
Despite we only have few available data on the above investments, and even if they 
were joined by Propel Venture Partner in conjunction with other investors who led the 
financing rounds, these investments represent an important strategy via with BBVA supported 
innovation and, in particular, they are useful for the bank to explore some very innovative and 
tech-edge areas of the Fintech universe, as it happened with Coinbase. 
Coinbase
87
, founded in 2012 in California, is a platform to buy and sell digital 
currencies, like bitcoin, ethereum, and litecoin, and a digital wallet to store them; in 2015, 
BBVA Ventures announced it had invested in the platform, which is among the world most 
popular in its Fintech class. 
By the year of the round, Coinbase had 2.1 million consumer wallets, 38 thousands 
merchants linked to its platform and 56 employees with a number of countries for service 
availability equal to 19. Now, the platform has reached 10 million users in 32 countries; it 
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Fig. 49 – Propel Venture Partner: some investments by BBVA’s fund 
Source: created by the author (Crunchbase & Propel data) 
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recorded $1billion in revenues, according to Pymnts, and its valuation at August 2017 was of 
$1.6 billion, a value which made Coinbase join the list of “unicorns” companies. 
The round of financing in which BBVA participated in, together with existing investors 
and other new entries, like the New York Stock Exchange, was the Series C financing round, 
led by DFJ Draper Fisher Jurvetson Venture Capital: Coinbase raised $75 million and reached 
this way $106 million of total capital raised. The deal was, according to Coinbase blog, the 
largest financing round ever made yet to a Bitcoin company and the first which saw the 
participation of traditional financial institutions. 
The managing partner of BBVA Ventures, Reinemann, was quoted to say “We’re 
making these investments to learn, to start the engagement, and we think that through these 
investments, the bank can do a better job of learning than just sitting on the sidelines, than 
trying to read about it. It’s about trying to actively participate”, thus explaining the reason 
for BBVA to participate was mainly to test the bitcoin opportunities by observing a running 
business. 
In Propel Ventures Partners’ portfolio we also find Insikt88; it was founded in 2012, it 
offers lending to the underbanked and the possibility to invest in loans; the most famous 
business of Insikt, which has distinguished this business model from many rival Fintech, is a 
white label B2B digital lending platform, called LENDIFY, with the mission to offer 
“Lending as a Service”. The company serves more than 30 brands and thus allows third 
parties, “from supermarket chains to money transfer stores”, to be alternative lenders to the 
banks. To date Insikt has offered 125.000 loans, and, starting from California, it has spread to 
Texas, Illinois and Arizona. 
Propel Ventures continues investing in Fintech with the aim to support their growth and 
thanks to its new added geographic presence in Europe, in particular in London, is perfectly 
placed to become an active stakeholder of such ecosystem; also BBVA’s main Spanish 
competitor, namely Santander, has a corporate fund based in London, suggesting how 
important is for banks to stay at the forefront of emerging opportunities. It is Santander 
InnoVentures
89
, launched in 2014 with a commitment of $100 million, it received further 
$100 million from the bank in 2016; also the rival’s fund vision is supportive for the “Fintech 
2.0” era, namely one which, as we saw in literature, does not see a competition between banks 
and Fintech, rather it builds the future of banking on collaboration and partnerships. The main 
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difference between the two funds lies in the decision of BBVA to run its fund as a separate 
entity from the bank to eventually broaden the willingness of Fintech to receive investments 
and due to the other reasons seen above. 
 
4.4.3. Strategic partnerships and alliances 
 
Strategic partnerships represent another crucial pillar of the business model innovation fueled 
by the digital disruption, as seen above; indeed BBVA has formed several to achieve aimed 
transformation: as the CEO of BBVA has stated: “The goal is to explore new business 
opportunities, technologies and share knowledge”. 
The partnership strategy is favored at BBVA giving evidence of above discussed 
benefits which it brings either for banks and innovators; Mr. Lopez Moctezuma with respect 
to this has also confirmed that many services launched by Fintech are not competing with the 
bank’s business model, rather they are complementary. As a consequence, partnerships are 
needed for both parties and have mutual advantages. 
The main partnerships of BBVA can be identified in the ones formed with Dwolla, 
OnDeck and Das-Nano. 
 
- BBVA and Dwolla partnership: the value of being an open platform 
Many partnerships, run with the idea to integrate the partner’s product’s features into the 
bank’s ones imply the reliance and the acceptance of the bank of “open APIs” (open 
application program interface
90
), this means that the institution willing to add to its own 
service the characteristics and functioning of a Fintech one agrees to open its technology, in 
terms of coding, to the third party so that the two products can be integrated. This strategy, 
above identified by BBVA’s CEO as “open platform” was followed, for example, in the case 
of partnership with Dwolla. 
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 APIs were meant to combine different parties offerings; some are publicly available for free, while others, 
especially in cases they contain more sensitive information, are only provided after a strategic partnership is 
arranged by the two parties. In many cases, when users find themselves using a service which is a combination 
of different parties’ ones, they are not aware of this openness in technology which allows their streamlined 
convenient experience. 
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Dwolla
91
 is a B2B Fintech, founded in 2010, with the mission of “Building the ideal 
platform to move money”; it provides payments platform for money transfer and accounts’ 
verification. 
In October 2014, BBVA Compass and Dwolla announced their partnership, made in 
order to make the real-time payment systems of Dwolla available for BBVA Compass’ and 
Simple’s customers. Thanks to the alliance, BBVA was able to avoid the period from two to 
five days of typical wait to transfer funds, making transfer funds instantly available to any 
other BBVA Compass account holder and also to any from the Dwolla network. 
The bank decision to form the alliance was strongly pushed by the fact that many of its 
current clients, especially enterprises and small businesses, were already users of the Dwolla 
platform and they proved to be very interested to this service; indeed, without the 
participation of the bank users needed to deposit money to a Dwolla account to transfer it. 
At the times of the alliance with Dwolla (late 2014), the traditional US payment 
network was far from being real-time focused; it had to be changed but that would have 
needed long time to transit towards more modern standards; also, the fees for payments 
transactions and money transfers within US were higher than those offered by Dwolla; indeed 
the Fintech allowed transactions of more than $10 to cost a flat fee of $0.25, while lower 
value transactions were given for free. Dwolla was a leading player within US as far as 
streamlined payments is concerned; indeed it even joined, in 2015, the Federal Reserve’s 
Faster Payments Task Force, a committee created just with the purpose of drafting and 
moving towards the creation of a new payment system. 
The partnership lets us understand the forward-looking vision of BBVA: the bank was 
the largest bank to partner with Dwolla in times in which the use of APIs was not so common 
by banks yet, giving evidence of the benefits coming from open innovation. Thanks to the 
alliance, customers of BBVA were able to make real-time transfer of funds and to access the 
other services offered by Dwolla, (in terms of APIs) to build their own payment platform 
within the network of this Fintech. 
The alliance represents a representative case in which the Fintech company was born as 
a B2B provider of a vertical service, in the payment class of Fintech, and in which the two 
parties, either the bank and the Fintech, found complementarity and reasons to ally: 
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- subsequently to the agreement and thanks to the bank’s opening of its API to the 
partner, Dwolla and BBVA co-developed FiSync, the protocol of Dwolla to work 
with financial institutions, and made it run on a larger scale, thus allowing the first 
to validate its innovation and the latter to satisfy the ease and safety requirements 
for payments coming from its customers;  
- Dwolla streamlined its process for clients too, because, without the partnership in 
place, customers willing to use its platform needed to open an account at the 
Fintech, and this used to complicate their experience; 
- the customer base of BBVA became a source of potential users of other B2B 
services offered by Dwolla; 
- the two contributed to push forward the standard required in the industry, giving 
further popularity to Dwolla as pioneer innovator and also giving voice to the need 
for change coming from customers. 
  
- BBVA and OnDeck partnership: online lender’s credit scoring 
In 2014, BBVA Compass also announced a partnership with OnDeck, focused on providing 
capital to SMEs via alternative credit scoring and in a fast digital way; the alliance was 
entered by the bank to be able to serve customers which would have been otherwise out of the 
bank’s client base. 
OnDeck
92
 was launched in 2007 in New York; in 2014 it went public in NYSE and 
today it is often labeled as the leader in online small business lending in US, where the service 
is available, together with Australia and Canada; indeed it has issued to date more than $8 
billion to 80.000 customers; it offers financing options as short and longer-term loans and 
lines of credit. 
The Fintech especially targets clients requesting loans which usually are too small in the 
amount to be worthy in terms of profit for a large bank with a completely different cost 
structure: entering the partnership, instead, OnDeck offered BBVA its technology, “OnDeck 
Score”(see figure below), an advanced proprietary analytics tool via which the Fintech is able 
to process thousands of data from small businesses (from public data to social media data) 
and to assess their credit worthiness. 
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OnDeck and BBVA Compass chose the “Enterprise Platform”, a partnership type that 
OnDeck offers to large companies and banks, among those available at the Fintech’s platform 
(the other partnership programs are “Referral Program”, best suited for advisors of SMEs, 
and “Affiliate Program”, for website owners to promote OnDeck and earn from sponsorship). 
Through the first kind of partnership, a company collaborating with OnDeck offers its 
customer base the Fintech’s technology to be able to enlarge the funding solutions for small 
business clients. 
OnDeck represents an example of Fintech whose business model is strongly levering on 
partnerships to grow; so, within the “Enterprise Platform” partnership program it mentions, 
together with BBVA Compass, also partners coming from the Fintech universe, such as 
Prosper, a lending marketplace. The main underlying objective for OnDeck to form such 
partnerships is clearly the need to accumulate users of its proprietary model, first of all to 
perfect it ever more and also to try to turn into clients the greatest possible share of such users. 
Even other banks followed BBVA’s decision to team with OnDeck, in particular JPMorgan 
Chase developed its digital loan service for SMEs through the partnership, namely Chase 
Business Quick Capital. 
OnDeck decided to base its business model on “Diversified Distribution Channels”, to 
build the adequate brand awareness and to reach many customers; in 2015, OnDeck channels 
included direct marketing, strategic partnerships and funding advisors; in particular, the 
strategic partnerships, as stated by the  Fintech in its annual report, were a way to gain 
partners’ “small business customers and data that can be used to enhance our targeting 
Fig. 50 – OnDeck proprietary credit score algorithm 
Source: https://www.ondeck.com/partner/enterprise 
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capabilities”. The partnerships’ functioning, in general, is the following: if the partner refers a 
customer to OnDeck which then serves him with its loan solutions, OnDeck pays that partner 
a fee; if, instead, the partner uses OnDeck’s technology and platform just to assess a 
customer’s credit worthiness and then it serves him, the partner pays a fee for the metrics 
generated. 
The OnDeck and BBVA alliance gives evidence of BBVA’s need to access the 
Fintech’s already developed technology to eventually serve customers otherwise lost in face 
of the bank’s higher costs and longer times to process their request; on the other hand, 
OnDeck could gain fees instead of providing funds and this goes at the Fintech’s benefit, 
coherently with the view of an initial need for startups to generate volumes even at low 
margins revenue formula and with the eventual longer term view to be stronger and able to 
originate more loans, as the company eventually did. 
Furthermore, thanks to the alliance, OnDeck was able to scale and to perfect its 
algorithm which represents its valuable asset to use in other partnerships such as the one just 
seen above and, finally, OnDeck needed to work on brand awareness, as we have seen how 
crucial is to acquire trust when it comes to digital financial services, and by partnering with 
recognized brands it could do it faster. 
 
- BBVA and Das-Nano: jointly developing Veridas 
In 2015, BBVA and Das-Nano
93
 had started collaborating; Das-Nano was founded in 2012 
and it provides nanotechnology, biometric and document verification solutions; its business 
thus can be placed within Fintech innovations in the class we defined “infrastructure”, namely 
one of technological innovations with great potential to be applied in banking and to 
contribute to its progress. 
In 2017, BBVA and Das-Nano announced they had created a new technology company, 
namely “Veridas”, specialized in biometrics to research and develop on identification and 
authentication systems for the bank, through the use of facial recognition, voice recognition, 
use of customers’ fingerprints, etc. sharing the risk, knowledge and resources for doing it. 
The partnership was crucial for BBVA to gain the specific skills and the expertise of the 
scientists from Das-Nano used to form and run Veridas, while the group of scientists from 
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Das-Nano needed most of all the possibility to test and validate their knowledge on a large 
customer base; a pattern which, as seen in the literature review, is very common for Fintech-
banks alliances. 
 
4.4.4. Innovation through M&As 
 
In addition to the partnerships, among the strategies available to face the emergence of new 
players within the industry, banks are also focusing on the opportunity to acquire a Fintech; 
literature has highlighted the benefits underlying entering M&As, being this a way to have a 
product or a specific technology already developed by the target available for the parent, or 
seeing in these deals a way to acquire capabilities, especially skills the team of the Fintech 
owns and which prove to be not easily replicable by a bank. This strategy has been 
aggressively adopted by BBVA, which in recent years completed several deals (see figure 
below). 
These Fintech M&As have different target companies and were prompted by specific 
objectives; in particular: 
- as far as Atom deal is concerned, it represents the acquisition of a stake into a neo-
bank, mainly related to the willingness of BBVA to target the UK market; 
- other deals, namely Simple and Holvi ones, represent acquisitions of technological 
non-bank companies; 
- still other deals, the acquisitions of SpringStudio, Madiva and OpenPay, are 
focused on the acquisition of vertical services, in order to endow the bank with 
needed crucial competencies or developed technologies. 
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Fig. 51 – BBVA main acquisitions towards digital transformation 
Source: company website (www.BBVA.com) 
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- BBVA and Atom Bank: acquiring a stake into one of UK’s leading neo-banks 
Atom
94
 is a neo-bank, namely a Fintech from the “digital 
banking” class, it was founded in 2014 in England to offer 
mobile banking and, in June 2015, it obtained the banking 
license. 
The acquisition of a 29.5% stake in Atom by BBVA came in 2015 (before the Fintech 
services launch which arrived in 2016) for £45 million, its assigned total value of about £150 
million before even launching was mainly seen by BBVA in two reasons: Atom bank’s great 
potential to succeed in digital banking, due to its team and the decision to apply for a license, 
and Atom’s geographic positioning, since UK represents a core geography for the Fintech 
ecosystem and one which BBVA was very committed to target. 
The team of Atom was indeed formed by many professionals coming from the banking 
industry (in particular from Metro Bank and HSBC) and adequately hard-skilled. In 2016, 
Atom launched its app and its first product was a fixed term savings account, at a very 
competitive interest rate, achievable thanks to the light cost structure of the neo-bank. In the 
year of the launch, thanks to the investments received, Atom also bought Grasp, a design 
agency which it had previously collaborated with; the strategic aim was to create a best in 
class mobile app, being this the Fintech principal channel, and also to incorporate in it 
gamification and other digital features to enrich the users’ experience. 
Atom is located in UK, where many neo-banks have challenged the traditional banking 
industry status quo in recent years, Atom’s rival with this reference include Monzo, Tandem, 
Starling, etc. BBVA Group had been interested in entering UK for many years, and the deal 
represented a good opportunity most of all because of the country good attitude towards 
digital, with a population, as we have seen, eager to adopt new tech solutions for financial 
services, and also because of the very competitive landscape in terms of digital banking. 
The acquisition of the 29.5% stake in Atom was a possibility for the neo-bank to, first 
of all, obtaining money to fund its growth plan; but, giving evidence of what highlighted in 
literature, the most important strategic reasons underlying the deal were identified by Atom 
CEO in others, such as BBVA’s well-known banking experience and its significant resources; 
furthermore Muller (CEO of Atom) recognized its Fintech and BBVA had similar aims and 
visions about digital banking, which represented a priority for both, thus he found reasonable 
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to collaborate and join forces to become two champions in this field, indeed he stated: “We 
feel that we share a vision with BBVA. One that says the power of technology can be used to 
transform people’s lives for the better and if we can use it that way, we can change banks and 
banking for good. We also feel that we share a culture and although culture covers many 
areas, for me at least it’s mostly about people. We have found the people at BBVA to be 
direct, straightforward, consistent, open and optimistic. There’s lots more nice things I could 
add but that’ll do for now. We felt that we could learn from them and vice versa, they could 
learn from us. In short, we felt that we could be proper partners.” Such statement triggers 
many considerations in light of the literature review made in previous chapter: first of all, it 
stresses the existence of achievable mutual benefits for Fintech and banks when collaborating, 
also it gives evidence of the importance of a cultural fit and of a shared vision between parties 
for banks-Fintech M&As deals to be entered and to succeed. 
This deal suggests the above even if Atom represents a real disruptor, namely it is not a 
matter of needed complementarity (e.g. because of the banking license, since Atom owns its 
own) rather the objectives and the reasons to collaborate were still found by the two 
companies, in particular in the possibility to join the two entities’ expertise and visions and 
also because the two had very different target customers which did not overlap. 
The financing round of November 2015 was led by BBVA, which, as said, contributed 
£45 million, and totally amounted £82 million, with other participants including previous 
investors Woodford and Toscafund, and also Marathon and Polar Capital. Subsequently to the 
financing round, BBVA became part of the Fintech board and it had the possibility to 
participate in further rounds, as it happened in 2017, when BBVA led another financing round 
of £83 million raised by Atom contributing £29.4 million to maintain its stake in the company 
and to remain Atom’s main strategic investor. 
 
- Simple and Holvi acquisitions: BBVA buys the “non-banks” 
Simple
95
 was founded in 2009 in Brooklyn by Josh 
Reich, who often tells he was really upset with existing 
banking experiences and sent to his friend and future 
co-founder, Shamir Karkal, an e-mail which afterwards became very popular, in which the 
object was an informal friendly request to “found a retail bank”. By the way, in 2011, the 
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headquarter was moved to Portland and, in July 2012, the company officially served its first 
customer. 
The main popular feature of the service just after the launch to customers, and also one 
of the most popular characteristic it ever maintained, was aimed to offer, in addition to a free-
fees account, a tool, called “Goal”, to automatically save money and to help clients in their 
personal finance management, thus showing their assets compared to set targets and planned 
expenses. Thus the competitive key of Simple is to combine in a single app the budget tools 
and the banking function, all delivered via a very user-friendly application. 
In 2013, Simple processed about $1.7 billion worth of transactions through a staff of 72 
people and, in 2014, year of the acquisition, it had about 100.000 customers, from 28 to 29 
years old, on average, and 92 employees. Thanks to the Goal feature and the characteristics of 
the app, Simple, in 2014, also boasted a 30% customers’ saving rate (versus a 5% average in 
the industry). During 2015, the company saw its customer base grow at a monthly rate of 10% 
and, in 2016, at its seventh year from birth, Simple had 300 employees. 
After the acquisition (which was in 2014), the two companies worked together in order 
to render BBVA Compass (US’s army of BBVA Group) the backend provider of Simple 
accounts. Prior to the deal, the Fintech relied on another partner, namely The Bancorp Bank, 
for deposits; they had formed a partnership in late 2011. 
After the acquisition, Simple continued to serve customers with its brand (as it ever did, 
regardless the partner bank), but, while just some accounts stayed backed by the old partner, 
the majority and the new opened ones relied on BBVA. Also, Simple became able to offer 
some others BBVA Compass’ features, still maintaining the control on the design of the 
experience, but, following the acquisition, all of the new launched Simple’s features were 
added to the BBVA-backed accounts only; indeed the deal gave Simple the possibility to 
enlarge its product range, for example, in 2017, Simple launched “Simple Shared”, a saving 
account for couples in a relationship (and only BBVA-backed customers could access it). 
Simple maintained the same management team and, apparently, the core of the online 
bank did not change. This was just one of many cases in which the original idea of the Fintech 
to disrupt banking was actually reshaped over the years towards the mission of offering an 
easy and “beautiful” way of banking, but without denying traditional banks’ role and reason 
to exist: indeed the startup always relied on banks as partners, instead of having a license. 
Even if some saw this as a limit for the Fintech, it represented instead an opportunity for 
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BBVA, just because Simple’s business model was complementary to its own in needing a 
bank back-end provider. 
As a matter of fact, the choice not to opt for having its own bank license, which is 
something that distinguishes Simple from a neo-bank like Atom, offered an opportunity for 
the two parties to collaborate and join respective strengths. Although rendering evident this 
opportunity, this deal also led us to consider a potential risk of bank-Fintech M&As entered 
with such objective: for the startup acquired there could be the risk to lose its customers’ 
approval and to see them leave the Fintech, due to the choice to marry what they had ever 
figured out as a “user-enemy” and, in turn, for the acquiring bank potential risks could arise in 
seeing a downsizing in the Fintech’s customer base it paid for. 
Simple was bought by BBVA in 2014 for $117 million, thus at about “$1k/customer”; 
the most valuable assets of the firm, for BBVA, were its digital capabilities and the young 
customer base in US. 
Notwithstanding the risk to erode the customer base subsequently to the acquisition 
seems sound in this deal, it could not be a challenge for the deal to succeed taking into 
consideration that Simple’s customers could already be aware of the Fintech business model 
and could realize that Simple had already been serving them as an intermediary, relying on 
partner bank. Just to maintain its customer relationship, Simple struggled not to give up its 
brand name and design and to keep communicating the same old vision to customers, 
appreciating BBVA’s integration approach since it was not heavy and left it the needed 
autonomy. 
Despite this, many concerns about the deal have arisen from customers and industry 
practitioners, as the first did not see very trustable the choice to sell to a large bank, while the 
latter added it was not clear what was the real valuable asset of Simple to bring to BBVA; 
being its proposition to much focused on the “design” side of the service rather than a real 
value-added technology. The acquisition by BBVA was entered by the bank due to Simple’s 
US digital and young customer base, which was probably the most valuable asset, and, also, 
given the recognized notoriety of the Fintech brand among the innovation ecosystem. As a 
matter of fact, BBVA was trying, especially some years ago, to render its brand more 
recognized in US, where the Group had arrived by acquiring Compass, in 2007, and Simple 
was a popular brand which had experienced a significant word of mouth such that the Fintech 
did not rely on marketing to attract customers. 
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Simple’s founder reported to the press: “Joining with BBVA gives Simple the resources, 
autonomy, and global footprint we need”, thus focusing on his Fintech strategic purpose to 
enter the deal: to find a bank with the right infrastructure (e.g. banking license) able to let the 
brand the needed autonomy and also to try to scale internationally; finally, Simple also found 
more compatible the approach of BBVA as a strategic investor, with respect to the one of a 
VC, much more focused on shorter time horizon. 
 
Holvi
96
 was founded in 2011 in Finland, to address self-employed, free-lancers, 
small businesses and entrepreneurs concerns with more traditional banks, thus 
prompted by a similar mission of Simple; but, beside some similarities, the 
Finnish Fintech business model is based on offering a digital account for clients 
together with the business tools (e.g. accounting tools) they need and that are usually offered 
by other parties.  
The account helps “makers and doers” (as the Fintech labels its customers) to monitor 
expenses and income, while the business tools are meant to generate and send invoices and 
monitor their payments, to make financial reports easily and analyze cash flows, to implement 
bookkeeping, etc. In the aim to push entrepreneurship in a digital and paperless way, Holvi 
also allows users to open a store from its website; on the sales made via this e-commerce 
Holvi charges a fee as revenue stream. The online store can be set up in minutes, easily 
customized, digitally marketed via Facebook or Google with no efforts or expertise from the 
owners and it allows the sellers to automatically generate paperless bookkeeping for their 
sales. 
In March 2016, BBVA acquired Holvi, the details of the deal were not disclosed, but 
many compared the deal to the one previously made by BBVA with Simple; the main 
difference however lies in the two challengers of traditional banks’ business models; indeed, 
in comparison with Simple, Holvi boasts an apparently grater advantage given by its strategy 
to offer SMEs a bundle of additional services in addition to the account and also has a more 
effective revenue model. While giving evidence of what could be the potential seen in Holvi 
by BBVA, such features also give reasons to think that post-acquisition retention of the 
customers’ base could be much easier for the Finnish startup than it was for Simple. 
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Holvi’s services are available in Germany, Finland and Austria and the deal was 
strongly based on enlarging the range of countries served; according to CEO of Holvi, BBVA 
constituted the “ideal owner”; this concept was mainly related to the Group’s ability to offer 
to the acquired Fintech the possibility to scale and grow its business, being backed by a solid 
structure. As usually done by BBVA, the decision was to run Holvi as a stand-alone, while 
the main objective of the bank in completing the acquisition could be seen in the aim of 
adding to its core ones’ additional revenue streams in European countries like those where 
Holvi is present. 
 
- Madiva, SpringStudio, OpenPay: integrating vertical innovators 
The acquisition strategy of BBVA in order to pursue innovation and launch digital services 
has also focused on other niche focused services, in classes of the Fintech services’ spectrum 
ranging from infrastructure (Madiva and SpringStudio) to payments (OpenPay). 
In these cases the most valuable assets were either the targets’ people and capabilities 
(as in the case of Madiva or SpringStudio), or the target’s technology which BBVA wished to 
integrate (as with OpenPay). These deals are different from the ones above in the character of 
the acquired companies, as these were much more complementary services rather than rival or 
substitutes for BBVA; indeed, all of these targets are B2B providers. 
So, BBVA’s strategic aim to enter the M&As deals with such vertical innovators was 
not to horizontally expand the banks’ customer base, rather to integrate the uniqueness of the 
acquired companies at the benefit of the bank’s core business and in order to have the needed 
skills or technologies within convenient time. 
 
BBVA first acquired Madiva Soluciones, a Spanish startup 
founded in 2008 and specialized on big data and analytics; 
the CEO of BBVA commented on the deal, which is 
unknown in the amount, saying it strengthened the bank’s 
capabilities; the target’s skills were used indeed by BBVA to launch new products, such as 
BBVA Valora. 
BBVA Valora is an app for its digital customers that allows them to track how much a 
house is worthy, estimating the current sale or rental price of an owned or desired building; it 
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also offers insights on the neighborhood and it allows owners of a house to collect all of their 
expenses related to the building in a place. 
The platform also allows mortgages simulation for potential buyers; all of the insights it 
generates (house prices, neighborhood value, etc.) are based on information from the registry 
office (geolocation, surface area, year of construction, and other characteristics of the 
property) plus information on offers made for similar buildings nearby; the app relies on 
Madiva Solucciones’ ability to analyze these data. This service is an evident case in which 
BBVA needed the integrated resources and capabilities of the acquired company to be 
matched with its own ones, in order to deliver the desired innovation. 
 
In addition to Madiva’s BBVA entered SpringStudio’s acquisition; it is a 38 employees 
team of user-experience designers founded in 2001 in San Francisco; after the acquisition, 
both the young companies were not integrated in an aggressive way into BBVA, which aimed 
leaving them both the possibility to serve other clients too, since, as highlighted in literature, 
not doing this could even destroy the companies’ innovative capabilities. 
The key assets within these companies are indeed intangibles, related to the talent of 
their people; so the main integration challenge is to ensure these talents are locked in their 
companies, through incentives created prior to acquiring them and thanks to an adequate level 
of autonomy which they can benefit after the deal. 
 
Similar considerations, in terms of acquiring new core 
competencies and resources through M&As, led to the 
deal with OpenPay
97
: founded in 2013, it is a startup from 
Mexico which delivers payment solutions, for B2B target, focused on offering businesses 
streamlined and frictionless services. 
It was acquired by BBVA in December 2016, for an undisclosed amount; the aim of the 
deal was to lever on mutual strengths in favor to the delivery of new digital efficient solutions 
and in order to improve customer experience; “With this operation, – BBVA reported - BBVA 
Bancomer, which is already collaborating with Openpay, increases its range of online 
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payments solutions, while allowing Openpay to strengthen its commercial firepower by 
joining forces with Mexico’s largest bank”. 
In this case, the capability needed was the Fintech ability to design payment solutions; 
OpenPay had attracted the company’s attention as it was a finalist in Open Talent 2015. As 
seen, this kind of events are an opportunity for scouting potential partners or even target. 
According to Carlos López Moctezuma - Head of New Digital Business at BBVA - the 
main priorities implied by the deal were: 
- “working with Openpay to strengthen the functionalities of a payment platform in 
the bank”; 
- “integrate new anti-fraud models”; 
- “market the Openpay product among the institution’s corporate customers”; 
- “build marketing synergies that complement both parties’ product offering”. 
 
4.5. Seizing opportunities from Fintech: insights and conclusions on BBVA strategy 
 
Despite the journey towards the innovation targets set by BBVA’s strategic plan is not ended 
yet and even if there are some limits for a thorough assessment to be done via this case study 
analysis, in terms of results achieved by each of the company’s implemented strategy 
(especially because some data are not disclosed or some results are to be seen and measured 
yet), we can draw some conclusions on what we described above. 
The case study analysis was useful to understand how this company reacted to the 
recent challenges posed to banking industry by the emergence of Fintech: first of all BBVA 
recognized early the huge changes in place in its sector, denying to have a “passive” 
approach, suggesting us once again how important is for banks to gain such awareness in 
order to react and embrace innovation somehow. Thanks to this understanding BBVA has 
developed a technological approach to banking which allowed it to adopt innovations at a 
constant greater extent and to be able to sense opportunities. 
All of BBVA’s strategies appear to be a clear attempt to learn from the beneficial 
aspects that the disruption brought in, rather than fighting it as some of its rivals used to do, 
especially in the first times of Fintech emergence. BBVA appears to be wise on this point and 
not to deny the need for some traditionally suffered limits of the banks’ business models to be 
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worked out in order for services offered to fit with customers’ current needs; its strategies 
give reasons to claim the climate between banks and Fintech today is, as highlighted by 
reviewed literature, much more focused on collaboration, rather than competition, at the 
benefit of mutual objectives for Fintech and banks and, most of all, at the benefit of final 
users. 
Learning from Fintech and its disrupting models has meant for the bank: 
- fueling innovation, instead of trying to fight the advance of novel models, the bank 
has prompted their emergence, through initiatives like the Open Talent and by 
giving innovators support through its incubator and its investments; 
- emulating best practices, this translates in adopting many features that were 
previously introduced by Fintech, adding them to the services offered by BBVA, 
through partnerships, matching events or investments made to have many touch 
points with Fintech; 
- participating in the ecosystem, BBVA’s commitment to this is evident and the 
company highlights this as a “win-win” opportunity for either new participants and 
incumbents in financial services; 
- opening the boundaries of the firm, since the focus has shifted towards the 
adoption of open APIs to be able in integrating other parties’ technology and also 
towards several attempts to bring in new services from the digital ecosystem, 
confirming the trend of open banking that practitioners are seeing to dominate the 
industry in future years; also, this strategy has rendered BBVA ready to adopt 
regulatory attempts to stimulate cooperation, such as the PSD2, and has proved the 
company’s ability to anticipate such direction of the Fintech phenomenon. 
The collaboration and learning attempt to embrace Fintech was done by investing in 
new participants in financial services, directly via M&As and partnerships, and, indirectly, via 
the bank’s funding arm. By these moves, we could notice that: as far as M&As are concerned, 
the greatest  and most evident opportunity is represented by the possibility to integrate many 
vertical services to the banks’ core, to lever on these third parties’ resources and capabilities 
at the advantage of BBVA’s traditional services; see for example the use of Madiva’s 
analytics for the launch of BBVA’s Valora. Indeed, as we were noticing in the literature 
review, B2B Fintech are emerging just to bring value to the traditional institutions and the 
latter are integrating to their business model many of them simultaneously. 
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By the way, within the field of M&As, some challenges were and still are to be faced by 
incumbents: first of all, still time is needed for the expected synergies to be realized and this 
implies, as seen in the literature review, post integration focus and collaboration between 
parties; but also, in some cases, acquiring a Fintech represents a bet for the bank, since these 
companies are young, do not have historical performances and can sometimes be overpaid or 
difficult to integrate. This, in our opinion, becomes particularly evident when the bank-
Fintech acquisition poses the challenge of eventually losing the most valuable asset after the 
deal, when this is the Fintech’s customer base. 
In particular, Simple’s acquisition by BBVA has rendered clear to us what such 
potential risk mean. In that acquisition, the strategic aim of buying the company in order to 
enlarge the customer base was difficult to be achieved and it is still a challenge for BBVA, in 
particular because the Fintech did not have its own banking license, as Atom, nor it had a 
value proposition designed to offer customers many value-added services in addition to the 
deposit, as for example Holvi does. In light of such risk to lose the target customer base, just 
as a consequence of the acquisition, because customers leave the Fintech proving to be 
“annoyed” by such bank-Fintech association, one could suggest that the two companies would 
have better to form a partnership, as an attempt to satisfy their needed complementarity. 
Also, Simple’s acquisition, which was not followed by an impressive growth of the 
Fintech acquired, stresses the importance of a careful evaluation to be done by the acquiring 
banks with reference to the Fintech targets. Despite the possible challenges, the M&As 
strategy has been kept on by BBVA and this also goes at the bank’s benefit in terms of 
experience, a factor which is deemed crucial for “doing tech M&As right”. 
In order to assess the existence of a significant competitive advantage of the Fintech 
target, a bank could, for example, collaborate or partner before entering the deal. This has 
been confirmed, among others, by BBVA’s acquisition of OpenPay, that followed a period in 
which the two could get in touch. 
By the way, BBVA’s deals also give evidence of the acquisitions’ benefits for banks: 
the deals brought to the parent the resources and competencies which were needed to pursue 
innovation, even human talent resources in many cases. 
Still other opportunities exist for banks entering a strategy similar to the one of BBVA; 
in particular, funding Fintech firms via a VC gives banks the possibility to explore new fields 
of technology applied to financial services, by doing many deals simultaneously (due to the 
lower prices of investments) and avoiding the risk of Fintech’s or its customers’ reluctance to 
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fall within the bank universe, which they perceive to inhibit innovation. Still, investments can 
be a way to eventually learn best practices or even be at the forefront of disruption which will 
impact the banking industry. 
Also partnerships proved to be a smart opportunity for banks, first of all to test 
collaboration and as a means to assess if a Fintech has a very unique model and competitive 
advantage, but also to launch initiatives by reducing both parties’ risk, such as the R&D 
company on biometrics launched by BBVA with a partner. 
 Finally, all of the above considerations developed through the analysis of BBVA’s case 
study, gave us reasons to better understand the role and the characters of in-house innovation 
for banks: we saw how deep is the contribution it borrows from third parties, from external 
contributors; in a nutshell, it appears to be necessarily “open” and supported by  the 
engagement with Fintech, either because banks cannot have a specialized expertise in all of 
the fields of Fintech, as instead focused Fintech people can for their class of pertinence, either 
because having internal teams dedicated to the development of new digital services does not 
ensure the banks that they will be able to realize all of the projects tested. 
Furthermore, we saw that, to be actually delivering the aimed innovation, banks have to 
reorganize themselves in terms of structures, to be ready to welcome the new activities and 
the new kinds of talents and also they should commit adequate resources before harvesting the 
results. 
Analyzing the case of BBVA has provided several examples of Fintech point of views 
and it rendered evident that these companies need to collaborate with the banks and to be 
supported in many aspects, from money to banking expertise, till regulation, etc. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In light of the above analysis, we have been able to discover what is currently happening in 
Financial Services: as we had seen in other industries, boundaries are blurring and there has 
been the entrance of new participants to a traditional sector; a disruptive wave has arrived 
there either prompted by the ability of new talented entrepreneurs to lever on new 
technologies, either fueled by the emergence of customers’ new needs and habits to be 
satisfied. As a matter of fact, these two factors, have had a huge impact in almost every 
industry in recent years and have forced firms to transform and reinvent themselves, while 
also accustomed clients to a different experience in almost every aspect of their daily life, one 
much more based on convenience, usability, engagement, full time availability and closer 
relationship offered by companies. 
However, if compared to other disruptive movements and innovations came at other 
industries, the one of Fintech in Financial Services can mainly be seen as an opportunity, 
rather than a threat for banks: this is particularly true because banks’ systemic importance is 
much greater than other companies’ within economic system, thus it is not easy to simply 
substitute them, and also due to the fact that, notwithstanding an initial phase of the Fintech 
phenomenon in which this seemed not to be true, the advent of Fintech business models does 
not come at the expense of banks’ ones, rather it is often characterized by the emergence of 
complementary models for traditional institutions. 
In summary, analyzing either banks’ and Fintech’s strengths and weaknesses, it has 
become clear that the two business models are not alternative rather, in many cases, they give 
to both parties reasons to get in touch and collaborate, at the benefit of final customers’ 
experience. In terms of capabilities, while Fintech can be the skilled digital experts focused 
on vertical niche services for the bank to be added at its core business and able to talk the 
customers’ new language, banks can be the hard-skilled ones, in particular as far as regulatory 
issues and compliance are concerned; in terms of resources, while Fintech often boast the 
support of young customers and the ownership of technological platforms or algorithms 
which the bank can integrate, banks serve large customers base and often have an 
international presence and a robust structure. 
Similar considerations, together with the assessment of how banks have been reacting to 
the Fintech phenomenon and on how have they embraced the need to innovate, also led us to 
conclude that not only a collaboration is often convenient for banks and Fintech, it is also 
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sometimes mandatory as the bank can be the back-end provider of a Fintech-designed  
experience. 
That said, the development of Fintech is not trivial and will not be a temporary trend 
without any impact in Financial Services: first of all because some Fintech have been able to 
bypass the need for banks to back themselves and, even if many of the Fintech players are 
young companies whose profitability remains to be known in the future, some became very 
well-known brands with appealing key performance indicators. Given this, and due to the 
rising ability of other participants to the industry, so-called Bigtech, to erode the banks’ 
traditional revenue streams, banks have to react and to seize the opportunities coming from 
the advent of this technological revolution; otherwise, they risk if not to be death at least to 
become “commodities”. 
So, first of all, we have seen they are attempting to change internally and to streamline 
their processes; many have learnt from the disruptors’ ability to be agile, nimble and flexible, 
and still many are trying to do it; there are several signals of greater commitment to change 
coming from banking industry, as the case of BBVA has showed us. 
But probably the greatest evidence in light of this study is that banks cannot think to do 
it alone; thus, for several reasons, if they want to go further, they have to join hands with 
Fintech firms: indeed we have seen that the development of in-house innovation is not easy 
for a complex and large organization, nor it comes without the risk for projects to fail; time 
and resources constraints force banks not to be able to explore on their own all of the Fintech 
fields; also, internal innovation flourishes and becomes eventually more effective just if it 
benefits from external contributions and from a combination of diverse talents. As a matter of 
fact, many innovative initiatives in banks need external talents to be projected and 
implemented, and a common way to do this on an ongoing base is establishing an innovation 
lab within the bank’s structure. 
This strategy is just one of the examples of how banks are trying to engage with the 
Fintech ecosystem; indeed, by analyzing some initiatives in place in Fintech which had 
involved the participation of banks (as the Fintech Innovation Lab) we can conclude that not 
only banks are willing to collaborate with disruptors but also they are often the ones which 
support their growth, through mentorship programs, investments, matching events, etc. They 
probably do this because they wish to learn from Fintech and because they recognize the 
underlying mutual opportunities. 
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Fostering the growth of innovation within Financial Services at the end comes at the 
banks’ benefit, if they are subsequently able to adopt the best practices introduced by the 
disruptors, by eventually imitating them or by forming partnerships and alliances with Fintech 
they have get in touch with.  
The supply of innovation in banks comes also with the pursuit of M&As deals with 
Fintech firms; in our analysis, these represent a still nascent but viable way for banks to adopt 
the needed innovation; in many cases banks are becoming buyers of tech-companies, 
following a trend common in many other industries. However, as seen in our dissertation, the 
M&As entail a greater level of risk and can also be more expensive than other strategies, such 
as establishing an innovation lab. 
To conclude, we can claim that banks need to be open in their approach to innovation 
and, as they wish to proactively navigate this disruption wave without being beaten, they have 
to move to the other side, if there eventually is a separation, namely the one of disruptors: 
engaging with the Fintech ecosystem is crucial for banks as it is supporting the growth of such 
new business models, in order for them to flourish within regulated and controlled fields and 
in a collaborative and complementary view with banks’ traditional activities. 
 Finally, looking at the state of the art of the Fintech development, we have tried to 
highlight which factors render a geography particularly favorable for innovation to grow 
there; such environments, of which UK is a leading example, are characterized by a 
competitive banking industry, by the presence of needed talents (spurred by the participation 
of Universities) and stakeholders (such as investors) and by the attempt of regulators to 
support the ecosystem; unfortunately we still do not see our country as part of them, even if 
Europe as a whole is moving ahead in financial services innovation. 
By the way, the exploration of some noteworthy initiatives that have been recently 
launched in Italy, with the participation of our country’s banks, led us to claim that Fintech 
opportunities could still unfold their potential in Italy in coming years. Indeed they could 
represent a way for banks to close efficiency and innovation gaps they suffered in the past and 
to stay ahead in this rise of opportunities offered by technology, if and only if they force 
themselves to commit more resources to the phenomenon, to imitate and adopt other 
countries’ benchmark initiatives and if they could benefit from a greater governmental 
support to Fintech development and to entrepreneurial projects to be established in Italy. 
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APPENDICES 
A. Personal Interview with Carlos Lopez Moctezuma - Head of New Digital 
Businesses at Bancomer and Global Director for Financial Inclusion at BBVA, 
(11th January 2018) 
 
1.A: Considering the current state of Financial Services what do you think is the role of 
Fintech within it? How much “strategic importance/centrality” would you attach, and why, to 
being able, as a bank, to expand in Fintech and to react to disruption? 
1.B: I think the Fintech ecosystem is pretty new, compared with other innovation or 
disruption in other industries. I think disruption in financial services, at least in retail 
financial services, is pretty new; we are not talking about the airlines or the travel agencies 
businesses, that changed a lot  with internet. Now, nobody goes to a physical travel agency to 
buy anything, or there are just a few that are for niche markets, very specific ones; but, the 
rest disappeared: a huge disruption came there many years ago, and maybe there is a second 
wave of disruption now, with AirBnb. All the travel industry has changed a lot and maybe this 
is the second wave we are seeing now. 
In financial services, I think there are some disruption factors in there: one is the 
adoption of mobile technology for the majority of the people. Even in emerging markets, the 
majority of the people now is using the smartphones; that’s a huge change in the way that you 
interact with different industries. That’s one important disruptor and, maybe, another reason 
why until now the Financial Services is starting to change is because the Financial Services 
industry is extremely regulated and regulation is not easy to accomplish. Many financial 
services are reserved for traditional financial institutions, because you have to accomplish 
many things in order to get a license to offer some services: deposit taking is an activity that 
is reserved, in many countries, to banks. 
And having said that, that regulatory frontier has been huge in many countries and now 
very vertical financial services are starting being offered by other participants and not by 
banks and those participants are offering vertical solutions trying to solve a specific need of 
specific people then offering value-added compared with traditional financial services in 
different parts or in different kinds of businesses: some are doing staff in payments, others are 
doing staff in lending, others are doing staff in personal finance management, and they are 
offering really added-value. 
Also, not only smaller startups are starting to emerge, but also technology companies 
are being participants in the disruption: Google, Facebook, etc.; or, in a much more 
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aggressive way, you can see the Chinese market where you have Alipay and WeChat Pay, that 
have completely changed the way in which finance has been seen: there is a change 
happening there. 
Then, how, being a bank, can you react to those changes? I think, first, you have to 
change the way in which you build the future, you have to internalize some core capabilities 
that actually you don’t have; and you can do it by yourself, like doing internal innovation, 
that’s something you can do and that’s something you should have started doing, by changing 
the way in which you design products, using agile methodologies, namely the same that 
startups are using and technology companies are using. You cannot continue building the 
future based on your brick-and-mortar branches; you have to start digitizing the offer of 
financial services. 
It is a good first step, and something you must do. But, in my opinion, that is not 
enough: you have to start interacting with those startups that are emerging and that are 
offering those specific value-added to the clients. Maybe some people could think that the 
startups are only competing with banks, that is not true; as many of them offer services that 
are complements to the services offered by banks, and that is something important, because 
maybe in some businesses, very specific businesses, you can compete with them, but in others, 
it is more about the value they can provide you and the many advantages you can provide 
them with your client base and with the services, the infrastructure you have already built. 
2.A: Talking about cooperation rather than competition between Fintech and banks is 
something becoming more common today. How do you see this interaction among the two? 
What are the main approaches used by banks to get in touch with disruptors? 
2.B: You should go into the ecosystem to talk with startups; startups are looking for two 
things: one is money, investments to grow their businesses and to validate their business 
models, and the other is clients and services and tools to validate the business model they 
have. And I think banks should participate in both, but the second one is more important than 
the first one; because money they will get it, if they have a good product, coming from 
Venture Capital Funds that are investing a lot in this kind of companies. But, a client base 
where they can really test their business model is not easy to get: if you want to do it 
organically, just with your business model, it will take them a lot of time; then, maybe, a 
catalyzer for testing faster and with real clients their products is in association with the 
banks. 
145 
 
That’s one thing that at least we in BBVA have been doing, like really testing things in 
conjunction with the startups and that’s something that, in my opinion, is a really good 
decision, you can test if the startup is really in a state where they have the systems and the 
capabilities to serve a huge client base, as the one that we have, or not, if the value they have 
is really something that you cannot replicate and you need to acquire from a third part. 
Then after testing things with them, you can decide if you invest as a strategic 
partnering, if they become your regular provider of services, or, maybe the most aggressive 
thing, is to acquire one of these startups, doing an acquisition. I think, it’s depending the 
startup, depending the size of the startup, depending if they are really providing a core 
capability that you won’t be able to build in the short run. 
Some investments have been happening with different banks investing in startups, and 
that is something good, because you are providing an exit, for some VC investors, you are 
monetizing part of the investment for the founders of these companies and you are acquiring 
these core capabilities: and, in my opinion, it is good for everybody. 
And BBVA has been maybe one of the most active banks, participating in the ecosystem 
with the startups, testing their business models and investing in them and that’s a good way to 
approach the Fintech ecosystem, being a bank. 
3.A: After acquiring a startup like these, how do you manage the integration between you and 
these very different companies? Do you use to leave them some autonomy, or should they 
instead come within the boundaries of the bank? 
3.B: I think it depends on the bank. If you are talking specifically of BBVA, the philosophy 
here is not to integrate the companies, at least at the beginning, because if not, you will be 
internalizing a core capability into a “huge elephant”, then maybe you can inhibit the 
innovation that they are creating. 
Then we think it is better to allow them to be part of the Board, sharing the Board of the 
company, but allowing them to continue doing what they know to do and to continue 
innovating, not internalizing them, because that can create bureaucracy and inhibit 
innovation. 
4.A: As far as screening and scouting of startups are concerned, do you rely on contests and 
similar initiatives you run or do you prefer to form strategic partnerships first, before entering 
an acquisition process? 
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4.B: We have had both. The one that I liked the most is: first, try to do something with them, 
then testing them, because that really shows you if they have something real for the bank. 
And, having that, you have to do traditional M&A analysis of the company. 
5.A: When you decide to proceed with the acquisition, what is the typical strategic reasoning 
that prompts the Group and who are the typical target you search for? And, as regards the 
process, what are the most important aspects of it (e.g. due diligence aspects)? What are the 
most valuable assets of Fintech for you, as a bank? 
5.B: There are different types of acquisitions, some acquisitions are more like “who you 
hire”, it is like acquiring a company for hiring the people. For example, we acquired a design 
studio for UX, that is based in California, in San Francisco. That company has nothing 
physical that you are buying, you are not buying a product; they are  offering also services to 
other industries, maybe even to other financial institutions. The present value is the culture of 
those companies; if you acquire them only for you, you are losing those characteristics from 
the company. But you are acquiring a specific capability that you don’t have, it is more like 
hiring the whole team in the company, because the rest really has not value, if you bought it. 
That’s more an acquisition for hiring the talents. You are acquiring people, you should 
have very strong incentive plan for they to stay in the company; if not, you are paying just for 
everything, but then they will have the incentive to leave and to start a new startup. You 
should create a good incentive scheme for them to stay. 
Then there are other kinds of acquisitions, that are more traditional; they are not for 
hiring people, it’s more for buying a running business, for example here in Mexico we bought 
an e-commerce company, a payment gateway company. We didn’t have that capability at the 
bank and they are very good and very fast in developing solutions for e-commerce. Then we 
bought the company, and they have a running business, they continue acquiring clients for the 
business, we are providing them additional value-added to their business they were 
developing, and they are providing us some capabilities that we didn’t have in the past. 
Then for the analysis for analyzing if you are going to acquire or not a company, you 
should take into account those things:  
 the value-added that you can provide to the company, only because it is yours, 
you are really increasing the value of the company; 
 and what they are providing to you in terms of your business; 
 and how you can continue growing in the future. 
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As I said, it is a very different approach than the first one that I mentioned before. 
6.A: If we talk, for example, about the acquisition of the design UX Studio by BBVA, what 
do you think were the synergies underlying the project? In particular, what could you, as a big 
bank, bring to this very creative startup, and what do they gave to you instead? 
6.B: We were very weak in terms of UX-design in the group, then acquiring them is providing 
experts in UX-design we didn’t have, that is helping us to running faster in terms of creating 
products and launching them into the market. They got good money from the transaction and 
a good incentive plan for staying in the company, for at least five years; then, they continue 
working there, all the founders, and it is an opportunity for them to participate in interesting 
projects, without being very worried about getting clients or more clients, because the bank is 
providing them all the flow of products and deals. 
7.A: Moving from market activities to in-house initiatives, how do you manage the change 
internally in terms of organizational structure and culture? What are some important steps 
made by and within BBVA? What are the main challenges of internal innovation process? 
7.B: Beside the ecosystem, talking about the digital transformation of the bank, for this 
transformation you should really have the head of the company committed to do it. Because it 
is not something natural for a company that has been doing a different business, a more 
traditional one. Then, if you don’t have the commitment of the top management, it will be 
really difficult to scale all the changes inside the organization, and it’ll take a lot of time. 
I think the appointment of Carlos Torres was really a sign that the President was 
committed to this: putting the Head of Digital Banking as a CEO of the bank, because he used 
to be, prior of being the CEO, the Digital Banking Head. That was a signal to show 
everybody outside and inside that the change to us was real and that we had to transform 
ourselves. 
And, of course, to make that change real in the rest of the organization takes a lot of 
time, I think we have been in these for some years and we have good results now, but then the 
transformation continues. There are some units that have not transformed yet, and continue 
doing the same, but then there are others which are really much more digital and are working 
faster creating the future. 
I think the most difficult part of a digital transformation here is that you have to 
sacrifice the current business and the current income, to build the future. Because you face 
scarcity in the resources you have and you have to allocate all your resources in the best way 
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you can. And if you just think in terms of present income, maybe you should be assigning all 
of the investment to current business and to branches, because from there you are getting 
your income. But here we took the decision of not allocating the whole of  the resources into 
the network and the branches, because we are really convinced that only if you sacrifice part 
of that income investing and creating the future in a different way, maybe you are creating a 
path that today is not giving as much money as it would if you invested in the traditional 
business, but if you didn’t do that in the future you would be disrupted by other participants. 
And, that decision of stop doing things to invest in new things is the most difficult part for the 
business; if you don’t do that, it would very difficult to be digitally transformed. 
8.A: If you had to suggest a “recipe” for innovation to big banks, would you suggest to opt for 
in-house building of innovative services or not? What are the main risk and drawbacks of not 
being open to third parties for delivering innovation? 
8.B: I think that wouldn’t be very smart. Banks have been very arrogant, thinking that they 
can develop everything that the clients need and that’s not true: you have, as I said, limited 
resources, and, even, when you want to innovate in many things you have many projects 
inside and you are not able to manage everything, you don’t have the scope to develop 
everything that the clients need. Then it’d better if you take advantage in what others are 
creating, having this mind of open innovation; in this global world where everything is 
connected, you have to be connected to the rest, if not  you will be isolated and being isolated 
diminishes your capability for really serving your clients as they would like to be served. 
The best part of the Fintech Revolution is not for the banks, is not for the startups: at 
the end, it is for the final client, because, in the end, as a client, you will have much more 
products and much more different experiences that will allow you to live your financial life in 
a better way and being much more productive. Then I think it is all useful for the consumer. 
9.A: When we talk about lacking of resources, should we consider also the often-cited  “gap” 
that banks suffered with youngest generation, in terms of talent acquisition? Is it so difficult 
for banks to attract young and tech-savvy talents, who often prefer to work for technology 
companies? 
9.B:  That’s true, maybe banks for Millennials and for the next generation are not seen as 
“sexy” to work for. But, that is changing, at least here. Here [BBVA] half of the employees 
are Millennials and that’s a good statistic. That means there are young people working within 
the bank and the attraction team, which is working with Universities and with developers and 
with young people, is trying to show the different way in which Bancomer and BBVA in 
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general is working, trying to empower people and having a more horizontal organization, 
letting people being leaders and really having the responsibility of a own project. 
For some kind of profiles, maybe, they won’t see bank “sexy” anymore, and they would 
like better working for Facebook or Google. But I think is changes and disruption are there, 
so maybe is not bad to consider a bank for them now, but it takes time to change the 
perception: only showing good products and that these banks are really changing the way in 
which they do things is a good way to convince people to come for working in a bank. 
10.A: As far as the different categories of Fintech are concerned, do you prefer to focus on 
any particular kind of Fintech only or to look at the broad spectrum of innovators, instead? 
10.B: I think there are many categories where you should pay attention and that are being 
trends: there are many things in payments, there are many things in block-chain, too, e.g. 
these are new technologies very interesting in terms of how they can changes the process of 
moving money… But I think all the different Fintech verticals are important and you should 
be aware of the new things that are arising, because maybe you think “that is not so 
important now!” but then, there, it will arise a new innovation and then you should be looking 
to what is happening in the whole ecosystem. I think this is important, then you should be 
really with your eyes open for catching all the new things that are arising. 
11.A: When you build or buy or ally and, in any case, launch a Fintech service, such as a 
platform for alternative finance, are not you scared, somehow, that the new product could 
cannibalize your traditional business/products? 
11.B: Yes, but that’s part of what I was mentioning before: “you have to sacrifice things”. 
For example, we have a platform that is called “Wibe”, it is a website and an app to buy 
auto-insurance, where you can like of personalizing the kind of insurance you want and the 
prices there are, maybe, in some cases better than the traditional prices of the other 
insurance we sell: is Wibe cannibalizing part of the BBVA’s business, here in Mexico? 
Maybe, yes; some clients could decide to buy there instead of buying in branches, and maybe 
we are cannibalizing the product with a cheaper product. But, we are also acquiring clients 
from the other insurance companies. The positive value of acquiring clients from the open 
market and of stealing those clients from the competitors is the incentive to continue the 
project, even when you know that you are cannibalizing the products. It’s like being blind to 
think that if you are not doing that, no one will do it. If you don’t come with that innovation 
somebody else will come and you will be losing market share in the future; then it would like 
not cannibalizing yourself, but waiting for others to cannibalize your business.  
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B. Secondary data collection for the case study analysis: main sources of 
information 
 
Date Author Title Content Type of 
data 
Source 
2014, 
20
th
 
Feb. 
Alden, W. BBVA Buys 
Banking 
Start-Up 
Simple for 
$117 
Million 
Deal to 
acquire 
Simple 
Article Dealbook 
[https://dealbook.n
ytimes.com/2014/0
2/20/bbva-buys-
banking-start-up-
simple-for-117-
million/?_php=true
&_type=blogs&_r
=0]
 
2014, 
20
th
 
Feb. 
BBVA 
Compass 
BBVA 
acquires 
digital 
banking 
service 
pioneer 
Simple 
BBVA 
Compass 
announces 
the deal to 
acquire 
Simple 
Company 
news 
BBVA Compass 
website 
[http://newsroom.b
bvacompass.com/
BBVA-acquires-
digital-banking-
service-pioneer-
Simple]  
2014, 
21
st
 
Feb 
Wisniewsk
i, M. 
BBVA Buys 
Simple in 
Path to 
Digital 
Transformat
ion 
BBVA’s 
acquisition of 
Simple 
Article American Banker 
[https://www.amer
icanbanker.com/ne
ws/bbva-buys-
simple-in-path-to-
digital-
transformation] 
2014, 
21
st
 
Feb. 
Crosman, 
P. 
BBVA's 
Simple 
Purchase 
Reflects 
Mobile 
Banking's 
Sizzle 
Consideratio
n about 
BBVA’s deal 
with Simple 
Article American Banker 
[https://www.amer
icanbanker.com/ne
ws/bbvas-simple-
purchase-reflects-
mobile-bankings-
sizzle ] 
2014, 
26
th
 
Feb. 
Wolman, 
D. 
The Bank 
and the 
Anti-Bank 
Drawbacks 
and 
customers’ 
concerns 
about Simple 
acquisition 
by BBVA 
Article The 
NewYorker[https:/
/www.newyorker.c
om/business/curre
ncy/the-bank-and-
the-anti-bank ] 
2014, 
06
th
 
May 
BBVA 
Compass 
BBVA 
Compass 
teams with 
OnDeck to 
bolster 
bank's small 
business 
offerings 
OnDeck and 
BBVA 
partnership 
Company 
news 
BBVA Compass 
website 
[http://newsroom.b
bvacompass.com/2
014-05-06-BBVA-
Compass-teams-
with-OnDeck-to-
bolster-banks-
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small-business-
offerings ] 
2014, 
07
th
 
May 
n.a. BBVA 
Compass 
partners 
OnDeck on 
small biz 
loans 
OnDeck and 
BBVA 
partnership 
Article Finextra 
[https://www.finex
tra.com/newsarticl
e/26044/bbva-
compass-partners-
ondeck-on-small-
biz-loans]  
2014, 
08
th
 
May 
Wisniewsk
i, M. 
Why BBVA 
Compass Is 
Sending 
Customers 
to an Online 
Rival 
Strategic 
partnership 
between 
OnDeck and 
BBVA 
Article American Banker 
[https://www.amer
icanbanker.com/ne
ws/why-bbva-
compass-is-
sending-
customers-to-an-
online-rival ] 
2014, 
04
th
 
Sept. 
Sharf, S. Simple CEO 
On How A 
Bank Can 
Be A Brand 
You Love. 
Simple 
Fintech’s 
CEO and 
CFO explain 
their startup 
mission and 
performances  
Article Forbes.com 
[https://www.forbe
s.com/sites/samant
hasharf/2014/09/0
4/under-30-
summit-simple-
ceo-on-how-a-
bank-can-be-a-
brand-you-
love/#2c14d0a673
67 ] 
2014, 
30
th
 
Oct. 
BBVA BBVA, 
Dwolla 
team up to 
offer real-
time 
payment 
innovation 
to U.S. 
Describes the 
aim of the 
partnership 
entered and 
the mutual 
openness of 
APIs between 
BBVA 
Compass and 
Dwolla 
Company 
News 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
dwolla-team-up-
to-offer-real-time-
payment-
innovation-to-u-s/ 
] 
2014, 
09
th
 
Dec. 
BBVA BBVA 
acquires big 
data startup 
Madiva 
Purchase of 
Madiva by 
BBVA 
Company 
news  
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
acquires-big-data-
startup-madiva/ ] 
2015, 
20
th
 
Jan. 
Coinbase Coinbase 
Raises 
$75M from 
DFJ 
Growth, 
USAA, 
NYSE, and 
More 
Coinbase 
announces 
the series C 
financing 
Company 
news 
Coinbase Blog 
[https://blog.coinb
ase.com/coinbase-
raises-75m-from-
dfj-growth-usaa-
nyse-and-more-
4fd3ac701646] 
2015, Cutler, K. Coinbase Coinbase Article TechCrunch 
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20
th
 
Jan. 
Confirms 
$75M Raise 
From DFJ, 
NYSE, 
Strategic 
Banking 
Partners 
raise funds 
from a group 
which boasts 
many 
financial 
institutions 
[https://techcrunch
.com/2015/01/20/c
oinbase-confirms-
75m-raise-from-
dfj-nyse-strategic-
banking-partners/] 
2015, 
21
st
 
Jan. 
Rizzo, P. BBVA: We 
Wanted to 
Better 
Understand 
the Bitcoin 
Opportunity 
Financing of 
Coinbase by 
BBVA as a 
“learning 
experience” 
Article Coindesk 
[https://www.coin
desk.com/bbva-
bitcoin-disrupt-
financial-services/ 
] 
2015, 
04
th
  
Feb. 
n.a. Half of the 
world's 
banks set to 
fall by the 
digital 
wayside – 
BBVA 
BBVA CEO 
F. Gonzalez 
on digital 
disruption 
Article Finextra 
[https://www.finex
tra.com/news/fullst
ory.aspx?newsitem
id=26965] 
2015, 
20
th
 
Feb. 
Ferreiro, C. BBVA 
Ventures 
Invests in 
Leading 
Bitcoin 
Platform 
Coinbase 
BBVA 
Ventures 
participates 
in Series C 
financing 
round of 
Coinbase 
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
ventures-invests-
in-leading-bitcoin-
platform-coinbase/ 
] 
2015, 
08
th
 
Apr. 
BBVA 
Compass 
BBVA 
Compass, 
Dwolla 
begin 
rollout of 
real-time 
bank 
transfers 
How the 
partnership 
with Dwolla 
works and 
what is it 
aimed to 
Company 
News 
BBVA Compass 
website 
[http://newsroom.b
bvacompass.com/2
015-04-08-BBVA-
Compass-Dwolla-
begin-rollout-of-
real-time-bank-
transfers#assets_1
7606_132769-
129:21366 ] 
2015, 
08
th
 
Apr. 
Roberts, D. Dwolla 
scores first 
big-bank 
partner for 
real-time 
payments 
Dwolla and 
BBVA 
partnership 
Article Fortune 
[http://fortune.com
/2015/04/08/dwoll
a-bbva-compass-
real-time-transfers/ 
] 
2015, 
10
th
 
Apr. 
Groenfeldt, 
T. 
Why Wait 
For The 
Fed? BBVA 
Compass 
And Dwolla 
Do Real-
Time 
Payments 
Dwolla and 
BBVA 
Compass 
partnership 
Article Forbes.com 
[https://www.forbe
s.com/sites/tomgro
enfeldt/2015/04/10
/why-wait-for-the-
fed-bbva-compass-
and-dwolla-do-
real-time-
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payments/#7900de
d3d896]  
2015, 
15
th
 
Apr. 
BBVA BBVA 
acquires 
leading user 
experience 
firm Spring 
Studio 
Purchase of 
SpringStudio 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
acquires-leading-
user-experience-
firm-spring-studio/ 
] 
2015, 
28
th
 
April 
González, 
F. 
Reinventing 
the 
Company 
for the 
Digital Age 
The company 
collected in a 
book 
different 
representativ
e authors’ 
perspectives 
on companies 
in current and 
digitally-
disrupted era 
Book www.bbvaopenmi
nd.com 
2015, 
04
th
 
May 
n.a. BBVA 
Appoints 
Carlos 
Torres New 
President & 
COO 
Organization
al changes in 
BBVA’s 
structure to 
pursue digital 
transformatio
n 
Article Fund Society 
[http://www.funds
society.com/en/ne
ws/appointments/b
bva-appoints-
carlos-torres-new-
president-coo ] 
2015, 
23th 
Oct. 
n.a. Banks need 
to develop 
new core 
competencie
s to survive 
- BBVA 
COO 
Torres Vila 
on BBVA’s 
internal 
pursuit for 
new 
capabilities 
Article Finextra 
[https://www.finex
tra.com/newsarticl
e/28021/banks-
need-to-develop-
new-core-
competencies-to-
survive---bbva-coo  
] 
2015, 
16
th
 
Nov. 
BBVA 
España 
La 
revolución 
de las 
pequeñas 
cosas 
It enhances 
convenience 
for mobile 
bankers 
offered by 
BBVA 
Adv. 
Campaign 
(2.287.974 
views on 
YouTube) 
YouTube  
[https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v=
Ao5S3UWqkgU ] 
2015, 
24
th
 
Nov. 
Lunden, I. UK Mobile-
Only Atom 
Bank Picks 
Up $128M 
Led By 
BBVA, 
Owner Of 
Simple In 
The U.S. 
BBVA and 
Atom 
strategic aims 
underlying 
their deal 
Article TechCrunch 
[https://techcrunch
.com/2015/11/24/u
k-mobile-only-
atom-bank-picks-
up-128m-led-by-
bbva-owner-of-
simple-in-the-u-s/]  
2015, Mullen, M. Atom and Atom’s CEO Company Atom website 
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24
th
 
Nov. 
BBVA explains 
BBVA-Atom 
deal 
news [https://www.atom
bank.co.uk/blog/20
15/11/bbva ] 
2016 Buvat, J., 
Khadikar, 
A. 
 
BBVA: 
Rebooting 
Banking for 
a Digital 
Economy 
Capgemini 
Consulting 
analysis of 
BBVA’s 
choices for 
digital 
transformatio
n 
Case study Capgemini 
Consulting 
2016, 
11
th
 
Feb. 
BBVA BBVA 
increases 
fintech fund 
to $250M
  
BBVA 
explains its 
equity 
investments 
strategy to 
fund Fintech 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
increases-fintech-
fund-250m/ ] 
2016, 
11
th
 
Feb. 
Lunden, I. BBVA Shuts 
In-House 
Venture 
Arm, Pours 
$250M Into 
New 
Fintech VC 
Propel 
Venture 
Partners 
Main reasons 
why BBVA 
created 
Propel 
Venture 
Partners 
Article Techcrunch.com 
[https://techcrunch
.com/2016/02/11/b
bva-shuts-in-
house-venture-
arm-pours-250m-
into-new-fintech-
vc-propel-venture-
partners/ ] 
2016, 
15
th
 
Feb. 
Barba, R. What's 
Behind 
Restructurin
g of BBVA's 
Fintech 
Venture 
Fund 
Comparison 
between 
Propel 
Venture 
Partners 
(BBVA) and 
InnoVentures 
(Santander) 
Article American Banker 
[https://www.amer
icanbanker.com/ne
ws/whats-behind-
restructuring-of-
bbvas-fintech-
venture-fund ] 
2016, 
15
th
 
Feb. 
Peachey, 
D. 
Seven keys 
to 
understandi
ng Propel 
and BBVA 
fintech 
investment 
Objectives 
and strategy 
beyond 
BBVA and 
Propel 
investment in 
Fintech 
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/seven-
keys-
understanding-
propel-bbva-
fintech-
investment/ ] 
2016, 
07
th
 
Mar. 
BBVA BBVA 
acquires 
Finnish 
banking 
startup 
Holvi 
Announceme
nt of Holvi 
acquisition 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
acquires-finnish-
banking-start-
holvi/ ] 
2016, 
7
th
 
Mar. 
Bergan, B. Echoes of 
Simple Deal 
Found in 
Comparison 
between 
Simple and 
Article Bank Innovation 
[https://bankinnov
ation.net/2016/03/
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BBVA’s 
Acquisition 
of Holvi 
Holvi 
acquisitions 
from BBVA 
echos-of-simple-
deal-found-in-
bbvas-acquisition-
of-holvi/ ] 
2016, 
7
th
 
Mar. 
Lunden, I. BBVA 
continues 
its fintech 
acquisition 
run, buys 
Holvi, an 
online-only 
business 
bank 
Acquisition 
of Holvi by 
BBVA  
Article TechCrunch 
[https://techcrunch
.com/2016/03/07/b
bva-continues-its-
fintech-
acquisition-run-
buys-holvi-an-
online-only-
business-bank/ ] 
2016, 
16
th
 
Mar. 
Räsänen, 
E. 
Holvi joins 
BBVA 
family of 
businesses 
Holvi joins 
BBVA 
family of 
businesses 
Company 
news 
Holvi website 
[https://blog.holvi.
com/2016/03/07/h
olvi-joins-bbva-
family-of-
businesses]  
2016, 
23
rd
 
Mar. 
Fernández 
Espinosa, 
L. 
Holvi, the 
"neobank" 
for the self-
employed 
that 
challenges 
the 
traditional 
banks 
Holvi 
business 
model and 
competitive 
advantage 
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/holvi-the-
neobank-for-the-
self-employed-
that-challenges-
the-traditional-
banks/ ] 
2016, 
28
th
 
Apr. 
Reich, J. Simple + 
BBVA 
Compass: 
We’re 
Moving! 
Simple CEO 
explains 
launch of the 
products 
which result 
by BBVA 
acquisition of 
the company 
Company 
news 
Simple website 
[https://www.simp
le.com/company/si
mple-bbva-
compass-we-re-
moving] 
2016, 
13
th
 
Jun. 
BBVA How 
traditional 
banking 
learns from 
fintechs 
Holvi’s CEO 
about how 
the deal with 
BBVA 
changed their 
vision 
Video 
interview 
https://www.bbva.
com/en/traditional-
banking-learns-
fintechs/  
2016, 
20
th
 
Jun. 
Tena, M. Fintech 
University: 
Technology 
meets 
finance at 
BBVA 
Innovation 
Center 
Event held by 
BBVA to 
support 
innovation in 
banking 
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/fintech-
university-biggest-
event-technology-
financial-experts/]  
2016, 
15
th
 
Canto, C., 
Niembro, 
BBVA 
Bancomer’s 
BBVA 
describes 
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
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Sep. M. digital 
factory, 
disruption 
in the way 
of working 
how 
dedicated 
teams apply 
agile 
methodologie
s to boost 
innovation 
com/en/bbva-
bancomers-digital-
factory-disruption-
way-working/]  
2016, 
30th 
Nov. 
BBVA Francisco 
González: 
"The years 
ahead are 
going to be 
incredible 
for BBVA" 
BBVA 
Global 
Executive 
Chairman 
Francisco 
González 
analyzes the 
state of the 
art of 
banking and 
the impact of 
technology 
on society 
Video 
Interview / 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/francisco-
gonzalez-years-
ahead-going-
incredible-bbva/ ] 
2016, 
23
rd
  
Dec.  
BBVA BBVA buys 
Openpay, a 
Mexican 
online 
payments 
startup 
Company 
announces 
signing for 
OpenPay 
startup 
acquisition 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-buys-
openpay-mexican-
online-payments-
startup/] 
2017, 
10
th
 
Jan. 
BBVA BBVA’s 
new tagline: 
'Creating 
Opportuniti
es' 
Brand’s new 
strategy: 
tagline and 
new 
purpose/visio
n  
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbvas-
new-slogan-
creating-
opportunities/ ] 
2017, 
03
th
 
Mar. 
BBVA BBVA 
strengthens 
its 
commitment 
to U.K.’s 
Atom Bank 
 BBVA joins 
another 
financing 
round in 
Atom 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
strengthens-
commitment-u-k-
s-atom-bank/ ] 
2017, 
03
th
 
Mar. 
Lunden, I. Atom Bank 
raises 
$102M at 
$320M 
valuation 
for a 
mobile-only 
bank for 
millennials 
BBVA joins 
another 
financing 
round in 
Atom 
Article TechCrunch 
[https://techcrunch
.com/2017/03/03/a
tom-bank-102-
million/] 
2017, 
24
th
 
Apr. 
Peña 
Álvarez, 
M. 
BBVA 
advances its 
fintech 
strategy 
with the 
Synergies 
behind 
BBV’s 
acquisition of 
OpenPay 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
advances-fintech-
strategy-
157 
 
acquisition 
of Openpay 
acquisition-
openpay/ ] 
2017, 
25
th
 
Apr. 
n.a. BBVA steps 
up fintech 
acquisition 
strategy 
with 
purchase of 
Openpay 
What is 
OpenPay and 
why BBVA 
bought it 
Article Finextra 
[https://www.finex
tra.com/newsarticl
e/30478/bbva-
steps-up-fintech-
acquisition-
strategy-with-
purchase-of-
openpay?via=inde
xdotco ] 
2017, 
13
th
 
Jun. 
BBVA Trust·u, 
funding 
with a little 
help from 
your friends 
About 
alternative 
funding 
platform 
launched by 
BBVA 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/trustu-
funding-little-help-
friends/]  
2017, 
26
th
 
Jun. 
n.a. Veridas, the 
new 
biometrics 
company of 
BBVA and 
Das-Nano 
Das-Nano 
and BBVA 
launch a 
biometric 
company 
Company 
news 
Das-Nano website 
[http://www.das-
nano.com/2017/06
/26/veridas-the-
new-biometrics-
company-of-bbva-
and-das-nano/ ] 
2017, 
13
th
 
Jul. 
BBVA BBVA, the 
best mobile 
banking 
service in 
the world 
BBVA 
mobile 
banking app 
ranked first 
in global 
mobile 
banking 
apps’ 
competition: 
comment on 
the result and 
underlying 
strategy 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-best-
mobile-banking-
world/]  
2017, 
07
th 
Aug. 
n.a. Chase 
extends 
relationship 
with 
OnDeck 
BBVA’s 
competitor 
JPMorgan 
partners with 
OnDeck 
Article Finextra 
[https://www.finex
tra.com/pressarticl
e/70308/chase-
extends-
relationship-with-
ondeck ] 
2017, 
16
th
 
Aug. 
Rado 
Quirós, M. 
BBVA Open 
Talent: 
creating 
opportunitie
s since 2009 
BBVA’s 
initiative to 
fuel 
entrepreneurs
hip  
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
open-talent-
creating-
opportunities-
2009/ ] 
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2017, 
14
th
 
Oct. 
n.a. BBVA, a 
Spanish 
bank, 
reinvents 
itself as a 
digital 
business 
BBVA’s 
vision to 
learn from 
Fintech 
“nimbleness” 
Article The Economist 
2017, 
15
th
 
Oct. 
Tuyyo Introducing 
Tuyyo: Send 
money, stay 
connected 
Tuyyo 
service is 
explained 
Video Youtube “Tuyyo - 
Provided By 
BBVA Transfer 
Services” channel 
[https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v=
pBZ7WpiCYSo&f
eature=youtu.be ]  
2017, 
18
th
 
Oct. 
BBVA BBVA aims 
to shake up 
the global 
remittance 
market with 
launch of 
Tuyyo 
Launch of a 
Fintech 
service for 
international 
remittances 
by BBVA 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-aims-
shake-global-
remittance-market-
launch-tuyyo/ ] 
2017, 
19
th
 
Oct. 
Semple, C. "We must 
innovate to 
survive” 
Carlos Torres 
Vila’s view 
on need to 
innovate 
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbvas-ceo-
says-must-
innovate-survive/ ] 
2017, 
25
th
 
Oct. 
BBVA Transformat
ion with 
disruption: 
BBVA’s 
formula for 
digital 
success 
Live@BBVA 
event’s 
evidences: 
BBVA takes 
its employees 
on the field 
of digital 
transformatio
n 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/transformi
ng-disruption-
bbvas-digital-
recipe/ ] 
2017, 
16
th
 
Nov. 
Semple, C. BBVA 
closing in 
on another 
critical 
digital 
banking 
target 
BBVA’s 
milestones 
and 
significant 
KPI in terms 
of 
transformatio
n completion 
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-
closing-another-
critical-digital-
banking-target/ ] 
2017, 
17
th
 
Nov. 
BBVA BBVA Open 
Summit 
2017 - Why 
Open 
Innovation? 
Meet 
BBVA’s 
CEO and 
CEO and 
Head of 
Customer 
Solutions 
describe 
importance 
and modes of 
open 
Video 
interview 
Youtube “BBVA 
Open Innovation” 
channel 
[https://www.yout
ube.com/watch?v=
uFrw71AZcE4&fe
ature=youtu.be] 
159 
 
Head of CS innovation at 
BBVA 
2017, 
18
th
 
Dec. 
Fernández 
Espinosa, 
L. 
BBVA wins 
award for 
its support 
for 
European 
startups 
The SEP 
awards 
BBVA open 
innovation 
strategy, the 
bank explains 
benefits of 
collaboration 
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/bbva-wins-
award-its-support-
european-startups/ 
] 
2017, 
22
nd
 
Dec. 
Anderson, 
C. 
The 
important 
role 
branches 
play in 
digital 
transformati
on 
How BBVA 
is giving 
branches a 
new leading 
role 
Article BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/important-
role-branches-
play-digital-
transformation/]  
2018, 
23
rd
 
Jan. 
n.a. Coinbase 
Reportedly 
Tops $1B In 
Revenue 
Coinbase 
performances 
attract many 
investors’ 
interest 
Article Pymnts.com 
[https://www.pym
nts.com/blockchai
n/bitcoin/2018/coi
nbase-investors-
funding-bitcoin-
crypto-exchange/]  
2018, 
09
th
 
Feb. 
BBVA Understandi
ng BBVA’s 
digital 
deliveries in 
2017 
BBVA 
communicate 
its main 
digital 
deliveries of 
2017, such as 
the launch of 
Tuyyo or 
Trust-u, etc. 
Company 
news 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/understand
ing-bbvas-digital-
deliveries-2017/ ] 
n.a. OnDeck OnDeck 
2015 
Annual 
Report 
OnDeck 
reports 2015 
results and its 
business 
model 
functioning 
Annual 
Report 
OnDeck website  
n.a. n.a. Organizatio
nal 
structure 
BBVA 
describes its 
inner 
organizationa
l structure in 
terms of key 
divisions 
Company 
Info 
BBVA website 
[https://www.bbva.
com/en/corporate-
information/organi
gram/ ] 
n.a. Solodkiy, 
V. 
Money of 
the Future – 
Results of 
2016 
Trends for 
Analysis of 
the Fintech 
ecosystem 
and news on 
cases 
Report Life SREDA 
Venture Capital [ 
http://sreda.vc/wp-
content/uploads/20
17/11/MOTF_engl
160 
 
2017 (BBVA, 
Atom, Holvi, 
Simple) 
ish.pdf ] 
 
  
161 
 
Bibliography 
 
ACCENTURE, (2016). Beyond the Everyday Bank [online]. Available at: 
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-10/Accenture-Banking-Beyond-Everyday-
Bank-pdf.pdf  
BANCA D’ITALIA, (2017). Fintech in Italia Indagine conoscitiva sull’adozione delle 
innovazioni tecnologiche applicate ai servizi finanziari [online]. Available at: 
https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/vigilanza/analisi-sistema/stat-banche-
intermediari/Fintech_in_Italia_2017.pdf  
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, (BIS) (2017). 87
th
 annual report 2016/17
 [online]. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2017e_ec.pdf  
Barba Navaretti, G., Calzolari, G. Pozzolo, A. F., (2017). FinTech and Banks: Friends or 
Foes?. European Economy. Available at: http://european-economy.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/EE_2.2017-2.pdf   
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, (BCBS) (2017). Sound Practices: 
Implications of fintech developments for banks and bank supervisors – Consultative 
Document [online]. Available at: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d415.pdf 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, (BCBS) (2011). Basel III: A global 
regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems [online]. Available 
at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, (BCBS) (2006). International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards - A Revised Framework 
Comprehensive Version [online]. Available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf 
BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, (BCBS) (1988). International 
convergence of capital measurement and capital standards [online]. Available at https:/
/www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf 
Beinker, N. (2017). Foreword. In:  Owens, John Vincent; Wilhelm, Lisa. 2017. Alternative 
data transforming SME finance. Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/701331497329509915/Alternative-data-
transforming-SME-finance 
Bradley, J., Loucks, J., Macaulay, J., Noronha, A., & Wade, M. (2015). Digital Vortex - How 
Digital Disruption Is Redefining Industries - Global Center for Digital Business 
Transformation: An IMD and Cisco initiative [online].  Available at: 
162 
 
https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/solutions/collateral/industry-solutions/digital-
vortex-report.pdf  
Busch, W., & Moreno, J. P. (2014). Banks’ new competitors: Starbucks, google, and 
alibaba. Harvard Business Review, 2, 1-3. 
CAPGEMINI, (2017a). Top Ten Trends in Banking - 2017 What you need to know. [online]. 
Available at https://www.capgemini.com/resources/top-ten-trends-in-banking-2017 
CAPGEMINI, (2017b). World Fintech Report 2017. [online]. Available at https://www.capge
mini.com/the-world-Fintech-report-2017 
Carney, M (2017). The promise of Fintech – something new under the sun?. [speech]. 
Deutsche Bundesbank G20 Conference on “Digitising finance, financial inclusion and 
financial literacy”. Wiesbaden, 25th January. Available at: http://www.bankofengland.co
.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech956.pdf 
CB INSIGHTS, (2014). “The Periodic Table of Fin Tech”. [webpage]. Available at: 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/fin-tech-periodic-table/ 
Chesbrough, H. W. (2007). Why companies should have open business models. MIT Sloan 
management review, 48(2), 22. 
CHISHTI S., BARBERIS J., (2016) The Fintech Book: The Financial Technology Handbook 
for Investors, Entrepreneurs and Visionaries. Wiley 
Chuen, Kuo D. L., & Teo, E. G. (2015). Emergence of FinTech and the LASIC 
principles. The Journal of Financial Perspectives. 3(3), 24-36. 
CNBC Life, (2017) The Finance Sector (B2C) | I.O.T. Powering The Digital Economy. 
[online interview]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BK8qOs1fl6c  
Cockerton, C. (2016). Nurturing New FinTech Communities. In CHISHTI S., BARBERIS J., 
(2016) The Fintech Book: The Financial Technology Handbook for Investors, 
Entrepreneurs and Visionaries. Wiley 
COMMITTEE ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (CGFS) & THE FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD (FSB), (2017). FinTech credit. [online]. Bank for International 
Settlements and Financial Stability Board. Available at: http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/CGFS-FSB-Report-on-FinTech-Credit.pdf  
Cordeiro, T. (2016) Design is No Longer an Option – User Experience (UX) in Fintech. In 
CHISHTI S., BARBERIS J., (2016) The Fintech Book: The Financial Technology 
Handbook for Investors, Entrepreneurs and Visionaries. Wiley 
163 
 
D'aveni, R. A. (2010). Hypercompetition. Simon and Schuster 
DELOITTE, (2017). A tale of 44 cities - Connecting Global FinTech: Interim Hub Review 
2017. [online] Available at: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Docum
ents/Innovation/deloitte-uk-connecting-global-fintech-hub-federation-innotribe-
innovate-finance.pdf 
Dietz M., HV V., Lee G. (2016) Bracing for seven critical changes as fintech matures. 
McKinsey & Company [online]. Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/fin
ancial-services/our-insights/bracing-for-seven-critical-changes-as-fintech-
matures?cid=other-eml-alt-mip-mck-oth-1611 
Dietz M., Lemerle M., Mehta A., Sengupta J., Zhou N. (2017) Remaking the bank for an 
ecosystem world. McKinsey & Company [online]. Available at: https://www.mckinsey.
com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/remaking-the-bank-for-an-ecosystem-
world 
Edelman R., (2017). An Implosion of Trust. [online]. Available at: https://www.edelman.com/
p/6-a-m/an-implosion-of-trust/ 
EDELMAN, (2017a). 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer [online]. Available at: 
https://www.edelman.com/global-results/ 
EDELMAN, (2017b). 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer – Financial Services [online]. 
Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsights/2017-edelman-trust-
barometer-financial-services-results 
EDELMAN, (2017c). 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer – Trust and the Technology Sector: An 
Industry at a Crossroads [online]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/EdelmanInsi
ghts/2017-edelman-trust-barometer-technology 
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,  (ECB) (2017). Annual Report 2016. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annrep/ar2016en.pdf 
EY, (2016). UK Fintech on the cutting edge An evaluation of the international Fintech sector. 
[online]. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-Fintech-on-the-
cutting-edge 
EY, (2016b) China and U.K. FinTech, Unlocking opportunity, A guidebook to building a 
leading partnership between the China and U.K. FinTech sectors [online]. Available at: 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-china-and-uk-fintech-unlocking-
opportunity/$FILE/ey-china-and-uk-fintech-unlocking-opportunity.pdf 
Gandel, S. (2016). Citigroup does 'Fintech'. Fortune, 174(1), 56-62. 
164 
 
Gnirck, M. & Visser, G. (2016). Singapore, the FinTech Hub for Southeast Asia.  In 
CHISHTI S., BARBERIS J., (2016) The Fintech Book: The Financial Technology 
Handbook for Investors, Entrepreneurs and Visionaries. Wiley 
GPFI Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, (2017). 2017 G20 Financial Inclusion 
Action Plan. Available at: https://www.gpfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/2017%20
G20%20Financial%20Inclusion%20Action%20Plan%20final.pdf 
Gulamhuseinwala, I., Hatch, M. &  Lloyd, J. (2017). EY FinTech Adoption Index 2017 – The 
rapid emergence of FinTech. [online]. Available at: http://www.ey.com/Publication/vw
LUAssets/ey-fintech-adoption-index-2017/$FILE/ey-fintech-adoption-index-2017.pdf 
Gulamhuseinwala, I., Bull, T., & Lewis, S. (2015). FinTech is gaining traction and young, 
high-income users are the early adopters. The Journal of Financial Perspectives, 3(3), 
16-23. 
H2 VENTURES & KPMG, (2017). “2017 FINTECH 100 Leading Global Fintech 
Innovators” [online]. Available at: https://h2.vc/reports/fintechinnovators/2017 
Haas, S. & Bierbaumer, R. (2016). Vienna as the No. 1 FinTech Hub in Mobile Payments? In 
CHISHTI S., BARBERIS J., (2016) The Fintech Book: The Financial Technology 
Handbook for Investors, Entrepreneurs and Visionaries. Wiley 
INNOVATE FINANCE, (2017). The H1 2017 VC FinTech Investment [online]. Available at: 
https://www.slideshare.net/innovatefinance/the-h1-2017-vc-fintech-investment-
landscape-by-innovate-finance 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (IOSCO), 
(2017). IOSCO Research Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech) [online]. 
Available at: https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf 
Juengerkes, B. E. (2016). FinTechs and Banks – Collaboration is Key. In CHISHTI S., 
BARBERIS J., (2016) The Fintech Book: The Financial Technology Handbook for 
Investors, Entrepreneurs and Visionaries. Wiley 
Kengelbach J., Keienburg G., Schmid T., Sievers S., Gjerstad K., Nielsen J., Walker D. The 
2017 M&A Report: The Technology Takeover. BCG. Available at: http://image-
src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-The-Technology-Takeover-Sep-2017_tcm81-172639.pdf  
KPGM, (2017a). The Pulse of Fintech Q3 2017 [online]. Available at: https://assets.kpmg.co
m/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/11/pulse-of-fintech-q3-17.pdf 
KPMG & CB INSIGHTS, (2016a). The Pulse of Fintech, Q3 2016 [online]. Available at: http
s://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/11/the-pulse-of-fintech-q3-
report.pdf  
165 
 
KPMG & CB INSIGHTS, (2016b). The Pulse of Fintech, 2015 in Review[online]. Available a
t: https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/03/the-pulse-of-fintech.pdf  
KPMG, (2017b). Value of Fintech. [online] Available at https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam
/kpmg/uk/pdf/2017/10/value-of-Fintech.pdf  
Laven, M., & Bruggink, D. (2016). How FinTech is transforming the way money moves 
around the world: An interview with Mike Laven. Journal of Payments Strategy & 
Systems, 10(1), 6-12. 
Longo, M. (2017). “Serve un Testo Unico europeo del Fintech”. Il Sole 24 Ore, 29/11/2017 
Lopez Moctezuma, C. Head New Digital Businesses at Bancomer and Global Director for 
Financial Inclusion at BBVA. (Personal Interview, 11
th
 January 2018) [Appendix A] 
Lorenzoni, G., & Baden-Fuller, C. (1995). Creating a strategic center to manage a web of 
partners. California management review, 37(3), 146-163. 
McGrath, R. G. (2013). The end of competitive advantage: How to keep your strategy moving 
as fast as your business. Harvard Business Review Press. 
McGuinness, C. (2017). Foreword. In: KPMG, (2017). Value of Fintech. [online] Available at
 https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/uk/pdf/2017/10/value-of-Fintech.pdf  
Mead W. (2016) Banking and the E-book Moment. In CHISHTI S., BARBERIS J., (2016) 
The Fintech Book: The Financial Technology Handbook for Investors, Entrepreneurs 
and Visionaries. Wiley 
Meinert, M. C. (2017), 'Making Friends with Fintech: Strategies for successful bank-fintech 
partnerships', ABA Banking Journal, 109, 5, pp. 32-33 
Meré, F. (2016) Why Am I Not Gonna Be Able to Enter a Bank?. In CHISHTI S., BARBERIS 
J., (2016) The Fintech Book: The Financial Technology Handbook for Investors, 
Entrepreneurs and Visionaries. Wiley 
Olson, P. (2016). Buy now, Pay later. Forbes, 198, 7, pp.88-96. 
Owens, John Vincent; Wilhelm, Lisa. 2017. Alternative data transforming SME finance. 
Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/c
urated/en/701331497329509915/Alternative-data-transforming-SME-finance 
Porter, M. E. (2008). The five competitive forces that shape strategy. Harvard business 
review, 86(1), 25-40. 
Rogers, E. M. (2003). Diffusion of innovations. Free Press. New York, 551. 
166 
 
Salesky J. Providing a frictionless banking experience: What banks can learn from apple. ABA
 Banking Journal. 2017;109(1):38. 
Schwab K., 2016. The Fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond. [online]. 
World Economic Forum. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-
fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/ 
Skinner, C. (2017) “Build or buy, or build and die?” [online]. Available at: 
https://banknxt.com/61053/build-or-buy/ 
Snyder, N. (2015), 'The Innovation Game', Bank Director, 25, 3, pp. 51-54 
Sonea, A. (2016) So, You Think the Innovation Lab is the Answer?. In CHISHTI S., 
BARBERIS J., (2016) The Fintech Book: The Financial Technology Handbook for 
Investors, Entrepreneurs and Visionaries. Wiley 
THE ECONOMIST. (2017) Ten years on. A decade after the financial crisis, how are the wor
ld’s banks doing?. Special Report 
Vermeulen, P. (2004). Managing product innovation in financial services firms. European 
Management Journal, 22(1), 43-50. 
Wardrop, R., Rosenberg, R., Zhang, B., Ziegler, T., Squire, R., Burton, J., Arenas Hernandez, 
E. & Garvey, K. (2016). Breaking New Ground–The Americas Alternative Finance 
Benchmark Report. Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance. 
WORLD BANK GROUP, The Global Findex Database 2014 Measuring Financial Inclusion 
around the World. (2015), available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/187
761468179367706/pdf/WPS7255.pdf#page=3 
 
Sitography 
 
http://interbrand.com 
http://propel.vc/ 
http://searchcio.techtarget.com/ 
http://startupeuropepartnership.eu/ 
https://addepar.com/ 
https://blockchain.info/ 
https://blog.google/topics/shopping-payments/ 
https://british-business-bank.co.uk/  
https://fundersclub.com/ 
https://investor.paypal-corp.com/index.cfm 
167 
 
https://new.innovatefinance.com/  
https://stripe.com/about 
https://techcrunch.com/  
https://transferwise.com/it/ 
https://trends.google.it/trends/ 
https://www.advicerobo.com  
https://www.antfin.com/ 
https://www.applicoinc.com/ 
https://www.atombank.co.uk/  
https://www.avant.com/ 
https://www.bankofamerica.com/ 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/  
https://www.bloomberg.com/europe 
https://www.cbinsights.com/ 
https://www.coinbase.com/  
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
https://www.creditkarma.com/ 
https://www.crunchbase.com/ 
https://www.dwolla.com/ 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/index.en.html 
https://www.etoro.com/ 
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox 
https://www.gsma.com 
https://www.insikt.com/#/  
https://www.investopedia.com 
https://www.kabbageplatform.com/  
https://www.kensho.com/  
https://www.klarna.com 
https://www.quantopian.com/about 
https://www.robinhood.com/ 
https://www.sofi.com/home-3  
https://www.wealthsimple.com/en-ca/ 
www.bbvaopenmind.com  
www.InvestCloud.com 
www.JPMorganChase.com 
168 
 
www.kabbage.com 
www.unicreditgroup.eu 
 
